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Abstract 
 
The emergence and rapid growth of the private security industry in the 1990s followed from 
the downsizing of the armed forces in the aftermath of the Cold War and the development of 
new security threats which increased demand for military manpower and expertise. This has 
led to a redefinition of security strategies and the restructuring of armed forces by Western 
governments, which has resulted in the elimination of non-core activities from the functions 
of many armed forces. Recently it has been argued that the private security industry can 
challenge what previously was believed to be a primary responsibility of states, namely to 
take on peacebuilding initiatives and support to other peace operations.  
 
This study seeks to assess the impact of the private security industry in peacebuilding efforts 
in African conflicts. The study suggests that the private security industry have taken on a 
much stronger role in conflicts world wide since the 1990s, and that its activities have 
significantly changed. Companies such as MPRI and DynCorp have managed to keep close 
contact with their home governments, which arguably has been a crucial factor to their 
growing business. Furthermore, the private security industry have sought to distance itself 
from the negative connotations associated with mercenaries and the activities of companies 
such as Executive Outcomes in the 1990s, by avoiding operations involving elements of direct 
combat. This has been illustrated through the extensive case study of the activities of three 
private military and security companies: Executive Outcomes, MPRI and DynCorp. 
Furthermore, this thesis has confirmed an increased presence of the United States on the 
African continent post-9/11, illustrated by the presence of American-based private military 
and security companies which arguably are being used as proxies for US foreign policy 
purposes.  
 
Furthermore, this study has discussed the various implications the private security industry 
has on the traditional notion of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. This thesis 
has argued that the legitimate use to exercise violence is in the process of devolution from 
governments to other actors, which the extensive growth of the private security industry 
illustrates. Additionally, it has been argued that the privatisation of military and security 
services can harm the reliable delivery of essential services in conflict. Furthermore, the 
findings of this thesis has highlighted the dilemma that many countries do not want stricter 
regulation or elimination of the private security industry for the reason that these companies 
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are viewed as valuable assets in fulfilling foreign policy objectives that for various reasons 
cannot be fulfilled by national armies. 
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Opsomming  
 
Die opkoms en vinnige groei van die privaatsekuriteitsbedryf in die 1990s was die gevolg van 
die afskaling van gewapende magte in die nasleep van die Koue Oorlog en die ontwikkeling 
van nuwe sekuriteitsbedreigings, wat die aanvraag na militêre arbeidskragte en kundigheid 
verhoog het. Dit het aanleiding gegee tot ’n herdefiniëring van sekuriteitstrategieë en die 
herstrukturering van gewapende magte deur Westerse regerings, met die gevolg dat nie-
kernaktiwiteite van die funksies van talle gewapende magte uitgesluit is. Daar is onlangs 
aangevoer dat die privaatsekuriteitsbedryf aanspraak kan maak op ’n funksie wat voorheen as 
die primêre verantwoordelikheid van regerings beskou is, naamlik om vredesinisiatiewe en 
steun aan ander vredesverrigtinge te onderneem.  
 
Die doel van hierdie studie was om die impak van die privaatsekuriteitsbedryf in 
vredesinisiatiewe in Afrika-konflikte te assesseer. Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat die 
privaatsekuriteitsbedryf sedert die 1990’s ’n baie groter rol in wêreldwye konflikte gespeel 
het, en dat die aktiwiteite van hierdie bedryf aanmerklik verander het. Maatskappye soos 
MPRI en DynCorp was suksesvol daarin om nabye kontak met hul tuisregerings te behou, wat 
stellig ’n deurslaggewende faktor in hul groeiende besighede was. Voorts het die 
privaatsekuriteitsbedryf gepoog om hom te distansieer van die negatiewe konnotasies wat met 
huursoldate en die aktiwiteite van maatskappye soos Executive Outcomes in die 1990’s 
geassosieer is deur bedrywighede wat elemente van direkte stryd inhou, te vermy. Hierdie 
poging is geïllustreer deur die omvattende gevallestudie van die aktiwiteite van drie privaat 
militêre en sekuriteitsmaatskappye: EO, MPRI en DynCorp. Die bevindinge van die studie 
bevestig voorts die Verenigde State van Amerika (VSA) se toenemende teenwoordigheid op 
die Afrika-vasteland ná 9/11, wat duidelik blyk uit die teenwoordigheid van Amerikaans-
gebaseerde privaat militêre en sekuriteitsmaatskappye wat stellig as volmag gebruik word vir 
die VSA se buitelandsebeleidsdoelstellings.  
 
Die verskeie implikasies van die privaatsekuriteitsbedryf vir die tradisionele siening van die 
regerings se monopolie ten opsigte van die wettige gebruik van magte word ook in die studie 
bespreek. Daar word aangevoer dat die wettige gebruik van geweld in die proses van 
devolusie is vanaf regerings na ander rolspelers, wat deur die omvattende groei van die 
privaatsekuriteitsbedryf bevestig word. Daar word verder ook beweer dat die privatisering van 
 v
militêre en sekuriteitsdienste die betroubare lewering van noodsaaklike dienste tydens konflik 
kan benadeel. Die studie se bevindinge werp ook lig op die dilemma dat talle lande strenger 
regulering of uitskakeling van die privaatsekuriteitsbedryf teëstaan omdat hierdie 
maatskappye beskou word as waardevolle bates in die bereiking van 
buitelandsebeleidsdoelwitte, wat vir verskeie redes nie deur nasionale leërs bereik kan word 
nie. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Problem statement 
The rise of the private security industry (PSI) has been cemented in modern global political 
reality. Post-colonial Africa is often considered the origin of the modern mercenary and 
certainly exemplifies the potential for privately sponsored military activities within unstable 
states (McFate, 2008a: 118). Over the past two decades, the role of the private sector in 
security has grown both larger and fundamentally different than it has been since the 
foundation of the modern state (Avant, 2008: 1). Recently it has been argued that the private 
security industry can challenge what previously was believed to be a primary responsibility of 
states, namely to perform peacebuilding activities and peacekeeping operations (Brooks, 
2000a, 2000b; Bures, 2008; Singer, 2008: 183).  
 
Much of the literature on the involvement of the private security industry in Africa has 
focused on the role of private military companies (PMCs) such as Executive Outcomes (EO) 
and Sandline International in Sierra Leone and Angola, and the likes of mercenaries such as 
Mike Hoare and Simon Mann (Aning, Jaye and Atuobi, 2008: 613; Cleaver, 2000: 134-135; 
Musah, 2002: 912). However, it is crucial to recognise that the contemporary role of private 
military actors on the continent differs significantly from that in the late 1990s. Today, the 
military functions of the state are increasingly being transferred to non-state entities. This is 
consistent with a decreasing political will amongst both wealthy and poor states to sustain 
those financial and other costs embodied in the maintenance of a monopoly on the use of 
violence (Patterson, 2009: 92). Following this, the legitimate use of force is in the process of 
devolution from governments to other actors, which the extensive growth of the private 
security industry illustrates. Recent literature has focused on the potential role of the private 
security industry in peacekeeping operations. This follows the increasing importance of 
humanitarian response since the end of the Cold War1 and the subsequent development of 
increased outsourcing of support functions in peacekeeping operations. Since the early 1990s 
the private security industry has taken on a much stronger role in conflicts world wide. This is 
most evident in developing countries, but also in Western countries in support of their global 
                                                 
1 The Cold War refers to the period between the end of the Second World War and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. The Cold War originated from an ideological conflict between capitalism and socialist 
communism, which manifested itself through conflicts and wars by proxy, in which the United States and the 
Soviet Union backed opposing sides in what was viewed as strategic countries in the developing world (Adebajo, 
2005: 175-176).   
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military operations which include interventions, peacekeeping, peace-support, and conflict 
and post-conflict operations (O’Brien, 2007: 54).  
 
This research project seeks to build on the literature of the private security industry in order to 
assess its impact in peacebuilding efforts in African conflicts. The study will look at the cases 
of the companies Executive Outcomes, Military Professional Resources, Incorporated (MPRI) 
and DynCorp in order to illustrate the changing role of the private security industry and the 
wide range of activities the companies within it offers. Furthermore, this research aims to 
analyse the increased importance and impact of non-state actors, illustrated by private military 
and security companies, within peacebuilding efforts in Africa. This research will focus 
specifically on post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives such as the military training of African 
forces by MPRI and DynCorp. However, aspects of peace enforcement will be discussed 
when assessing the impacts of Executive Outcomes, seeing that this was among the South 
African-based company’s key activities.  
 
1.2. Research question and objectives 
The purpose of the research is to bring insight into the development of the activities of the 
private security industry on the African continent. Furthermore, it is also to critically explore 
the trends of outsourcing non-core military functions and the increased role played by the 
private security industry, particularly in United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) 
peacekeeping operations in Africa. The overall research question of this study is the 
following: What is the impact of the private security industry on peacebuilding efforts in 
African conflicts? 
 
Very few African states have effective regulatory frameworks that are aimed at addressing the 
phenomenon of private security. There is an overwhelming agreement in the literature that 
there is a great need for regulation and control of the private security industry at the national, 
regional and international level (Gumedze, 2009; Lilly, 2000a; Singer, 2008). Thus, assessing 
the impact and development of the private security industry in peacebuilding efforts in 
African conflicts is crucial in order to determine what steps should be taken for the future 
regulation of this industry. Previous MA studies have focused specifically on the regulation of 
private military and security companies by comparing the South African regulatory 
framework to domestic regulation in the United States of America (USA) and the United 
Kingdom (UK), as well as to international conventions. However, this research does not 
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specifically seek to analyse the current regulatory framework of the private security industry, 
but rather the implications for the allocation of legitimate authority that is entailed by the 
growth of the industry. Furthermore, earlier MA studies have focused solely on the activities 
of Executive Outcomes, thereby not adequately addressing the crucial influence of American-
based private military and security companies following the increased US presence on the 
continent, specifically post-9/112. This research attempts to address this gap, and to assess the 
changing nature of private military and security companies, from Executive Outcomes to the 
more recent activities of MPRI and DynCorp. The continued growth and development of the 
private security industry has become vital in the last decade. While Executive Outcomes had a 
major impact in several conflicts in Africa during the 1990s, US-based private military and 
security companies have become increasingly influential. Today’s private military and 
security companies tend to be hired by donor governments to perform activities such as the 
training of African state militaries, peacekeeping activities and post-conflict reconstruction, 
rather than the approach of the seemingly ‘direct’ military involvement of Executive 
Outcomes. The companies tend to be entrenched in the military and administrative structures 
of both the donor and recipient state, and thereby exercise their power within these structures. 
According to Aning et al. (2008), this does not necessarily change the political impact of the 
private security industry: however, it does essentially change the manner in which it needs to 
be analysed. It is also important to understand how these companies have become part of a 
broader corporate structure in order to be able to regulate them in the future.  
 
Furthermore, this research will have the following sub-question: What implication does the 
private security industry have on the traditional notion of the state’s monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force? 
 
Robert Mandel argues that “the fundamental underlying question surrounding the 
privatization of security is who has, and who should have, the legitimate authority to use the 
physical coercion in pursuit of security” (Mandel, 2002: 29). The structure of the nation-state, 
reinforced by the concept of sovereignty, has control over the use of force at its core. The 
ultimate symbol of the sovereignty of a nation is often perceived to be precisely its ability to 
monopolise the means of violence and maintain military forces. Mandel argues that the 
justification for this exclusive government coercion has perhaps been the protection of human 
                                                 
2 9/11 refers to a series of coordinated suicide attacks by the terrorist network al-Qaeda in the United States on 
September 11, 2001 (Aning et al.,2008: 622; Brooks, 2002: 13). 
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life, although, historically motivations such as keeping the regime in power seem to have 
taken priority (Mandel, 2002: 29-30). The problem in analysing the source of legitimate 
authority to make use of coercion originates from the “clouding of temporal standards relative 
to today’s global setting” (Mandel, 2002: 30). The current international norms make it 
difficult to decide what sets of regulations or uses of military coercion are appropriate 
according to universally acknowledged historical principles. However, with the rise in power 
of well-respected transnational and sub-national groups offering security services similar in 
quality to those provided by governments, there is a growing opinion that the distinction 
between public and private security is becoming increasingly arbitrary (Mandel, 2002: 30).  
 
1.3. Background and literature review 
The 1990s witnessed the increasing use of private military and security companies in a 
number of contexts within conflicts. In Africa, private security companies are increasingly 
replacing the primary responsibility of the state to provide security both for the people and for 
profitable business activities (Cilliers 1999: 1). According to Peter W. Singer (2001/2002: 
193-197) the end of the Cold War, changes in the nature of armed conflicts and a general 
trend of privatisation have led to the sudden increase in private military services. Cilliers 
further argue that “globalisation, the failure of African countries to achieve sustainable 
development, concomitant with the general weakening of the African state and Western 
peacekeeping disengagement from Africa after the Somali debacle, all provide a new context 
within which one should view historical mercenary patterns in Africa” (Cilliers, 1999: 1). The 
increase in private security can be tied to supply and demand, as with the development of any 
market. In the 1990s, the supply factors came from both local and international phenomena 
that caused militaries across Africa, as well as the rest of the world, to be downsized in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. The downsizing led to a security gap across large parts of sub-
Saharan Africa that the private market rushed to fill (Singer, 2008: 38-39, 49-51). In addition, 
the downsizing released experienced military personnel with intimate knowledge of other 
countries in the region (Singer, 2008: 49-53).  
 
Since the end of the Cold War, many Western governments, with the United States in the 
forefront, have become increasingly reluctant to commit their national troops to multilateral 
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions unless key interests are at stake. Even when forces 
are provided, they are often slowly deployed, poorly trained, underequipped and “ineffective 
when challenged due to lack of motivation or a flawed mandate” (Singer, 2008: 183). This 
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trend became evident after the disastrous intervention in Somalia in 1993. Recently, it has 
been suggested that private military companies (PMCs) can provide the critical military 
‘muscle’ to make peacekeeping work, as long as they have a legitimate international mandate 
from the United Nations or a regional organisation such as the African Union. PMCs have 
shown a willingness to intervene in many of the hostile environments of little strategic interest 
to the key global powers, while appearing not to suffer the same political constraints as 
governments when it comes to casualties (Lilly, 2000a: 16).  
 
Within the peacekeeping sphere the military consulting and support industry sectors have 
already been outsourced for quite some time (Singer, 2003: 63). The post-Cold War world has 
already witnessed an exceptional increase in PMC involvement in peacekeeping operations. 
PMCs have been hired by Western governments, various non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and the UN to perform tasks that international peacekeepers were either not 
mandated to perform or incapable of performing (Bures, 2008: 7). It seems that outsourcing 
has become necessary in a bid to maximise limited resources due to the unavailability or 
inadequacy of funds for peacekeeping operations (Charles and Cloete, 2009: 2). However, 
PMCs have only been used in selective instances, such as logistical and support services, 
security and policing functions and military support (Lilly, 2000b: 4). For instance, the US-
based company MPRI has carried out large parts of American military training overseas, such 
as in the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) set up to create an indigenous peacekeeping 
force in Africa (Lilly, 2000b: 3). In addition, both public and private aid organisations hire 
private companies to ensure the protection of their operations in unstable areas. Humanitarian 
NGOs have been forced to recognise that, in order to fulfil their missions, they have little if 
any choice than to enlist the services of private security companies (PSCs) (Bures, 2008: 8; 
Leander, 2002: 4-5). Critics such as Musah and Fayemi (2000: 23-26) claim that the 
consequences of privatising security can be severe by threatening to undermine state control 
and democratic processes. On the other hand, optimists like Shearer (1998) and Brooks 
(2000a, 2000b) claim that private options offer solutions to intractable security problems that 
can operate within national interests and the values shared by the international community.  
 
The term peacebuilding came into widespread use after 1992, when Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 
then United Nations Secretary-General, announced his Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 
1992). The history of UN military intervention in Africa is rich in diversity and includes both 
successes (Namibia and Mozambique) and disastrous failures (Somalia). In the last decades, 
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Africa has emerged as the major arena for UN peace operations. Of the 15 peace operations 
managed by the UN at the end of 2009, seven were in Africa (De Coning, 2007: 1; UN, 
2010a: 3, 69) According to Karin Dokken, the peace operations in Congo, Somalia and 
Liberia in particular are all examples of missions that have taken place in the “ultimate 
challenge Africa has posed to the international system: the disintegration of the state as a 
viable unit” (Dokken, 2008: 151). The achievements of UN operations under such 
circumstances have been mixed, probably owing partly to a lack of understanding of the 
characteristics of the African state (Dokken, 2008: 151).  
 
Lack of resources has been an abiding concern of the UN in recent times, as demands rose 
and states were reluctant to participate in risky ventures. The UN has strived to catch up with 
the evolving conflict environment and attempted to institute reforms agreeable to its most 
powerful member states (Pugh, 2008: 410). In 1997, then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
announced that the UN would intensify cooperation with regional organisations “in all 
activities related to the maintenance of international peace and security” (Annan, 1997: §116). 
Annan emphasised, in 1998, that this was particularly important in Africa because the UN 
“lacks the capacity, resources and expertise to address all problems that may arise in Africa” 
(Annan, 1998: §41).  
 
Pugh argues that the UN does not have, or never has had, a monopoly in peace operations and 
peacekeeping (Pugh, 2008: 418). Freelance missions have been an element in international 
relations at least since coalitions to manage the prolonged dismantling of the Ottoman Empire 
in the nineteenth century were formed. Pugh argues that hybrid operations, where regional 
organisations operate alongside one another, may reduce the problems arising from groups of 
self-appointed states keeping watch over their own interests that can add to the dynamics of 
the conflict (Pugh, 2008: 418). For instance, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) 
operates under the overall command of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). 
However, African intergovernmental organisations have never undertaken military 
enforcement action on behalf of the UN. Whether this will change with the development of a 
greater focus on security-political aspects of the African Union remains to be seen. The 
various regional organisations in Africa are already in the process of developing a stronger 
focus on such aspects (Dokken, 2008: 164-165). Although the UN has promoted hybrid 
initiatives, its universal legitimacy and a trend towards increased professionalism should 
continue to make peace missions a core function of the organisation. Freelance peace 
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missions will be only one of a range of international responses to wars and complex 
emergencies. However, Pugh argues that UN deployments will still be needed where regional 
bodies are overstretched, lacking in infrastructure or requiring legitimacy (Pugh, 2008: 418). 
 
1.4. Conceptualisation 
1.4.1. The private security industry 
The term ‘private security’ refers to security services provided to clients by non-state 
agencies. Its growth has been facilitated by the desire to reduce the burden on state agencies 
of protecting their citizens (Gumedze, 2009). Small further argues that privatised security 
today essentially refers to an industry that is exclusive and self-sufficient of the state, trading 
in professional military and security services, equipment, training and logistics (Small, 2006: 
7). These actors have become important players in the security sector after the Cold War, 
especially in Africa (Dokken, 2008: 186-187). This is often cited as being due to the security 
vacuum caused by a combination of weak states and the lack of will in developed countries to 
intervene in internal conflicts in these countries (Brayton, 2002: 308).  
 
The private security industry (PSI) generally consists of private military and security 
companies (PMSCs) that sell military and security services. It can be difficult to distinguish 
between the two kinds of companies, although PMCs are more often associated with activities 
designed to have a military impact, while private security companies (PSCs) are primarily 
concerned with protecting individuals and property. While PSCs can be defined as having the 
ability to provide a ‘proximate capacity’ for violence or defensive security services, PMCs 
possess an ‘immediate capacity’ for violence, offering more offensive military and security 
services (Small, 2006: 7-8). However, many companies provide both types of services 
(Dokken, 2008: 187; Lilly, 2000a: 14; Musah, 2002: 913). Schreier and Caparini have defined 
private security companies as “companies that specialize in providing security and protection 
of personnel and property, including humanitarian and industrial assets” (Schreier and 
Caparini, 2005: 2). Furthermore, Peter W. Singer defines private military companies as 
“corporate bodies that specialize in the provision of military skills – including tactical combat 
operations, strategic planning, intelligence gathering and analysis, operational support, troop 
training, and technical assistance” (Singer, 2001/02).   
 
The Montreux Document describes private military and security companies as “private 
business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they 
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describe themselves” (Montreux Document, 2008: 6). However, this definition does not 
recognise the fact that a service that private military and security companies provide is 
engaging in actual combat operations (as is the case in Iraq and Afghanistan). However, this 
definition highlights another important aspect, namely that private military and security 
companies tend to describe themselves differently (Gumedze, 2009: 2).  
 
Brooks and Rathgeber argue that the distinction between private security companies and 
private military companies in terms of their definition creates regulatory problems, thus 
suggesting that the term PMCs should be preserved “only for the specialized firms that 
willingly engage in offensive operations, such as the no longer operational Executive 
Outcomes” (Brooks and Rathgeber, 2008: 18). Brooks and Rathgeber further argue that PSCs 
are clear in the provision of their work in that their civilian personnel provide only legal 
defensive and protective services (Brooks and Rathgeber, 2008: 18). Furthermore, unlike the 
PMC role, private civilian security is as common in stable countries as it is in contingency 
operations. However, this definition can be problematic, seeing that some PMCs offer security 
services and some PSCs offer military services. It is a general problem that definitions of 
military services and security services are open-ended, meaning that they can be interpreted to 
include a variety of services that may fall under the category of ‘other related activities’. 
Thus, the definition of private military and security companies remains complex because it is 
not comprehensive enough to cover everything that such companies are actually involved in 
(Gumedze, 2009: 2).  
 
The distinction between PMCs and PSCs is hard to maintain, given the variety of services that 
any given company may provide and the increasing blur between traditional military and 
other security tasks in today’s conflicts (Avant, 2008: 451). The terms private security 
industry (PSI) and private military and security companies (PMSCs) are therefore used 
throughout this research to denote the whole range of for-profit security companies, because 
they both aptly describe the range of services these companies provide.  
 
1.4.2. Peacebuilding 
According to Neethling (2005), the concept of peacebuilding is the most important UN tool 
related to the changes in both the volume and the nature of UN activities in the field of peace 
and security. According to former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 
peacebuilding consisted of “sustainable, co-operative work to deal with the underlying 
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economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems […]” (Dokken, 2008: 160; Neethling, 
2005: 40). The umbrella term ‘peace operations’ includes a variety of activities. The UK 
government departments categorise them according to general objectives: conflict prevention, 
peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. In this categorisation 
peacebuilding is referred to as “support to the long-term regeneration of war-torn societies 
and for establishing sustainable peace through administrative, judicial, military, economic and 
political capacity-building” (Pugh, 2008: 410). While this is a relatively vague definition, the 
United Nations goes into further detail in the 2008 document, United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations Principles and Guidelines. This document states that peacebuilding “involves a 
range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by 
strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the 
foundation for sustainable peace and development” (UN, 2008: 18). Thus, peacebuilding is a 
complex and long-term process in which it is necessary to address the deep-rooted, structural 
causes of violent conflict in order to create sustainable peace. Peacebuilding measures address 
core issues that effect the functioning of society and the state, and that seek to enhance the 
capacity of the state so that it can carry out its core functions effectively. The many ways of 
defining peacebuilding have created difficulties in understanding the usefulness of the concept 
as an object of empirical analysis. For instance, Eva Bertram argues that “full-scale 
peacebuilding efforts are nothing short of attempts at nation-building; they seek to remake a 
state’s political institutions, security forces, and economic arrangements” (Bertram, 1995: 
389).  
 
1.4.3. Peacekeeping 
UN peacekeeping is an elusive concept that has undergone reconceptualisation and changes 
since the first UN peacekeeping operations. Some of the first UN peacekeeping operations 
included overseeing an Arab-Israeli ceasefire in 1948, and monitoring an Indo-Pakistani 
ceasefire in 1949. Peacekeeping was not envisioned in the UN charter and had no clear legal 
standing, as it occupied a middle ground between the provisions for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes in Chapter VI of the Charter, and the provisions for enforcement mechanisms in 
Chapter VII. The end of the Cold War brought about developments that challenged the 
conception that peacekeeping was about maintaining peace between states. In response to 
intrastate wars, humanitarian crises, human rights abuses and the collapse of civil order in a 
number of states, UN operations became both more numerous and more complex, involving a 
wide set of political, military, and humanitarian tasks (Dokken, 2008: 157). 
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 Peacekeeping refers to “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto 
with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military 
and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Furthermore, 
the UK government refers to peacekeeping as “military forces and police operating with host 
consent to underpin a peace settlement or ceasefire, using force impartially and with severe 
restrictions (for example, in self-defense)” (Pugh, 2008: 410). In terms of Article 24 (1) of the 
UN Charter, the Security Council is entrusted with the “primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security” (UN, 1945). Particularly in Africa, this 
responsibility is more critical, as Africa remains the most conflict-prone region in the world 
(Gumedze, 2009).  
 
1.5. Research Design 
The study will have a qualitative research design and will make use of an inductive and 
critical approach, meaning that theoretical propositions are developed as the data-collection 
process evolves. This research project will primarily make use of secondary (existing) data, 
such as academic literature, policy documents, newspaper articles and press statements. Few 
standardised procedures are predetermined. Stronger hypotheses will be developed throughout 
the data-collection process on the basis of the information obtained, rather than as a pre-stated 
hypothesis (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 273). A non-linear and circular research path will 
ensure that new data is continuously collected that can shed light on the research question. As 
such, the research allows for switches in focus or changes in perceptions (Lewis, 2003: 47).   
 
The research will be of a qualitative nature, and such research often includes a descriptive 
approach. Thus, the assessment of the impact of the private security industry in peacebuilding 
initiatives in Africa will be primarily of a descriptive nature. However, qualitative studies are 
seldom limited to a descriptive purpose, and this research will go beyond this by discussing 
the implications the private security industry poses to state authority, specifically the 
traditional notion that states are the sole legitimate actor on the use of force.  
 
Previously, attempts at examining the private military and security industry as a whole have 
been lacking. Schreier and Caparini argue that the literature was often polarised between the 
pro-PMC analysts that identified and discussed a wider application of outsourced military 
force in resolution of modern conflict, and the opposing viewpoint that discussed a perceived 
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need for a more limited and defined application of private military force within modern 
conflict (Schreier and Caparini, 2005: 11). Thus, seeing that an extensive assessment of the 
role of the private security industry in peacebuilding efforts is a relatively new field of 
research, this study will also contain elements of exploratory research. The aim is that this 
research will lead to insight and comprehension, rather than the collection of detailed data. 
Research projects like this seldom provide satisfactory answers to specific research questions, 
but this research hopes to develop new hypotheses about the impact of the private security 
industry in peacebuilding efforts in African conflicts (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 80).  
 
Further, this research will make use of multiple, descriptive case studies. Case studies are 
particularly useful in order to examine the effect on the phenomenon that are being 
investigated (De Vaus, 2001: 232). Previous studies of the private security industry have 
concentrated on individual companies or of specific conflicts with little elucidation of the 
variations in activities of private military and security companies, their impact and the 
following implications. Therefore, this research will consist of multiple case studies. This type 
of study is essential if case studies are being used for inductive purposes. Given sufficient 
resources and access to cases, multiple case designs will normally provide more insights than 
single case designs (De Vaus, 2001: 227).  
 
This research study presents the case studies of three private military and security companies: 
Executive Outcomes, MPRI and DynCorp. These case studies have been selected in order to 
provide illuminating examples of the impact of the private security industry in peacebuilding 
initiatives in Africa. Furthermore, the specific case studies have been selected because the 
three companies typically provide different activities and services and thus are used for 
different purposes. Executive Outcomes generally provide combat and operational support, 
MPRI offer military advice and training, while DynCorp primarily deliver logistical support. 
Furthermore, the main users of the three companies vary accordingly; while Executive 
Outcomes and MPRI tend to be hired by governments, DynCorp are primarily hired by 
multinational companies, humanitarian agencies and peacekeeping organisations (Lilly, 
2000a: 11; Shearer, 1998). Brooks describes MPRI as a ”passive PMC”, meaning that they 
focus on training and developing a force structure and do not serve their client’s militaries, as 
opposed to “active PMCs”, which are willing to carry weapons into combat alongside their 
clients. He argues that this makes “passive PMCs” more acceptable than “active PMCs” in the 
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eyes of the UN and many NGOs. Executive Outcomes would, according to Brooks, be the 
classic example of an “active PMC” (Brooks, 2002: 11-12).  
 
Currently, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) is undertaking a project titled “The 
Involvement of the Private Security Sector in African Conflicts, Peacekeeping, and 
Humanitarian Assistance Operations” that it aims to complete in 2011. This shows the interest 
and relevance of such a study in relation to Africa. The ISS project will be executed in three 
phases. The first phase looked at the involvement of the private security sector in African 
conflicts (specifically in Angola, Sierra Leone and Sudan), was completed in 2009 and has 
resulted in the publication of several articles by senior researcher Sabelo Gumedze. The 
second phase aims to be completed in 2010 and will focus on the private security sector and 
peacekeeping missions (specifically in Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire and Sudan). Finally, the last 
phase will focus on the private security sector and humanitarian assistance operations 
(specifically in Cote, d’Ivoire, Somalia and Sudan), and is planned to be completed in 2011. 
The current project succeeded a previous project, titled “Regulation of the Private Security 
Sector”, which was completed in 2008 and co-funded by the United Nations University 
(UNU) and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). This project was 
undertaken in response to the increased involvement of private military and security 
companies in African conflicts and focused specifically on the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, South Africa and Uganda.  
 
1.6. Limitations 
Descriptive studies tend to make use of pre-existing conceptual categories and often use 
implicit theories of what is relevant and what categories are important (De Vaus, 2001: 225). 
For instance, this study will make use of the existing concept of private military and security 
companies (rather than distinguishing between PMCs and PSCs) in order to represent the 
whole range of for-profit security companies because it appropriately describes the range of 
services these companies provide. Furthermore, this research will not enter the debate of 
whether or not private military and security companies essentially are equal to mercenaries, 
but rather this study seeks to discuss the development and corporatisation of the private 
security industry and to explore the following change in nature of their activities.  
 
The level of secrecy is high in the private security industry, and thus the amount of empirical 
information will be limited, especially as relating to the specific terms of the contracts these 
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companies operate under. However, more information regarding the contracts of such 
companies has recently become available through newspaper articles, US government 
documents, as well as press statements by both the private military and security companies 
themselves and by the UN. Nevertheless, the information available depends on the nature of 
the specific company and the purpose of the contract undertaken. 
 
In addition, because this research project focuses on the impact of the private security industry 
in peacebuilding in African conflicts, the large quantity of literature regarding the activities of 
this industry in Iraq and Afghanistan will not be analysed thoroughly. However, it might be 
useful to provide certain examples from Iraq and Afghanistan when analysing the specific 
case studies in order to make comparisons or clarify the nature of these companies. This study 
will make use of literature published up until May 2010, due to the fact that articles published 
after this period are difficult to retrieve through online databases. However, press statements 
made by the UN and by MPRI and DynCorp after this date will be included in this study.  
 
1.7. Structure of the study 
The thesis will have five chapters, organised in the following manner. Chapter 1 will 
introduce the theme, the problem and the objectives of the study. The problem statement will 
be presented and reasons for its significance will be provided. Central concepts will be 
defined. Chapter 2 will present the theoretical framework and a more extensive literature 
review of the private security industry. Chapter 3 will provide three case studies, that of 
Executive Outcomes, MPRI and DynCorp focusing on their activities and involvement in 
African conflicts and their corporate connections. Chapter 4 will assess the impact of the 
private security industry on peacebuilding efforts in Africa, primarily focusing on UN-led 
peace operations, as well as US policy towards Africa and the implications for African 
countries. Furthermore, Chapter 4 will discuss the implications of the privatisation of security 
on the traditional notion of the state as the sole legitimate actor on the use of force. Chapter 5 
will conclude the thesis with the findings of the research.  
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Chapter 2. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Functions traditionally performed by state armed forces are now increasingly outsourced to 
private contractors not only in complex emergencies but also in the context of day-to-day 
security provision. The increasing trend of globalisation and privatisation in the international 
system is partly responsible for the expansion of the private security industry and the 
changing form of its activities since the 1990s (Leander, 2002: 3) . In recent years, research on 
global governance has begun to draw attention to the expanding role and importance of 
private, non-state actors exercising authority in a variety of fields, including the economy, 
environmental protection and security (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007b: 237).  
However, Leander argues that state authority is not always fulfilled by someone else. This 
does not mean that there is hierarchy, but merely that the international society lacks a well-
defined decision-making body to appropriately deal with these new challenges facing the 
world today (Leander, 2002: 1). Furthermore, the expanding role of non-state actors hinders 
state capacity to govern the use of violence in its territory by making it more difficult to 
establish and maintain a monopoly on legitimate violence. It is within the creation of this 
security vacuum that the rise of private authority and the private security industry has been 
made possible. Private security providers have come to be seen as an indelible feature of 
large-scale military, and even humanitarian, interventions. The size of the private security 
industry is projected to reach US$ 210 billion by 2010 (Perrin, 2008: 3).  
 
This chapter will provide a theoretical overview of a number of concepts and theories that are 
useful in analysing the privatisation of authority and the impact of the private security 
industry in peace operations in Africa. First, the history of mercenaries will be presented, 
followed by a section considering the existing regulatory frameworks for mercenaries and 
why it is considered problematic. Thereafter, theoretical arguments on state authority and the 
privatisation of authority in the international system will be presented, as put forward by 
various scholars. The next section will look at the changing concept of security, followed by 
an examination of the privatisation of security in terms of the corporatisation of mercenaries 
and how this development came about. This will be followed by a section on privatisation 
specifically in Africa. The latter part of the chapter will focus on peace operations, outlining 
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theoretical frameworks for the analysis of the private security’s increased impact on such 
operations on the African continent. 
 
2.2. The history of mercenaries 
Peter W. Singer states that “hiring outsiders to fight your battles is as old as war itself” 
(Singer, 2008: 19). In some eras these outsiders were individual foreigners, known as 
‘mercenaries’, brought to fight for whichever side bid highest. In other periods they came 
along as highly organised entities. For both, the important factor was their goal of private 
profit, originated from the act of fighting (Singer, 2008: 19). The general assumption of 
warfare is that it is engaged in by public armed forces fighting for a common cause. The fact 
is that, throughout history, the participants in war were often private entities working for 
profit, not loyal to governments. Thus, Singer argues that the monopoly of the state over 
violence is the exception rather than the rule in world history (Singer, 2008: 19-20).  
 
The proliferation of private military and security forces coincided with rising conditions of 
instability. Singer argues that “these included extreme changes in political orders or when 
standing armies were reduced at the end of a war, which particularly characterized the 
Hundred Years War period (1337-1453)” (Singer, 2008: 23). Private soldiers thrived in the 
absence of centralised control. Originally, many soldiers hired themselves out as freelancers, 
with the result that they were left without employment when a war ended. Many of these 
soldiers formed ‘companies’, which were organisations designed to facilitate their 
employment as a group (Small, 2006: 6). Eventually, these free companies evolved from 
temporary organisations, into permanent military and economic organisations that were 
systematically in the employment of multiple localities (Singer, 2008: 23-24).  
 
By the seventeenth century, the conduct of violence had become a capitalist enterprise that 
was little different and, in fact, highly entangled with other industries. War had become one of 
the biggest industries in Europe (Singer, 2008: 28). At the time, European armies were often a 
mixture of hired mercenary companies. It was not until the seventeenth century that the use of 
official armies, loyal to the nation as a whole, was manifested in Europe. In many ways, the 
Thirty Years War3 was turning point in this regard, with the ultimate result being that the 
concept of sovereignty won out against that of empire (Milliken and Krause, 2002: 755). The 
                                                 
3 The Thirty Years War refers to the period from 1618 to 1648.  
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Peace of Westphalia in 16484 solidified the emergence of the state by preserving the 
importance of sovereignty over affairs within borders (Singer, 2008: 29). Singer claims that, 
“it was within this context that hired armies of foreigners began to be replaced by standing 
state armies made up of citizens” (Singer, 2008: 29). Furthermore, as national armies became 
the norm, states began to pass neutrality laws, which banned their citizens from enlisting in 
foreign armies. State rulers’ interest in controlling their power over society was another 
motivating factor for the rise of this institution of neutrality. However, with the state’s 
monopolisation of the authority to deploy forces, came also the responsibility for the violence 
emanating from their own jurisdiction (Singer, 2008: 31).  
 
Private businesses also began to take on military roles outside of governments through the 
charter company system, like the Dutch East India Company and the English East India 
Company (Singer, 2008: 34). Military activities were a vital part of trading companies 
because contributed to improve profits. However, the outsourcing of trade controls to private 
companies brought about unintended consequences, particularly as the private companies 
often engaged in activities that differed to their government’s national interests (Singer, 2008: 
35-36; Small, 2006: 6-7).  
 
Mercenaries as we know them today became well known during the decolonisation of Africa 
when they played reactionary roles and even committed various atrocities towards the civilian 
population (Singer, 2008: 37). For instance, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (what was 
once known as Zaire), the private security industry played a multiplicity of roles for all parties 
in the war. According to Singer, when long-term ruler Mobutu Sese Seko sought support for 
his falling regime in the mid-1990s, he began negotiations with MPRI and Executive 
Outcomes for aid against the rebellion led by Laurent Kabila (Singer, 2008: 10). Neither 
company opted to take on the contract, as the regime was about to fall and seemed unlikely to 
be able to pay. Eventually, Mobutu’s regime fell, and Kabila emerged as the new head of 
state. Reportedly the coup had been assisted by another private military company, namely the 
Bechtel company. However, Kabila’s new government was quickly threatened by a shifting 
coalition of rebel forces. Kabila sought support from all areas and hired the South African-
based private military company Executive Outcomes which supplied his government with air 
                                                 
4 The Peace of Westphalia denotes a series of peace treaties signed between May and October of 1648 in 
Osnabrück and Münster. These treaties ended the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) in the Holy Roman Empire 
after five years of negotiation (Croxton, 1999: 569).  
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combat support, electronic warfare assistance and security protection (Singer, 2008: 10). In 
other words, the use of private military companies in Africa is not just limited to legitimate 
governments or multinational companies (Singer, 2008: 10). In addition, these companies 
have reportedly worked for rebels in both Senegal and Namibia, as well as in Angola.  
 
As a result of this, in the 1960s the international community recognised for the first time the 
need to regulate these private actors. Prompted by African states, the United Nations passed 
several resolutions condemning the mercenaries fighting against the newly independent 
African governments (Sandoz, 1999: 203-204). However, the private security industry that 
operates in Iraq, Afghanistan and post-colonial Africa today is very different from the 
mercenaries that operated throughout Africa during the 1960s. This development is not 
reflected in the definitions contained in international regulatory frameworks, which focus on 
mercenaries as individuals rather than corporatized firms. Lilly argues that, because the 
personnel of private military and security companies are involved in foreign conflicts for 
essentially financial gain, they might be considered mercenaries in the traditional sense of the 
word (Lilly, 2000b: 10). However, the former UN Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries, 
Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, has argued that private military and security companies cannot 
be considered as falling within the legal scope of mercenary status (Ballesteros, 1997). These 
definitional issues have prompted many scholars to argue that the regulatory framework that 
exists today is outdated and in need of renewal (Lilly, 2000b: 10). 
 
2.2.1. Mercenaries and regulation 
According to Lilly (2000a: 8), Africa’s post-colonial history is the origin for the popular 
notion of a mercenary5. The mercenary activity of the 1960s led to a backlash by African 
leaders, who saw this development threatening their countries’ rights to self-determination 
and their new-found sovereignty. The UN General Assembly passed its first resolution 
condemning the use of mercenaries in 1968. Since then, UN bodies have repeatedly 
condemned mercenary activity as an international unlawful act. In 1977, mercenaries were 
given legal status within international humanitarian law with the adoption of Article 47 to 
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention (Lilly, 2000a: 9). This identifies a mercenary 
as a person who  
                                                 
5 The popular notion of a ‘mercenary’ is considered by Damien Lilly to be “someone who fights for financial 
gain in armed conflicts alien to their own nationality” (Lilly, 2000: 8).  
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a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;      
b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;                                                          
c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private 
gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material 
compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of 
similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;                                                                    
d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory 
controlled by a Party to the conflict;                                                                                                          
e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict;                         
f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty 
as a member of its armed forces (Shearer, 1998: 17).  
 
 
Kevin O’Brien argues that there are two main flaws with this definition when it comes to 
applying it to the private security sector today. Firstly, in order to be defined a mercenary one 
has to fulfil all the above requirements. According to Lilly, Article 47 is not particularly 
useful for understanding the phenomenon as it exists today, and he claims that the definition 
was worded in this specific manner so as to allow states to retain the right to hire foreign 
soldiers as part of their national forces (Lilly, 2000a: 9). Secondly, the definition in Article 47 
only concerns the actor, and not the activities that the actor engages in (O’Brien, 2002: 5). 
The focus of the definition is a person’s motive, and this is problematic because it can be very 
difficult to prove an individual’s motive in a court of law (Sandoz, 1999: 208).  
 
Steven Brayton argues that the most important features of mercenaries are that “they are 
foreign to the conflict, they are motivated chiefly by financial gain: and, in some cases they 
participate directly in combat” (Brayton, 2002: 124). These are all traits that mercenaries 
share with several companies within today’s private security industry. Former UN Special 
Rapporteur on Mercenaries, Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, agrees on this, even suggesting that 
one reason for the existence of private military and security companies is that mercenaries 
have realised that these companies are not covered extensively in regulatory legislation 
(Ballesteros, 1998: 15). Victor-Yves Ghebali highlights the point made by Ballesteros and 
further argues that another shortcoming of this definition is the requirement that the 
mercenary takes a direct part in the hostilities, because this excludes military advisers or 
counsellors (Ghebali, 2006: 221). These are among the activities that private military and 
security companies primarily promote. According to Cleaver, “Article 47 is generally deemed 
to apply only to inter-state conflicts and to ‘wars of national liberation’, and therefore it might 
be argued that civil wars remain outside its provisions” (Cleaver, 2000: 132). Cleaver further 
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argues that these conflicts are precisely the ones in which private military and security 
companies have prospered during the 1990s in Africa (Cleaver, 2000: 132). 
 
Although not establishing criminal responsibility for being a mercenary, Article 47 served as 
an attempt to deter people from engaging in such activities. In the same year, members of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopted the Convention for Elimination of 
Mercenarism in Africa, which came into force in 1985. The convention is a regional 
instrument prohibiting both mercenary activities and mercenarism as a crime against peace 
and security in Africa, whether committed by an individual, a group, an association a state or 
a state representative. Thus, the Convention covers the responsibility of private companies as 
well as individuals (Ghebali, 2006: 221). However, Ghebali argues that most states do not 
have effective legislation that criminalises mercenary activities, because weak states affected 
by violent conflicts are willing to hire private military and security companies as a means to 
whatever end they may seek. In addition, powerful states may hire such companies in order to 
use them as undercover tools of foreign policy (Ghebali, 2006: 221-222). The UN introduced 
a similar ban on mercenaries in 1989 with the adoption of the International Convention 
against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries (Lilly, 2000a: 9). 
Nevertheless, like Article 47 (to Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention), this 
Convention concerns the actor and not the activities that the actor engages in, thereby proving 
difficult to apply to the private security sector that exists today.  
 
A modern definition of the term mercenary would be helpful in order to avoid confusion over 
several types of related but quite different types of employment. Yet the question of definition 
is surprisingly difficult (Patterson, 2009: 43). Some argue that international conventions 
define mercenaries in too detailed manner, to the point that the definitions become almost 
useless (Cameron, 2006: 578; Singer, 2004: 531). Current UN Special Rapporteur on 
Mercenaries, Sharista Shameem, argue that a new definition of mercenaries might be arrived 
at “only after a policy decision has been reached on the fundamental question of whether 
States wish to continue to be solely responsible for the use of force” (Shameem, 2005: §51).  
 
2.3. State authority 
Traditional notions of authority in the international system derive from the Weberian 
conceptions of the state and of the domain of international politics. For Weber, the essence of 
the state is its ability to claim “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a 
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given territory” (Weber, in Hall and Biersteker, 2002: 1). Since the late seventeenth century it 
has been widely accepted that states may, in part, be defined by their claim to a monopoly on 
legitimate violence. National defence and civil order have driven the creation of military 
budgets that have absorbed less than one per cent to something like 30 per cent of gross 
national product (GNP) in almost all states since 1945 (Patterson, 2009: 91). The right to 
legitimate violence has led to a system of belief within international law regarding criteria for 
statehood, one of which is the existence of government. Mandel argues that perhaps the 
primary stated justification for the exclusive government right on coercion has been the 
protection of human life (Mandel, 2002: 30). However, historically, other motivations, such as 
keeping the regime in power, have often actually taken precedence. In practice, over the 
centuries there always have been extra governmental applications of force at home and 
abroad, deemed by the international community to be unobjectionable. According to Mandel, 
the problem with analysing the source of legitimate authority to make use of force originates 
from the “clouding of temporal standards relative to today’s global setting” (Mandel, 2002: 
30). Such a prediction becomes increasingly difficult due to the existence of so-called failed 
states and corrupt states, whose governments are unable or unwilling to manage security for 
their citizens. In addition, there are several so-called illegitimate states, whose governments 
have assumed power under irregular conditions. With the rise in power of transnational and 
sub-national groups offering security services equivalent in quality to those provided by 
governments, there is a growing sentiment that the distinction between public and private 
security is becoming increasingly arbitrary (Mandel, 2002: 30).  
 
2.3.1. The privatisation of authority in the international system  
Sometimes, governments have found it convenient to transfer some of their public 
responsibilities to the private sector due to cost issues, quality or efficiency. The terms 
‘outsourcing’ and ‘privatisation’ are used to describe this relocation of service provision. Both 
are generally accepted practices and can be traced back as far as the founding economist 
Adam Smith’s writings in the 1700s. While health care and education are both examples of 
services that have been outsourced, there is one area in particular into which the debate over 
public or private has never ventured namely the military, the force that protects society 
(Singer, 2008: 7). By the time the state had been accepted as the dominant means of 
government, the service side of war was understood to be the sole domain of government, and 
one of the most essential tasks at that. Bruce Grant argues that for the last two centuries, the 
military profession has been seen as distinctive from all other occupations, because it 
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comprises experts in war-making and the organised use of violence (Grant, 1998). Grant 
further argues that  
as professionals, military officers are bound by a code of ethics, serve a higher 
purpose, and fulfil societal need. Their craft sets them apart from other 
professionals in that the application of military power is not comparable to a 
commercial service. Military professionals deal in life and death matters, and the 
application of their craft has potential implications for the rise and fall of 
governments (Grant, 1998)  
 
Singer thus argues that, since states started to replace rule by kingdoms in the 1600s, military 
services have been considered an area of services that should be kept within the political 
realm under the control of the public sector (Singer, 2008: 7-8). However, military functions 
of the state are today increasingly being transferred to non-state entities. This is consistent 
with a decreasing political will amongst both wealthy and poor states to sustain those 
financial and other costs embodied in the maintenance of a monopoly on the use of violence 
(Patterson, 2009: 92). The state monopoly on violence may no longer exist, but the authority 
to legitimise its use remains with states, and with the UN in certain circumstances. It is the 
legitimate exercise of this function that is arguably in the process of devolution from 
governments to others, thereby altering the role of the state (Patterson, 2009: 92).  
 
In the current era, neo-liberalism has emerged as the defining economic programme by which 
state administrations are held accountable. Muthien and Taylor (2002: 183) argue that this has 
happened simultaneously with the globalisation process, thereby building a ‘market 
civilisation’ whereby states are increasingly subject to the arbitrary impulses of the market. 
Muthien and Taylor argue that the autonomy of states has “been reduced and the ability of 
administrations in the South to resist prescriptions emanating from the developed world” has 
been reduced (Muthien and Taylor, 2002: 183). This has been particularly the case in Africa, 
where international lending institutions have placed firm conditions on governments seeking 
funds to help them out of the economic situation they are currently suffering from (Muthien 
and Taylor, 2002: 183). Furthermore, with globalisation the boundaries between domestic and 
international have begun to blur as issues that previously were under the domain of domestic 
laws and politics now are both influenced and increasingly affected by international law and 
politics. Examples of such issues would be environmental standards and labour regulations. 
Simultaneously, a growing number of actors other than the state have taken on authoritative 
roles and functions in the international system. Robert Mandel argues that sub-national and 
transnational groups of all kinds have emerged in the last few decades, with an impact on 
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world affairs so significant that it is common to describe their authority relative to that of the 
nation-state as shared governance (Mandel, 2002: 40). Because the non-state groups have 
emerged out of a sense of latent dissatisfaction with the services the state provides, these 
groups inherently do not have much loyalty to national governments, pursuing ends that are 
either narrower (in the case of sub-national groups) or broader (transnational groups) than 
those of the nation-state (Mandel, 2002: 41).  
 
While these actors are not states or state-based, they often appear to have been credited with 
some form of legitimate authority. Basically, they do many of the things traditionally 
associated with the state. States act in their own interests and sometimes employ force to 
achieve their objectives (Hall and Biersteker, 2002: 2). Hall and Biersteker argue that, “there 
is an implicit social relationship between those who claim or exercise authority and those who 
are subject to, or recognize, authority” (Hall and Biersteker, 2002: 3). While this relationship 
is public one (to the extent that claims of authority involve an open, visible process among the 
various actors), it does not mean that a state, or public institution, must be involved in the 
process, although they may take part in recognising the authority that is being claimed. Thus, 
this implies that the recognition of authority should be expressed publicly. Furthermore, this 
opens the possibility for the emergence of private, non-state authority, and the idea that 
authority does not necessarily have to be associated with state institutions. Hall and Biersteker 
argue that “the state is no longer the sole, or in some instances even the principal, source of 
authority, in either the domestic arena or in the international system” (Hall and Biersteker, 
2002: 5).  
 
With globalisation a great deal of attention has been focused on the authoritative role of the 
market and on market-based actors or institutions. Hall and Biersteker highlight Susan 
Strange’s argument that non-state actors are increasingly acquiring power in the international 
political economy and, to the extent that their power is not challenged, they are implicitly 
legitimated as authoritative. Often it is states that contribute to creating this authority of the 
market (Hall and Biersteker, 2002: 6-8). 
 
2.3.2. Globalisation and the concept of ‘ungovernance’ 
Anna Leander argues that there is a tendency for academic critics of ‘globalisation’ to focus 
their attention on the institutions of global governance, such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the G7 countries, arguing that the accountability of these 
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institutions is insufficient. However, Leander further argues that there is a potentially more 
threatening tendency towards what she calls ‘ungovernance’ in the international system 
(Leander, 2002: 1). There has been a tendency to diffuse authority away from states. In 
Leander’s words, “state authority has moved upwards to international or regional institutions, 
sideways to firms and markets, but also downwards to (sub-national) authorities or regions” 
(Leander, 2002: 1). Nevertheless, when the authority of the state changes and it no longer 
fulfils the functions it used to, these functions are not always fulfilled by non-state actors, and 
in many cases these functions are not fulfilled at all. Leander argues that, this does not mean 
“that there is no hierarchy or competition involved. It is merely to say that there is no process 
of governance and in this sense there is ungovernance” (Leander, 2002: 1). In addition, 
because there is no well-defined body of decision-making on the international level, this 
condition of ‘ungovernance’ is difficult to contest, unlike the actions of international 
institutions (Leander, 2002: 1-2). It is important to recognise this development, because it 
means that some of the essential political developments in our time are taking place outside 
the realm of institutional politics (Leander, 2002: 15). By focusing on the tensions between 
states and international institutions, one overrates their significance in shaping politics at the 
expense of other actors (Leander, 2002: 2). For instance, Ann Leander argues that this 
increasing tendency of ‘ungovernance’ in the international system is partly responsible for the 
expansion of the private security industry and the changing form of its activities since the 
1990s (Leander, 2002: 3). 
 
2.4. Security 
The end of the Cold War brought about a variety of demands to expand the concept of 
security. The background to this new approach is the feeling that a fundamental 
transformation is taking place in the international arena, and that it is moving away from the 
traditional world of territorial states and inter-state conflict. Today, completely different 
challenges and needs have moved to the top of the global and human agenda. While the 
traditional conception views the state as the sole agent responsible for its national security, 
“new views underline the interdependence of security relations and thus see security as 
common to humankind” (Miller, 2001: 22). In other words, there are global threats to all of 
humanity that cannot be addressed by nation-states alone. This conception leads to a focus on 
multilateralism rather than unilateralism in managing global security challenges, thus 
suggesting a key role for global agencies such as the UN. Furthermore, the new values are 
followed by a greater focus on the individual and human rights than on the state (Miller, 2001: 
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18-23). Miller argues that “the former core value of state sovereignty is in decline both as a 
result of the emerging new values and of rising transborder technological and socio-economic 
forces, which undermine state power and government control” (Miller, 2001: 23).  
 
It is possible to identify two prevalent philosophies of security, each emerging from 
fundamentally different starting points. The first views security as being virtually 
synonymous with the accumulation of power. From this perspective, security is understood as 
a commodity. Power is believed to be the route to security, so that the more power (primarily 
military power) that actors can accumulate, the more secure they will be. On the other hand, 
the second philosophy challenges the idea that security flows from power and instead views 
security as being based on emancipation, a concern with justice and the provision of human 
rights. This differs from the first view in that security is understood as a relationship between 
different actors, rather than as a commodity (Williams, 2008: 6).  
 
2.4.1. The privatisation of security 
Mandel argues that “the fundamental underlying theoretical question surrounding the 
privatization of security is who has, and who should have the legitimate authority to use 
physical coercion in pursuit of security” (Mandel, 2002: 29). The growing international trend 
towards the privatisation of security and the outsourcing of state functions typifies the steady 
erosion of the state monopoly over all forms of organised violence. Mandel further argues that 
“the contemporary organisation of global violence is neither timeless nor natural. It is 
distinctly modern” (Mandel, 2000: 3). Singer claims that “the state monopoly over violence is 
the exception in history rather than the rule”, and that “the modern state is a relatively new 
form of governance” (Singer, 2001/2002: 190). The incidence of the Thirty Years War and 
the ensuing signing of the Peace Treaty of Westphalia are widely credited with the formation 
of the modern nation-state and the inter-state system. These modern states distinguished 
themselves from earlier political associations by agreeing to two main properties: the belief in 
absolute sovereignty and the belief in bounded territory (Small, 2006: 10). In essence, 
sovereignty granted each signatory state territorial integrity and the right to govern without 
outside interference, but, most importantly, the right to a monopoly on and over force within 
that space. Thus, it is with the rise of the modern state that the idea arose that violence and 
force should be brought under control within those entities, by those entities. The state 
essentially provided an organising structure and organising principles for a previously chaotic 
conflict-ridden international system. The core organising principle, and indeed the ultimate 
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symbol of the state, became its capacity to administer, regulate, and control all instruments of 
violence, force and coercion (Small, 2006: 11).  
 
Many security analysts have begun to accept the inevitability of the entrance of at least the 
most respectable private military and security companies into the mix of ingredients providing 
national and international security. The legitimacy of this industry has been growing slowly 
over time (Mandel, 2002: 34). Since the beginning of the nation-state system, even with 
completely public security, there has been significant differentials in the levels of protection 
received by different segments of a society. In many societies, certain groups have been 
deemed to be completely outside the protectiveness umbrella of government security. Thus 
Mandel argues that the current crop of private military and security companies appears to be 
more evolutionary than revolutionary (Mandel, 2002: 33). Private military and security 
companies represent a reconstituted form of organised corporate mercenarism that is 
responding to the need for advanced military expertise in escalating internal conflicts. These 
companies also present new means of disguised efforts by their home states to influence 
conflicts in which the home states are technically neutral. In this sense, the emergence of 
private military and security companies is not a revolutionary development in military and 
geopolitical strategy, but a variation of past forms of mercenarism adapted to the demands of 
the post-Cold War world (Mandel, 2002: 33-34).  
 
The spread of privatised security brings into question traditional understandings of the 
concepts of sovereignty and the self-determination of peoples (Mandel, 2002: 132). The 
international community constantly changes direction between the need for absolute 
protection of the national sovereignty of every state, and respect for peoples’ right to self-
determination. The very act of entering the territory of a state without the consent of the 
government is a violation of sovereignty, whatever the reasons for such an action may be. 
Even humanitarian relief operations conducted in the context of internal armed conflicts 
require the consent of the government. The reluctance shown by the UN to rule on the 
legitimacy of governments does not entitle a private entity to substitute itself for the 
international community to decide whether or not their support on behalf of an entity involved 
in a struggle against a government is lawful or not (Sandoz, 1999: 205-207).  
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2.4.2. From mercenaries to corporate structures in the private security industry 
Private military and security companies are business providers of professional services 
intricately linked to warfare. Today, the private security industry is comprised of corporate 
bodies that specialise in the sale of military skills representing the evolution of private actors 
in warfare and the mercenary trade. Schreier and Caparini argue that globalisation and the 
deregulation of international markets have been influential in assisting the restructuring of 
mercenary activities and have made it possible for the private security industry to form large 
corporate groups operating across state lines (Schreier and Caparini, 2005: 7). The decreasing 
burden of bureaucracy and the increasing movement of people and services across borders 
have allowed for quicker and more flexible operations. Private military and security 
companies are hierarchically organised into integrated and registered businesses that trade and 
compete openly on the global market. Schreier and Caparini argue that the private security 
industry also benefits “from contemporary conditions that offer the type of organization best 
suited for the purpose, and allow them to take advantage of tax-havens” and “incentives for 
foreign investment” (Schreier and Caparini, 2005: 7). This corporatisation offers clear 
advantages in both efficiency and effectiveness. Schreier and Caparini claim that, an essential 
aspect of the rapidly growing demand for and supply of services offered by the private 
security industry “is that it has taken place in an overall ideological environment marked by 
the conviction that markets and efficiency are prime criteria for judging the desirability of any 
project” (Schreier and Caparini, 2005: 7). This has been crucial in making the private security 
industry succeed and in spreading the idea that the industry basically compromises businesses 
like any other (Schreier and Caparini, 2005: 7-8).  
 
The identifying marker of the private security industry is their offer of services that 
traditionally fall within the domain of states. Singer argues that one of the critical features of 
the private security industry is that it is not a capital-intensive sector, unlike a public military 
structure (Singer, 2008: 73-74). Furthermore, the labour input is relatively cheap and widely 
available, both on international and local markets. The continuing supply drive behind the 
labour pool is the comparatively low pay by and prestige of many state militaries. Employees 
of private military and security companies tend to be paid anywhere from two to 10 times as 
much as in the official military and police. Thus, many of the public force’s best are drawn 
into the industry by the prospect of increased rewards. In developed countries, many ex-
soldiers also seize the opportunity of combining their public retirement pay with a full private 
salary (Singer, 2008: 74).  
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 According to Deborah Avant (2006: 510), the corporate form of today’s private security 
industry is not necessarily something new. Avant further argues (2006: 510) that this industry 
bears similarities to the military enterprises of the late Middle Ages and early modern period 
(Avant, 2006: 510). However, some features of today’s market are unique. For instance, the 
private military and security companies today do not so much provide the foot soldiers, but 
more “often act as supporters, trainers and force multipliers for local forces” (Avant, 2006: 
510). In this sense, when they leave they leave behind whatever expertise they have conveyed, 
subject to whatever local political controls, or lack of thereof, exist (Avant, 2006: 510). 
Furthermore, Mandel argues (2002: 9) that the corporate structure that many companies in the 
private security industry exhibit today includes an ongoing intelligence capability, as well as a 
desire for good public relations. Such companies can handpick their employees, on the basis 
of proven accomplishments, from a large pool of qualified applicants. Companies are 
encouraged to keep control over their employees’ actions in order to acquire further contracts. 
In addition, many of these companies often enjoy ties with major multinational companies, 
which provide increased funding, intelligence and political contacts (Mandel, 2002: 9).   
 
Anna Leander argues (2007: 49) that the private security industry is regulated in certain areas 
by export licensing systems and international humanitarian law. In addition, the employees in 
the industry can be held accountable individually and both states and armed forces tend to 
regulate their relations with contractors. However, the regulation of the role of the private 
security industry in shaping understandings of security and politics remain unregulated.   
 
2.4.3. The rapid growth of the private security industry 
Peter W. Singer argues that it was the convergence of several changes at the start of the 1990s 
that led to the rapid re-emergence of this industry (Singer, 2001/2002: 193). Firstly, the end of 
the Cold War produced a vacuum in the market of security. The peace dividend led to a 
massive downsizing of the armed forces. The booming private military and security sector 
soaked up part of this manpower and expertise, wherever possible replacing soldiers with 
much better paid civilians. Western armed forces have focused on redefining and maintaining 
only core competencies. Non-core activities were eliminated and those activities that need not 
necessarily be performed by uniformed personnel thus became outsourced to the private 
military and security companies.  
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Secondly, with the end of superpower pressure from above, a raft of new security threats 
began to appear after 1989, many involving emerging ethnic or internal conflicts. The period 
since then has seen a massive increase in instability, which often resulted in failing states 
being unable to field sufficient armed forces to maintain internal order. In addition, non-state 
actors with the ability to challenge and potentially disrupt world society began to increase in 
number, power, and stature. Thus, for some fragile states, lacking support from the 
superpowers and unable to provide security for their citizens, the private security industry has 
provided a means of reaffirming political control and some resemblance of order (Schreier 
and Caparini, 2005: 4; Singer, 2001/2002: 193).  
 
Thirdly, another critical underlying trend is the revolutionary change within warfare itself. 
One of the things that made nation-states the most effective organisations for waging warfare 
in the industrial age was the overwhelming expense of troops, equipment and supplies. 
However, technological and financial developments have made it possible for smaller 
organisations to wage war. At high-intensity levels of conflict, the military operations of 
superpowers have become more technologic and thus more reliant on civilian specialists to 
run their increasingly sophisticated military systems. At low-intensity levels, the primary tools 
of warfare have not only diversified, but have also become available to a broader range of 
actors (Singer, 2001/2002: 195). Furthermore, the developments are not limited to weapons. 
A significant area is the new importance of information warfare (IW). Information warfare 
involves diverse activities such as psychological warfare, military deception and electronic 
combat. The high-tech, low-personnel requirements of information warfare make it suitable 
for non-state organisations (Singer, 2008: 62-63).  
 
2.4.5. Privatisation of security and the African state 
The trend towards the outsourcing of core national security obligations is not limited to 
Africa, nor is it necessarily viewed negatively, particularly in the West. In developed 
economies, this trend is largely driven by market forces in search of less expensive and more 
effective ways of using scarce resources. However, while outsourcing and even 
commercialisation are common practices in countries such as the US, Britain, France and 
others, it is often core functions of statehood that are contracted out in Africa due to the 
inability of the state to fulfil such functions. Thus, the purpose is to fill the subsequent 
security vacuum (Cilliers, 1999: 5). The motivational picture for turning to private protection 
is radically different in the developing world compared to the developed world. Mandel 
 28
argues that developing countries have long experienced distinctive security problems, 
involving major challenging threats emanating from internal rather than external sources, and 
this predicament has taxed the coercive management capabilities of even stronger developing 
states (Mandel, 2002: 60).  
 
Cleaver argues that, prior to the growth of the private security industry in the last decades, the 
activity of mercenaries in post-colonial Africa was characterised by the operations of groups 
led by individuals such as Mike Hoare, Bob Denard and Costas Georgiou (“Callan”). These 
men and others like them have been associated with all of the continent’s conflict zones: the 
Congo, Comoros, Seychelles, Zimbabwe and Angola to name a few. They usually operated to 
support factions in internal power struggles, and to overthrow regimes that were unfriendly to 
a foreign power (Musah, 2002: 912). Their involvement in civil wars and struggles for 
liberation earned them a reputation for brutality (Cleaver, 2000: 134-135). Cleaver (2000: 
135) further argues that the activities of these individuals differ from today’s private security 
companies in that the connection with the companies that hired them remained covert, while 
today those connections are formalised through identifiable corporate linkages. Cleaver 
emphasises that the activities of these individuals are not the only examples of foreign 
military interference in the affairs of independent African states (Cleaver, 2000: 135). The 
newly independent states of sub-Saharan Africa have been the subject of intervention both 
covertly and overtly, by African and non-African states. An example is South Africa’s use of 
units such as the famous 32 Battalion in Angola in support of the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA) (Cleaver, 2000: 135). Many individuals from this battalion 
later joined the private military company, Executive Outcomes, when the apartheid regime 
came to an end. Abrahamsen and Williams argue that “this is not to say that the possibility of 
private armies intervening in African countries has disappeared” (Abrahamsen and Williams, 
2007a: 137). There have been coup attempts by mercenary groups that distinguish themselves 
from these corporatized companies that characterise the private security industry today. In 
March of 2004, the government of Equatorial Guinea arrested 19 soldiers accused of plotting 
a coup in the small, oil-rich country. Meanwhile, the Zimbabwean government arrested 
another 70 soldiers supposedly en route from South Africa to support the coup. The coup was 
led by Mark du Toit, a former employee of Executive Outcomes, and Simon Mann, one of the 
founders of Sandline International. The operation was financed by, among others, Sir Mark 
Thatcher (son of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher), and the intention of the 
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coup was to replace President Obiang Nguema with the long-exiled opposition leader Severo 
Moto (McSherry, 2006: 23; Small, 2006: 8).  
 
While the growth of the private security industry is a global phenomenon, it is arguable that 
its most extreme manifestation can be found in sub-Saharan Africa. Cleaver argues that “the 
factors leading to the creation of this environment are both international and African in 
origin” (Cleaver, 2000: 137). Since the end of the Cold War, Africa has suffered from 
international marginalisation. However, during the Cold War, African countries became 
proxies on the battleground between the superpowers, and many African leaders managed to 
exploit this to their political and economical advantage. Following the collapse of the Eastern 
Bloc in 1989, Africa lost its political worth and this political marginalisation has been 
followed by growing economic isolation. The end of the Cold War saw increasing 
expectations of a peace dividend, particularly in the West. The means to achieve this was 
through the reduction of military forces, a phenomenon was not just limited to the Western 
powers. According to Cleaver, this development led to a “reduced military capacity among 
the Western states and an increasing reluctance to become involved in areas not deemed to be 
vital to their national interests” (Cleaver, 2000: 137). Cleaver further argues (2000: 137) that 
Africa usually falls into this category. The reduction in military forces released experienced 
manpower into the private market and facilitated the growth of the private security industry. 
Cleaver argues further (2000: 138) that the military retrenchment in South Africa following 
the end of apartheid created a pool of experienced manpower available for private 
employment. Cleaver states that “these political and economic circumstances, together with 
Africa’s underdeveloped natural resources, have created an opportunity for those able to 
exploit it” (Cleaver, 2000: 138). Within Africa, a number of factors have contributed to a 
subsequent deprived security environment. The lack of popular legitimacy for state 
institutions and its political processes has characterised the African state in post-colonial 
times. The legitimacy of politicians and the state itself has been undermined by widespread 
systematic corruption. Furthermore, this has directly contributed to the poor performance of 
local security forces (Cleaver, 2000: 138).  
 
In addition, Western militaries are increasingly using private companies to provide logistical 
services. Furthermore, in the economically weak states of Eastern Europe and the former 
USSR, the arms industries were often the most advanced and competitive fragments of the 
economy. Thus, these states sought to maximise their earnings through increased arms exports 
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to the world’s conflict zones (Cleaver, 2000: 137). The 1990s also saw a dramatic decline in 
international participation in peacekeeping on the African continent. The unfortunate US 
intervention in Somalia that ended in 1994 is a case in point (Cleaver, 2000: 138). The 
experiences from Somalia have influenced the scale and nature of UN peacekeeping 
operations, with the number of personnel involved falling from 76,000 in September 1994 to 
around 19,000 in August 1997 (Shearer, 1998: 33). According to Cilliers  
the extreme case of a territory so thoroughly privatised that the slightest 
semblance of statehood has disappeared, must be Somalia, where warlords are 
most plausibly regarded as commercial operators, each with a private military 
force recruited largely on a clan basis and dealing in straightforward looting, arms 
trade, narcotics, and the considerable profits to be made out of humanitarian relief 
and, most ironically, international peacekeeping (Cilliers, 1999: 4).  
 
2.6. The private security industry and peace operations 
Schreier and Caparini argue that as states and international organisations prove less capable or 
unwilling to meet security threats, the private security industry will continue to assume 
functions formerly performed by national armed forces (Schreier and Caparini, 2005: 44). 
This is opening the path to the privatisation of warfare, as well as of peacebuilding efforts.  
 
In the last two decades, the private security industry has played increasingly significant roles 
in peace operations, raising questions about its potential to help satisfy the increasing global 
demand for peacekeeping. The challenge facing the UN and other international organisations 
is therefore to find a suitable balance between the public and private provision of 
peacekeeping (Bellamy and Williams, 2010: 321). The UN’s official documents on peace 
operations do not disclose much information about the roles that private contractors play 
within such operations. The Brahimi Report (UN, 2000) makes only two brief and vague 
references to supporting private contractors; the Handbook on United Nations 
Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (UN, 2003) alludes to the ‘private sector’ a 
couple of times, but not to private military and security companies specifically; while the UN 
Principles and Guidelines (UN, 2008) document does not mention them at all. According to 
Bellamy and Williams, this is “surprising because private contractors have played important 
roles in the conduct of peace operations and have done so for a considerable period” (Bellamy 
and Williams, 2010: 322). While the UN’s member states have showed a general reluctance to 
establish peace operations led by private actors, this has not stopped the UN from hiring 
private contractors to conduct a wide variety of tasks within its own peace operations 
(Bellamy and Williams, 2010: 323).  
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 Private companies have long been involved in the conduct of peace operations, and many of 
them are listed on the supply database for UN and UN-related organisations. In broad terms, 
they have played advisory roles and provided logistical, intelligence and other forms of 
support. A variety of operations, including the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL), the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) and the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), received logistical support 
from several private companies (Bellamy and Williams, 2010: 326-327).  
 
However, to date the UN has shied away from using contractors in peace enforcement 
activities. The intervention choices of both the UN and regional groups are normally limited 
by the weaknesses of their member states, in terms of material capabilities and willingness to 
deploy forces. Currently, UN operations increasingly make use of military support companies, 
but more controversial, however, are recent discussions of using private military and security 
companies in privatising the peacekeeping role. The argument is that, by privatising aspects of 
peacekeeping, the effectiveness and efficiency of operations might be increased. Private 
companies lack the procedural processes that often impede international organisations, and 
therefore can take quicker and more decisive action (Singer, 2008: 182-183). The concept of 
the private sector profiting from peace operations has the potential to fundamentally alter the 
very nature of UN peacekeeping (Singer, 2008: 186). The key to understanding these different 
types of companies and activities lies in developing a good overview of the services the 
companies provide and the contracts they are hired to undertake (Bellamy and Williams, 
2010: 323). Meanwhile, private military and security companies are becoming significant 
‘expert’ voices in current debates about peace operations (Bellamy and Williams, 2010: 327). 
For instance, Doug Brooks argues that, in relation to the crisis in Darfur, private contractors 
were involved from the start, “providing logistics, base construction, management and 
operations, medical services, and transportation for the African Union troops” (Brooks in 
Leander and Van Munster, 2007: 202).  
 
There are both benefits and disadvantages to UN troops as well as private soldiers. According 
to Mandel (2002: 18), UN peacekeeping troops have greater legitimacy, accountability and 
public acceptance, while private military forces are less restrained in terms of what they can 
do to maintain order, have often trained and fought together for years, can deploy where 
needed much more rapidly in weeks or even days, and usually are less costly. Leander argues 
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that, by outsourcing peacekeeping missions and humanitarian interventions to the private 
security industry, one risk creating a vicious circle where supply pushes demand. It follows 
from this argument, that by selling security, insecurity will increase. This will create an ever 
increasing market for private military and security companies (Leander, 2002: 9). Leander 
further argues that private military and security companies are likely to be a hindrance to state 
building, because such companies tend to relieve the state of the need to build institutions 
capable of providing security. In addition, employees within the private security industry are 
often untrained in the culture of peacekeeping. Many of them tend to come from elite forces 
that fundamentally are about combat, rather than peacekeeping (Singer, 2008: 187). Another 
great concern in relation to private military and security companies has to do with their 
accountability. At the moment, there is no international regulatory scheme that brings the 
operations of such companies under the authority of international law. Therefore, neither the 
law of the state where the company is based, nor that of where it operates applies (Bures, 
2008: 13). Furthermore, both peacekeeping and the operations of private contractors often 
take place in states where absence of the rule of law tends to be the norm, thus making legal 
oversight unlikely (Bures, 2008: 14). However, states often use private military and security 
companies precisely because they fall outside these accountability mechanisms that are 
present for members of armed forces. This allows them to operate in less regulated 
environments, and the state that hires the PMC will not be responsible for their conduct if 
their behaviour is controversial (Heinze, 2008: 9-10). 
 
2.7. Peace operations  
On the surface there is little agreement between analysts, governments and international 
organisations about what peace operations are, and on the differences between terms such as 
peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. Both governments and international 
organisations have been known to label different kinds of military activity as peacekeeping 
sometimes in an attempt to legitimise their activities (Bellamy and Williams, 2010: 14).  
The situation is not helped by the fact that the terms peacekeeping and peace operations are 
not found in the UN Charter. Furthermore, the term peacekeeping is a political activity, and 
thus two actors looking at the same phenomenon might come up with two quite different ways 
of defining and conceptualising their experience (Bellamy and Williams, 2010: 14). Member 
states of the UN remain divided as to the proper scope of UN interventionism and the relative 
concepts such as neutrality, impartiality and the use of minimal force. The UN’s Handbook on 
Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations simply lists the military and civilian tasks that 
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peacekeepers are commonly required to perform. This approach was continued in 2007 by the 
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) when it came to developing 
what was initially referred to as ‘capstone doctrine’ to guide the conduct of its peace 
operations. Peacekeeping is thus identified as one of five ‘peace and security activities’: 
conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding 
(Bellamy and Williams, 2010: 14).  
 
Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace (1992) marked something of a defining moment for the 
way peacekeeping was defined and conceptualised. Here, peacebuilding was defined as 
“action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in 
order to avoid a relapse into conflict (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 21). Furthermore, Boutros-Ghali 
defined peacekeeping as “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto 
with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military 
and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is an activity that 
expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace” 
(Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 20). The significance of Boutros-Ghali’s definition lay not in its 
wording, but in its broader conceptualisation, namely the idea that peacekeeping was one of 
several ways in which third parties might contribute to preventing, resolving or managing 
violent conflict and the rebuilding of communities thereafter.  
 
Cedric de Coning argues that “contemporary UN complex peace operations are in effect 
peacebuilding operations, in that they have mandates that combine political, security, 
development, rule of law and human rights dimensions in the post-conflict phase aimed at 
addressing both the immediate and root causes of conflict” (De Coning, 2007: 4). He further 
claims that the UN’s capability to undertake such system-wide peacebuilding operations is 
what sets the organisation apart from NATO and the AU. The EU is the only other 
multilateral body that currently has the potential to develop such a complex peacebuilding 
operations capacity in the mid- to long-term (De Coning, 2007: 5).  
 
2.7.1. Traditional peacekeeping 
The United Nations was established to ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’ 
and one of its main purposes is to maintain international peace and security. Despite not being 
explicitly provided for in the Charter, peacekeeping has evolved into one of the main tools 
used by the United Nations to achieve this purpose. The legal basis for the Security Council to 
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establish a United Nations peacekeeping operation is found in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of 
the Charter. While peacekeeping has traditionally been associated with Chapter VI of the UN 
Charter, the Security Council does not need to refer to a specific Chapter of the Charter when 
passing a resolution authorising the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. 
Linking such operations with a particular Chapter can in fact be misleading for the purposes 
of operational planning, training and mandate implementation (UN, 2008: 13).  
 
Traditional conceptions of peacekeeping are premised on the so-called holy trinity of consent, 
impartiality and the minimum use of force. Bellamy and Williams (2010: 173) argue that 
“traditional peacekeeping intends to assist the creation and maintenance of conditions 
conducive to long-term conflict resolution by the parties themselves, often in conjunction with 
international mediation”. In practice, this means non-coercive, consent-based activities, 
primarily to support a peace operation or interim ceasefire, in order to prevent the resumption 
of violence and to establish a stable peace. Traditional peacekeeping usually takes place in the 
period between a ceasefire and a political settlement, and is designed to cultivate the degree of 
confidence between belligerents that is necessary to establish a process of political dialogue.  
 
UN peacekeeping is an elusive concept that has undergone reconceptualisation. While it was 
not envisioned in the UN Charter, former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold has 
described peacekeeping as being nestled in a nonexistent “Chapter six-and-a-half” in the 
Charter (Dokken, 2008: 155). Peacekeeping missions were created under the authority of the 
United Nations Security Council. Missions were deployed between states in support of a 
ceasefire or a peace settlement. Thus, peacekeeping operations were to be impartial and 
deployed with the consent of the host states.  
 
2.7.2. Peacekeeping operations in Africa 
While Western attention in the past has been directed toward the Balkans, Afghanistan, and 
Iraq, Africa has emerged as the major arena for UN peace operations. Seventy-five percent of 
the approximately 100,000 military, police, and civilian UN peacekeepers currently deployed 
are in Africa (Dokken, 2008: 147). The peacekeeping roles of the United Nations in Africa 
have varied. Norrie MacQueen attempts to classify the different UN operations that have been 
completed in Africa (MacQueen, 2006: 180-183). There have been operations responding to 
conflicts in failed or collapsed states, aimed at restoring state capacity. Second, there have 
been operations responding to conflicts spurred by internal divisions and contested state 
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legitimacy, where the state has come under challenge either from groups excluded from 
power within it, or from the outside by other states and their clients. Third, the UN has 
assisted in conflicts spurred by decolonisation and the transfer of power to post-colonial 
regimes. According to MacQueen, this categorisation offers a tool for making sense of the 
enormous complexity of African conflicts and the peacekeeping response to them 
(MacQueen, 2006: 183). 
 
Cleaver and May argue (1995: 490) that, prior to 1990, perhaps the most extensive 
peacekeeping operation undertaken in Africa was the United Nations Operation in the Congo 
(ONUC) between 1960 and 1964. According to Karin Dokken (2008: 149), this operation is 
highly important when looking at the history of peacekeeping in Africa, because it posed 
some of the same difficulties the UN was to counter in the 1990s in Somalia, Sierra Leone 
and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In all of those operations, the UN found itself in a 
situation where no state or only a weak state existed. The ONUC force had been deployed 
under the mandate of traditional peacekeeping as provided for in Chapter VI of the UN 
Charter. However, the force gradually became embroiled in the civil war and was therefore 
authorised to use force against rebel forces. The operation became a de facto peace 
enforcement operation. Dokken argues that “the ONUC experience became a classic example 
of discrepancy between mandate and situation, and of the problems encountered when a 
peacekeeping operation is deployed in the absence of a peace to keep, a cease-fire to monitor, 
or a legitimate authority to grant consent to the operation” (Dokken, 2008: 150).  
 
African countries have always been major contributors to United Nations peacekeeping 
operations around the world. As of 1994, Africa stood second only to Europe in the number of 
countries contributing troops to UN peacekeeping operations. Thirty-four African countries 
contribute 28% of the UN’s uniformed peacekeepers (De Coning, 2007: 1). Peace operations 
are also a dominant theme for the African Union. Over the last half decade, the African Union 
has undertaken three major peace operations of its own, in Burundi, Sudan and Somalia, 
involving approximately 12,000 peacekeepers.  
 
2.7.3 Peace support operations 
Peace support operations are multifaceted missions that combine a robust military force with a 
significant civilian component (Bellamy and Williams, 2010: 279). Such operations typically 
involve the deployment of multinational forces, usually (but not exclusively) authorised by 
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the UN Security Council, that have both the means and the mandate to respond effectively to 
breaches of the peace and other activities associated with actors who use violence to 
undermine peace processes for political, religious or economic reasons. The purpose of 
military force is to provide public security, actively disarm belligerents and help to implement 
either a peace agreement or the wishes of the UN Security Council. Peace support operations 
are often associated with Western peacekeepers, and thus have often been used to create a 
functioning state alongside an ongoing transitional administration or in other operations where 
the West is heavily invested6. This involves heavy expansion of peacekeeping functions to 
include the maintenance of public order, policing, capacity-building in the security sector, 
infrastructure, reconstruction, and national reconciliation.  
 
The sources of the concept of peace support operations are set out in three important places. 
The first source is the British peacekeeping doctrine (Wilkinson, 2000; Woodhouse, 1999). 
According to this doctrine, peace support operations are  
multi-functional operations involving military forces and diplomatic and 
humanitarian agencies. They are designed to achieve humanitarian goals or a 
long-term political settlement and are conducted impartially in support of a UN or 
OSCE mandate. These include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, 
peacebuilding and humanitarian operations7 (HMSO, 1999: 1.1I). 
 
The second source is the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, the so-
called Brahimi Report (UN, 2000). This report contends that UN forces must be able to 
defend themselves effectively, and that this should include impartial defence in the mandate 
(Bellamy and Williams, 2010: 280; Pugh, 2008: 413, UN, 2000). Bellamy and Williams argue 
that both documents represent a response to the perceived failings of wider peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement operations in the 1990s. Particularly, in the light of Lt. Gen. Roméo 
Dallaire’s distressing experience in Rwanda, the Brahimi Report suggested that peacekeeping 
needed to be more flexible and robust. Pugh (2008: 413) argues that the Brahimi Report was 
seriously flawed in its assumptions that a strategy could be devised for both peacekeeping and 
enforcement by the same forces as if they were a part of a spectrum of force (whereas 
peacekeeping is on a spectrum of non-force). The third source is the American doctrine on 
“support and stability operations” and “peace operations”, although it takes a slightly different 
approach and uses different terminology (Bellamy and Williams, 2010: 280).  
                                                 
6 Bellamy and Williams (2010: 279) suggests that a liberal democratic state is often what is considered a 
functioning state. For instance, such operations were deployed in East Timor and in Bosnia and Kosovo.  
7 OSCE is the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.  
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 In military terms, the concept peace support operations insist that it is possible to use force in 
a peace operation without losing impartiality. This move is based on the idea that neutrality 
and impartiality are quite different things. Whereas neutral peacekeepers play no political 
role, refusing to take sides even in the face of breaches of a ceasefire, peace agreement or 
Security Council resolution, impartial peacekeepers discriminate between belligerents 
according to their compliance with the terms of the peace operations mandate and treat 
breaches in similar ways (Bellamy and Williams, 2010: 281). In other words, impartiality 
simply means treating everyone according to the same principles, whereas neutrality means 
opting to not take a position. Peace support operations rest on the view that it is possible to 
use force occasionally without undermining a mission’s impartiality. However, any use of 
force must be directed against a specific breach of the mandate, linked to a clearly defined 
outcome. In order to achieve this, the military component of a peace operation must be 
‘robust’, as the Brahimi Report suggests. Where necessary, it must be able to move swiftly 
from a traditional peacekeeping posture, based on concept and cooperation, to peace 
enforcement and back again (Bellamy and Williams, 2010: 281-282).  
 
Military tasks in peace support operations often need to be related to the broader tasks of the 
mission, such as maintaining and constructing infrastructure, assisting with institutional 
capacity-building, and cooperating with other community projects by providing manpower. 
This involves recognition of the fact that military peacekeepers play a supporting role to 
civilian agencies and thus deepen local consent. Ultimately, it is civilian-led activities, such as 
the delivery of humanitarian assistance, institution-building and the establishment of good 
government, economic reconstruction and national reconciliation, that lay the foundations for 
self-sustaining, stable peace. According to the concept of peace support operations, the role of 
military peacekeepers is to create an environment that is conducive to those activities. As 
such, the military component is seen as one of several components and not necessarily the 
most significant (Bellamy and Williams, 2010: 283-284).  
 
2.7.4. Integrated and hybrid peace support operations 
The UN has never had a monopoly in peace operations, or even peacekeeping. Under the UN 
system, the US-sponsored Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai after the Egypt-
Israel Peace Treaty of 1979 is a prominent example of a non-UN mission. The trend has been 
for the UN to opt out of operations likely to involve combat, and this has allowed groups of 
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states to act as proxies (Pugh, 2008: 417). Pugh argues that hybrid operations, in which 
freelance or regional organisations operate alongside one another, may reduce the problems 
arising from groups of self-appointed states policing their own interests, which can add to the 
dynamics of conflict. For instance, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) operates under the 
overall command of the AU’s African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) (Pugh, 2008: 418).  
 
Such hybrid operations place a high premium on effective coordination and integration, which 
has not often been apparent. Pugh argue (2008: 418) that although the UN has promoted 
hybrid operations its universal legitimacy and a trend towards increased professionalism 
should continue to make peace missions a core function of the organisation. Pugh further 
claims that freelance peace missions will be only one of a range on international responses to 
wars and complex emergencies (Pugh, 2008: 418). Nevertheless, freelance peace operations 
could be a positive development if regional organisations beyond Europe are able and willing 
to conduct multilateral missions in their region.   
 
2.8. Conclusion 
This chapter started out with presenting the history of mercenaries, in order to highlight that 
hiring outsiders to fight your battles has been a common practice throughout history. This 
chapter has further pointed out that current regulatory frameworks have proved relatively 
unsuccessful when applied to the private security industry that exists today, due to a focus on 
individuals’ motives rather than organised entities and the activities they engage in. 
Furthermore, this chapter has theorised the privatisation of security and authority within the 
international system, and in Africa in particular. The conclusion can be drawn that non-state 
actors are experiencing increased legitimate authority, and furthermore, that the spread of 
privatised security brings into question traditional understandings of the concepts of 
sovereignty. Moreover, this chapter has discussed the corporatisation of the private security 
industry, a development that came about due to the end of the Cold War and the consequent 
downsizing of armed forces; the emergence of new security threats in the post-Cold War 
environment; and transformations in the nature of warfare. Furthermore, this chapter has 
defined central concepts such as peacebuilding, peacekeeping and peace support operations. 
This has been done in order to further discuss the increased involvement of the private 
security industry in peacebuilding efforts, and the challenge of the United Nations and other 
international organisations to find a suitable balance between the public and private provision 
of peace-related initiatives. The next chapter will present a case study of the military and 
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security companies Executive Outcomes, MPRI and DynCorp, with a specific focus on their 
activities and involvement in Africa.  
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Chapter 3. The impact of Executive Outcomes, MPRI and DynCorp in peace 
operations and peacebuilding efforts in Africa 
 
3.1. Introduction 
During the 1990s, companies within the private security industry began to specialise, thereby 
taking advantage of new opportunities within strategic consulting, military training, 
operational support and logistics, armed protection and military operations. The privatisation 
of military operations has relied heavily on demobilised personnel from special forces and on 
specially qualified military officers, exemplified by companies such as the former Executive 
Outcomes, MPRI and DynCorp. The trend of outsourcing parts of military operations gained 
momentum after the end of the Cold War (Lock, 1999: 27-28). As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
tendency of privatising security has certainly played a significant role in post-colonial Africa. 
As a result, the United Nations came to condemn mercenary activities, and still has a special 
rapporteur on the issue. However, this condemnation of the private security industry is 
increasingly fading. The United States and its increasing reliance on the private security 
industry to carry out military support missions has been a major contributor behind this shift 
in opinion. Within the private security industry, MPRI and DynCorp are among the leading 
American-based contenders. Towards the end of the 1990s, the interventions of Executive 
Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone were viewed as the forerunners of a continued 
privatisation of international military relations (Lock, 1999: 28). 
 
In recent years, private military and security companies, such as DynCorp and MPRI, have 
frequently been hired to deliver different forms of US foreign military support, including 
training under the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), the Africa Contingency 
Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) and the Global Peace Operations Initiative 
(GPOI) programmes. These companies are involved in a varied and differentiated set of 
activities such as the post-conflict peacebuilding process in Liberia and the provision of 
logistics support to the African Union Mission to Sudan (AMIS) and the conflict in Darfur 
with strong emphasis on military security issues. The outsourcing of such programmes to 
private companies is certainly following the US administration’s recognised commitment to 
the dictates of neo-liberalism and the emphasis on privatisation. Moreover, these ideas are 
increasingly also being applied in states where private military and security companies 
perform (Aning et al., 2008: 616). In addition, as business unites, private military and security 
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companies are often tied through complex financial arrangements to other firms within as well 
as beyond their industry.  
 
This chapter will provide case studies of three companies representing different activities 
within the private security industry on the African continent. Executive Outcomes generally 
provided combat and operational support (previous to its closure in 1999), MPRI offers 
military advice and training, while DynCorp primarily deliver logistical support. As a result, 
the main users of the three companies vary accordingly; while Executive Outcomes and MPRI 
tend to be hired by governments, DynCorp is primarily hired by multinational companies, 
humanitarian agencies and peacekeeping organisations (Lilly, 2000a: 11; Shearer, 1998). The 
case study of each company will look at its background, corporate connections and major 
operations, with a particular focus on involvement in Africa. This chapter will end with a 
concluding section, focusing on the corporate functions of the three companies, as well as 
their efforts to take on operations with seemingly humanitarian agendas.  
 
3.2. Executive Outcomes 
Within the privatised military industry, Executive Outcomes (EO) is perhaps the best known 
company. According to Singer (2008: 101) it is also the most celebrated player in the 
implementation subsector, conducting openly public military operations all over the globe, 
and thus embodies much of what any definition of a private military company is all about. 
Originally, EO was set up in 1989 as an intelligence training unit for South African Defence 
Force (SADF) special forces to be run by Eeben Barlow. Barlow was a former assistant 
commander of the 32nd Battalion of the SADF before he became the head of an external South 
African Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) cell that allegedly could be tied to the murder of 
African National Congress (ANC) activists in Europe. Through his time with the CCB, 
Barlow likely developed many of his corporate connections that would later prove useful for 
EO (Singer, 2008: 102; Shearer, 1998: 41). Lafras Luitingh was also one of EO’s founders, 
with a background in South Africa’s apartheid-era special forces (Cleaver, 2000: 139). The 
company registered in South Africa, but quickly began running operations in other countries. 
Its first contracts were to provide covert espionage training to the SADF special forces units, 
as well as security provision for corporate clients such as the diamond firm DeBeers (Singer 
2008: 107). In 1997, both Barlow and Luitingh left EO and the company was then headed by 
Nick van den Bergh, a former officer in the South African parachute regiment. Cleaver argues 
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that it “appears that his past was a little less controversial than those of his predecessors and 
thus better for the corporate image” (Cleaver, 2000: 139).  
 
Executive Outcomes formally dissolved itself early in 1999 and is thus a defunct company. 
However, the activities of EO throughout Africa hold significant importance, both for the 
growth of other companies within the private security industry and, thus, for the analysis of 
private military and security companies. EO’s defining organisational characteristics lay in its 
origin in the elite forces of the apartheid-era South African Defence Force and its tight 
business links to other mining and oil corporations (Singer, 2008: 101). Kevin O’Brien claims 
that EO was the world’s first ‘corporate army’ and, while many viewed it as a mercenary 
force, some argue that it was the only effective peacekeeping force on a continent that more or 
less had been left by the Western world to find its own solutions (O’Brien, 1998: 84).  
 
Canadian journalist James Davis categorises EO as a private military company within combat 
services, meaning that it was a commercial entity conducting combat or combat support 
operations (Davis, in Patterson, 2009: 60-62). Such companies supply command and control, 
fire support, communications, intelligence, planning and combat troops. While EO for many 
represents the modern face of mercenary activity, its corporate mission statement differed 
little from that of MPRI or other companies offering military assistance. EO claimed to 
“create a climate for peace and stability for foreign investment” and that it only works for 
‘recognised’ governments. By recognised EO meant pro-Western rather than necessarily 
democratic governments (Shearer, 1998: 40).  
 
EO had unique expertise in low-intensity conflict, drawing on its years of experience. It 
recognised that the concept of frontlines was meaningless in such wars and aimed to keep the 
enemy force constantly off balance. Surprise long-range helicopter assault operations against 
targets deep within enemy territory, supported by ground attack aircraft, became a hallmark of 
EO operations. EO was innovative and adjusted to changing situations by using ad hoc tactics 
not found in the books, options perhaps less possible in a public military (Singer, 2008:116). 
 
3.2.1. Corporate connections 
For two reasons, EO’s main contracts were with countries holding valuable mineral resources. 
First, mineral wealth is one of the few means available by which developing countries can 
afford the services of an outside force. Second, the types of conflict in which EO became 
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involved were often fought to win control of this wealth, thus making these countries likely 
places of conflict. EO denies a formal link in the shape of shareholdings with larger corporate 
entities, although EO has been paid for its services in mining concessions granted to 
companies with which it has close connections (Shearer, 1998: 43). Pech (1999: 90) argues 
that EO’s operations facilitated the granting of some of the richest diamond concessions in the 
world, valued at over US $3 billion. Furthermore, evidence suggests a close relationship 
between an umbrella organisation originally formed as Strategic Resources Corporation 
(SRC), and the Branch-Heritage Group of mining and exploration companies. Through SRC, 
EO was closely linked to a number of other private security companies, such as Lifeguard 
Security and Saracen Security. EO also had a close business relationship with the Branch-
Heritage Group, which was based in the same London office building as the agents acting for 
EO (Cleaver, 2000: 139). The Branch-Heritage group, consisting of several subsidiaries, has 
specialised in developing mineral and oil deposits in insecure areas. This ‘high-risk, high-gain 
policy’ has benefited from the company’s relationship with EO and its subsidiaries (Shearer, 
1998: 45). The Branch-Heritage Group also includes another private security company, 
namely Sandline International (Cleaver, 2000: 140). Shearer argues (1998: 43) that links 
between the directors of the Branch-Heritage Group and African leaders were often 
instrumental in negotiating EO’s entry into countries such as Sierra Leone and Angola, and its 
securing of mineral concessions. However, proof of formal corporate links between Branch-
Heritage and EO is difficult to find and, according to Shearer, is likely buried in offshore 
company-registration offices (Shearer, 1998: 43).  
 
Another company that was an integral part of the EO story is Ibis Air, which could essentially 
be described as the private air force of Executive Outcomes. Although it was a separate 
holding in the umbrella group, the links between the two companies would make them almost 
undistinguishable to outsiders. Ibis Air accompanied EO on its most significant operations, 
and was also leased out to the client or state that had hired EO. The close ties with Ibis Air 
gave EO the ability to lift and deploy a fighting force anywhere around the globe, a capability 
even most state militaries lack (Singer, 2008: 106). For example, during the time of EOs 
operations in Angola and Sierra Leone in 1995, Ibis Air reportedly operated about 20 
helicopters (Singer, 2008: 106). In addition, the links between EO and Ibis Air resulted in a 
company policy that all operations had the support of at least one attack helicopter and a 
medical transport plane on standby. Cleaver argues that, although there are no official 
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corporate links between EO and the Branch-Heritage Group, they both share interests in Ibis 
Air (Cleaver, 2000: 140).    
 
3.2.2. Major operations 
Executive Outcomes carried out operations in Uganda, Kenya, South Africa, Indonesia and 
Congo to name a few. However, the Angola and Sierra Leone episodes capture the impact that 
an effective military provider company can have in altering the process and outcome of a 
conflict. The only known unsuccessful EO operation was in the Congo, where the company 
was not defeated in battle, but rather betrayed by the government that had hired it (Singer, 
2008: 116). African governments that most need the services of private military companies 
can often least afford to pay them. Angela MacIntyre and Taya Weiss (2007: 71) argue that 
Sierra Leone provides a case study for the complications inherent when PMCs are 
compensated in the form of concessions to extract natural resources from the client country. 
 
3.2.2.1. Sierra Leone 
The post-colonial regime in Sierra Leone, led by Siaka Stevens, quickly devolved into a one-
party kleptocracy (Singer, 2008: 111). The fighting in Sierra Leone began in March 1991, 
when a small group of fighters led by Foday Sankoh crossed the border from Liberia, fighting 
under the flag of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)8. Although lacking any clearly 
defined political agenda, RUF’s willingness to use violence against the regime was evident. It 
quickly became apparent that the government’s ability to resist the RUF was undermined by 
its very corrupt nature. The army had been largely ceremonial, completely unprofessional and 
was recruited from among the same alienated youths as the RUF. Consequently, the RUF met 
little resistance and quickly lost terrain to the rebels (Singer, 2008: 111). By April 1995, the 
RUF had advanced toward the capital of Freetown. Grasping at options when the UN, the UK 
and US had all declined the government’s request to intervene, Executive Outcomes was 
hired to bolster the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) government of Valentine 
Strasser9. The contract was for approximately $15 million dollars and called for the defeat of 
the RUF and their clearance from the capital region and several key industrial sites. The 
original one-year contract called for a total of 160 EO personnel to be deployed on the 
                                                 
8 Sankoh had earlier been excluded from the army in Sierra Leone, before joining the RUF. During training at a 
revolutionary camp in Libya in the 1980s he made acquaintance of Charles Taylor, an aspiring rebel leader in 
Liberia. Taylor’s bid for power in Liberia had stalled when the Nigerian-led ECOMOG intervention force 
stepped in. The government of Sierra Leone had supported this operation, prompting Taylor to support Sankoh 
in return, with money, arms and mercenaries in order to destabilise Sierra Leone (Singer, 2008: 111). 
9 The NPRC government had come to power in a coup against the RUF in 1992 (Shearer, 1998: 49). 
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ground. It was later supplemented by contacts for additional manpower that brought the total 
cost to $35 million for the 21 months that the company was in Sierra Leone (Singer, 2008: 
112). While some commentators have argued that this was too high a price for a financially 
crippled government to pay, the bill only represented one-third of the total cost of the 
government’s war effort. The UN force that had been planned to stay in the country for eight 
months after the peace agreement was signed was to cost $47 million (Shearer, 1998: 51). 
Furthermore, the IMF had given its approval for payments to EO as part of Sierra Leone’s 
overall budget, recognising the need for stability to attract investment (Shearer, 1998: 53). 
 
As mentioned, EO first made an appearance in Sierra Leone to drive the RUF back from an 
assault on Freetown in 1995. Later that same year, EO expanded their operations into rural 
Sierra Leone, re-taking the diamond areas. In early January 1996, EO reclaimed control over 
the Sierra Rutile mine, formerly a major source of revenue for the country. Both the diamond 
mine in Kono and the Sierra Rutile mine have become post-war flashpoints in the conflict 
between government and civilians over armed private security and local governance issues 
such as housing and development. It is generally agreed by all parties that the players 
involved in private security and mining had close personal connections, also after the war 
ended (McIntyre and Weiss, 2007: 72).  
 
The EO operation in Sierra Leone was planned closely with government commands, although 
intelligence leaks caused EO to deviate from the initial plan. EO’s military success in Sierra 
Leone testifies to its expertise in low-intensity conflict. The company increased its 
effectiveness by using cheap ex-Soviet weaponry generally purchased by the host government 
but operated by EO personnel. According to Shearer (1998: 54), EO’s greatest strength in 
Sierra Leone, and in Angola, was the use of its intelligence capabilities to build a profile of 
enemy activities. For instance, night-sighting equipment, radio-interception devices and aerial 
reconnaissance were used extensively. In addition, EO made good use of local expertise, 
which usually stood in contrast to the strongly electronic orientation of modern Western 
military intelligence-gathering. In Sierra Leone, the Kamajors10 became an essential part of 
EO’s information-collection network. Familiar with the jungle and sworn enemies of the 
                                                 
10 The Kamajors are a Mende group from the south-east of Sierra Leone, based on traditional hunter guilds and 
skilled in bushcraft. EO supplemented the Kamajors by providing additional training in counter-insurgency. The 
use of the Kamajors grew from the efforts of a retired army officer, Captain Hinja Norman, to mobilise a local 
militia force for the defence of Tetu Bogor, a chiefdom south of Bo of which he was the regent chief, during 
1994. Chief Norman’s activities saw the Kamajor militia grow to 2,000 to 3,000 strong (Douglas, 1999: 183).  
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RUF, the Kamajors reported the movements and locations of rebel units to the EO. They 
became fiercely loyal to the South African company, whom they and the majority of the 
population regarded as liberators. Douglas argues that, as time progressed, the protection of 
civilian life and property increasingly became the recognised role of the Kamajors and the 
EO, while the efforts of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) and the RUF 
were generally viewed as self-serving (Douglas, 1999: 183).  
 
The Kamajors provided information and intelligence to EO and, in some cases, acted as 
guides for assault operations. The Kamajors eventually became recognised as protectors of 
civilian life and of regional defence operations (Douglas, 1999: 183). EO had an advantage in 
that they managed to establish and maintain a positive relationship with the public, as well as 
cooperating with local forces. Establishing local ownership is, among other aspects, essential 
in post-conflict reconstruction and security sector reform. However, the military training of 
the Kamajors would become significant later, as it created an additional armed force in Sierra 
Lone not tied to the government. The Kamajors’ rise to power has since complicated domestic 
politics in Sierra Lone and thereby provides an illustration of the unintended consequences 
that private military and security companies can have on conflicts (Singer, 2008: 113).  
 
In 1996, after a series of setbacks, the RUF agreed to negotiate with the government for the 
first time. In February of that year, some stability had been achieved and a multiparty civilian 
presidential election was conducted11. The elections brought to power Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, 
a former UN administrator (Singer, 2008: 113). When the RUF pulled out of the peace 
agreement in October of that year, EO went back into the field and destroyed its headquarters. 
As a result, the RUF leader signed the peace accords in November of 1996, which mandated 
EO’s withdrawal as a condition of signature. However, the stability that EO prompted was not 
long-lasting. Facing opposition from the international community for the continued 
employment of EO and expecting the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force, President 
Kabbah terminated the company’s contract early and EO left in January 1997. Due to renewed 
RUF opposition and the failure of any donors to supply the necessary funding, the expected 
UN force did not deploy. Instead, a Nigerian-led ECOMOG force entered in its place. EO had 
warned Kabbah that their premature departure would result in another coup, predicting that 
                                                 
11 In the interim, a new leader General Julius Bio, whom EO preferred to Strasser had taken over the government 
in Sierra Leone. It was suspected that EO had contributed to his coup. While this was not the case, EO did 
approve of the coup, as Bio was considered easier to work with (Singer, 2008: 113-114).  
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one would occur within 100 days. This prediction proved correct when, 95 days later, the 
RUF in cooperation with mid-level army officers toppled Kabbah’s government in May 1997 
(Singer, 2008: 114). On June 1998, the Security Council established the United Nations 
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) for an initial period of six months. Due to 
continued rebel attacks, the Security Council on 22 October 1999 authorised the establishment 
of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), a new and much larger mission 
with a maximum of 6,000 military personnel. UNAMSIL continued to increase in size and, by 
2001, it was the largest peacekeeping force in the world, with over 17,000 military personnel 
(UN, 2005a). UNAMSIL concluded its mandate at the end of 2005, having declared that its 
mission was complete (UN, 2005b: 1).  
 
Leslie Hough argues that EO had several advantages over the ECOMOG and UNAMSIL in 
intervening in the conflict in Sierra Leone (Hough, 2007: 20). While the ECOMOG and 
UNAMSIL in particular suffered from unclear and at times inappropriate mandates, EO had a 
clear peace-enforcing mandate. In addition the ECOMOG and UNAMSIL suffered from 
inefficient multilateral structures, which led to communications problems and conflict of 
interests within the headquarters, and insufficiently trained and inexperienced troops (Hough, 
2007: 20). Furthermore, EO had advantages such as its “unitary structure, the elite training 
and experience of its forces in counterinsurgency techniques, its intelligence gathering 
capabilities, its role as a force multiplier, as well as the financial and professional incentives 
for its soldiers and headquarters to win against the RUF as quickly and efficiently as possible” 
(Hough, 2007: 20).  
 
3.2.2.2. Angola 
A ceasefire between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was agreed in Portugal in 
199212, thereby clearing the way for elections in September of that year. The polls were 
declared free and fair by the UN, and MPLA won the election. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi 
refused to accept the result, and fighting resumed. UNITA concentrated on their traditional 
                                                 
12 The war in Angola can be traced all the way back to its abrupt independence from Portuguese colonial rule in 
1975. Hundred of thousands of Portuguese, the majority of the educated population, left the country leaving 
Angola in a difficult state. For the better part of the next 25 years the superpowers, their proxies, and white 
minority governments in the region refuelled the conflict by injecting cash, arms and military personnel. The 
Soviet Union and its allies supported the communist MPLA, while the US and South Africa supported UNITA. 
By the time EO became involved in the Angolan conflict in 1993, the end of the Cold War had left the Angolan 
government without external support, as many of its Soviet-bloc allies now ceased to exist (Singer, 2008: 107-
108). 
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areas of support and quickly achieved successes. By 1993, UNITA controlled 80% of Angola, 
including the Soyo oil centre (Shearer, 1998: 46). 
 
The origins of EO’s activities in Angola are not entirely clear. Singer argues that although the 
details of the initial contract are not public, it is clear that this is the point that EO made its 
first mark on the Angolan conflict (Singer, 2008: 108). Shearer argues that the Angolan 
government hired EO to regain the Soyo area on behalf of the Angolan army (Shearer, 1998: 
46; Singer, 2008: 108). Cleaver argues that the company initially was retained by a number of 
oil companies in 1992 to protect their installations in the Soyo region of Angola, where 
Heritage Oil and Gas and the state-owned oil company Sonogal had interests (Cleaver, 2000: 
140). In March 1993, EO was contracted by the Angolan government to assist in the recapture 
of the strategically vital Soyo region. Backed by Angolan forces, EO was successful in 
recapturing the facilities (Cleaver, 2000: 140). The Soyo operation and EO’s openness about 
its involvement in the operation caused observers to be amazed at the company’s overall 
effectiveness. However, it also created suspicions due to the fact that they were fighting 
alongside the Angolan government, which had been the fiercest enemy of the private 
company’s employees when they were serving the SADF13.   
 
However, the control over the Soyo oil centre was subsequently lost again after EO’s 
departure; this action led the Angolan government to offer EO a $40 million dollar one-year 
contract to train its forces. The contract was renewed continuously until January 1996. 
However, after a series of setbacks in 1994, UNITA agreed to sign a peace accord in Lusaka 
in November of that year. Defence strategists have credited EO with being an essential 
component in restructuring the Armed Forces of Angola (FAA) and turning the tide of the 
war. The critics of EO argue that the company played a minor role, and that the MPLA’s 
military successes were the result of UNITA’s international isolation, together with the lifting 
of the arms embargo on the government. However, Shearer argues that EO’s entry into the 
war coincided precisely with the turning point in the MPLA’s military successes. 
Furthermore, in a seeming recognition of EO’s effectiveness, UNITA made a condition to its 
signature that the company leaves the country (Singer, 2008: 109). Much of EO’s contribution 
was based on tactical advice, and possibly was supported by intelligence information on 
                                                 
13 Many of EO’s employees had been involved in the Angolan conflict in the late 1980s while serving in the 
SADF, supporting and fighting alongside Jonas Savimbi and his rebel movement UNITA. On numerous 
occasions the SADF intervened to prevent UNITA’s defeat and also to punish Angolan support of rebels fighting 
apartheid rule in Namibia and South Africa (Singer, 2008: 107-108).  
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UNITA’s activities leaked via South African sources. EO continued to assist the FAA until 
December 1995, when it was requested to withdraw by Angolan President Eduardo dos 
Santos after personal lobbying by then US President Bill Clinton (Shearer, 1998: 48; Singer, 
2008: 109). In the aftermath of the contract’s termination, a UN peacekeeping operation was 
deployed, but it was unable to secure the peace and fighting resumed. The war continued for 
several more years, until the death of Jonas Savimbi in February of 2002. This brought about 
a ceasefire and, on 4 April 2002, the FAA and UNITA signed a memorandum of 
understanding that halted the fighting, and peace was formally declared on 2 August 2002 
(Human Rights Watch, 2003: 13). 
 
3.2.3. The end of Executive Outcomes 
Despite the efforts to polish its image, the past came back to haunt EO. The company was 
never able to shake its link to the apartheid past of its founders, and clients found it easier to 
hire a competitor. The South African government largely overlooked the fact that EO 
launched its operations from South Africa, thereby leading to speculations as to whether the 
government privately tolerated or even supported EO (Shearer, 1998: 54). Because it was 
linked to the history of the apartheid regime’s defence, the new South African government 
was embarrassed by EO’s activities and fears persisted among ANC figures that EO 
represented a so-called ‘Third Force’ of the old regime that had come close to hindering the 
country’s transition. However, most unease was felt towards individual employees, especially 
those formerly with the CCB, rather than towards the company as a whole (Shearer, 1998: 
55). 
 
As a result, domestic legislation was formulated in 1997 that sought to regulate the new trade 
in private military and security services. Under the provision of The Regulation of Foreign 
Military Assistance Bill of 1998, a company such as EO was compelled to seek the South 
African government’s authorisation for each contract. At the time, many analysts took this to 
mean that such military provider companies that offered implementation and combat services 
were no longer viable. However, rather than truly ending their business, it appears that EO 
simply devolved its activities, illustrating the final advantage that private companies have. A 
number of companies once associated with EO, such as Sandline, Lifeguard and Saracen, are 
all still active in the private security industry. In addition, a number of new companies headed 
and staffed by former EO personnel have opened up since EO shut down in 1999 (Singer, 
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2008: 118). In other words, although EO technically closed down, it simply globalised and 
transformed its activities to suit the market better.   
 
3.3. Military Professional Resources, Incorporated (MPRI) 
MRPI has probably become the best-known and largest current US private military company. 
Initiated and led by an elite of retired US military personnel, it has taken a prominent place in 
the lucrative market offered by the outsourcing of many former military functions (Cilliers 
and Douglas, 1999: 111). MPRI was established in 1987, when eight former senior military 
officers of the US military incorporated the company under the business-friendly laws of the 
state of Delaware, USA. The company’s headquarters are located in Virginia, USA, a short 
distance from the Pentagon, implying a continuing close relationship. MPRI originally 
planned to tap into the domestic military market that opened up as the Pentagon downsized at 
the end of the Cold War (Singer, 2008: 120). MPRI is encouraged to undertake profit-making 
military ventures that are aligned with the national security interests of the US, and does so 
overtly. Instead, the opening up of the global market of military services led it to take on an 
increasing range of international operations, many in settings where the US military is 
prohibited (Singer, 2008: 119). MPRI claim that the firm is distinguished by its 
professionalism and loyalty to US foreign policy goals, and that they work only in a training 
capacity and not in direct combat. The company’s key asset, as with Executive Outcomes, is a 
carefully managed database of former military personnel, among whom the company can 
replicate every single military skill. MPRI have no standing force, and personnel selection is 
specifically tailored to each contract’s requirements.  
 
James Davis has categorised MPRI as a military train-equip company within non-combat 
services (Davis, in Patterson, 2009: 60-62). Davis argues that such companies typically 
provide military consulting, training and support excluding a commitment to engage in 
combat (Davis, in Patterson, 2009: 60-62). For instance, they can carry out staff training for 
air, ground and sea operations; supply arms and offer planning and force development 
programmes; train forces in modern electronic, intelligence and logistics operations; and are 
able to coordinate the training of units on the ground in combined arms to enhance their 
effectiveness.  
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3.3.1. Corporate connections 
Indeed, MPRI’s most distinguishing feature is the prevalence of former senior military figures 
among its employees and the contacts with the US military that this implies. The hierarchy 
within the company broadly appears to reflect the former seniority of rank within the military 
(Shearer, 1998: 56). Unlike many of its larger corporate counterparts, military work has 
remained at the core of the MPRI’s activities. Where EO was not successful in maintaining 
close ties with its home government, MPRI has managed to keep close contact with former 
colleagues still in public service. This gives MPRI a decided advantage over corporate rivals, 
because these ties provide the firm with a steady flow of business recommendations and 
information (Singer, 2008: 120-121). However, the concern with such ties is that they defeat 
the notion of competition that underlies the advantages of privatising services. Some have 
also raised questions as to whether these close ties to the US military simply make MPRI an 
extension of the US military. However, it certainly gives MPRI an advantage in that they can 
go into areas where the US military cannot. This, in addition to the company’s close ties with 
the US government, creates advantages over other companies in the private security industry.  
 
According to MPRI, the company “manages programs throughout the United States and in 
more than 40 countries overseas” (MPRI, 2008). In June 2000, defence giant L-3 
Communications acquired MPRI for $40 million. L-3 was started in 1997 by former Loral 
Corporation executives Frank C. Lanza and Robert V. LaPenta, along with the Lehman 
Brothers investment banking firm. MPRI has since “acquired Ship Analytics, Inc. (December 
2002), Haven Automation, Ltd. (March 2003), BeamHit LLC (May 2004), GE Driver (May 
2004), and Hitec-O (November 2005)” (MPRI, 2008). MPRI states that these “acquisitions 
have provided complementary service lines to MPRI’s traditional offerings and enhance the 
company’s ability to support its customers’ needs” (MPRI, 2008).  
 
3.3.2. Major operations 
3.3.2.1. Former Yugoslavia 
MPRI has capitalised well on the business opportunities offered by post-Cold War Europe and 
an expanding NATO. Of MPRI’s operations, its activities in the former Yugoslavia have 
attracted the most international attention. Under a contract signed with the US State 
Department in mid-1994, 45 MPRI personnel served as border monitors for the UN sanctions 
against Serbia from 1994 to 1995 (Singer, 2008: 125). The contract ended 18 months later, 
when sanctions were lifted with the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace 
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in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Accords) in November 1995 (Shearer, 1998: 38). In 
1994 the company was contracted by the Republic of Croatia to help with its military’s 
transition to a professional force (Singer, 2008: 125). Under that contract, MPRI was to 
design a long-term management programme for the Croatian Ministry of Defence with 
strategic capabilities to increase the possibilities of Croatia becoming a member of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).  
 
It especially has been the company’s alleged role in Operation Storm, a coordinated offensive 
against the Serb-held Krajina region by Croat forces in August 1995, that has received 
attention. Serb defences collapsed rapidly and the whole territory was recaptured within a 
week. The scale and sophistication of the operation greatly surprised Western military 
analysts. This new-found coordination is generally believed to have been achieved with covert 
involvement of the US government. However, the US administration downplayed Operation 
Storm’s humanitarian consequences, namely the creation of 120,000 Serb refugees. Since the 
US military was not involved in the area at the time, suspicion turned to MPRI. The company 
denies any link to the operation, claiming that its involvement was limited to instructions on 
civil-military relations, and not on weapons training. Either way, the suspected involvement 
of MPRI has generally benefited the company, enhancing its reputation and raising its profile 
above that of larger established companies due to the fact that the operation was of such 
complexity (Shearer, 1998: 59). 
  
3.3.2.2. Minor contracts in Africa  
MPRI does not possess the same record of extensive operations in Africa as Executive 
Outcomes or DynCorp. However, since the mid-1980s, USA has been using private military 
and security companies such as MPRI to maintain a high-profile presence in Africa, 
especially in the Great Lakes Region, and the company has conducted several small-scale 
operations throughout the continent (Musah, 2002: 922). One of MPRI’s acknowledged 
contracts in Africa were a minor operation to train Nigerian forces in the use and maintenance 
of US-supplied military vehicles in Liberia. MPRI’s efforts concentrated on training and 
retooling a punitive rapid reaction force with high-speed gunboats to pacify the restless oil-
rich Niger Delta basin, much to the irritation of local commanders (Musah, 2002: 931).  
 
In 1996, MPRI negotiated a $60 million contract with the Angolan government to provide a 
training programme for its military and police forces. EO had bid for the contract, but lost out, 
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despite most observers feeling that the South African company was better suited for the 
conflict situation in Angola (Singer, 2008: 131). The likely rationale behind MPRI gaining 
access to Angola ran in two directions. For the United States, it would provide enhanced 
influence over the local situation, whereas the Angolan government saw it as a way to bind 
the US closer and further isolate UNITA. Political advantage seems to be the real impetus 
behind the deal, rather than MPRI’s specific training programme and expertise (Singer, 2008: 
131). However, the contract was never fulfilled, for a variety of reasons. Initially, there were 
disagreements over the duration and cost of the contract. Renewed fighting between the 
government and UNITA also complicated MPRI’s role. Although not confirmed, it has been 
suggested that the problem was not the actual contract numbers, but rather the absence of 
bonuses, or ‘bribes’, for the Angolan Army officers involved in the contract negotiations14 
(Singer, 2008: 131).   
 
Internationally, MRPI point out that it only works on contracts approved by the US 
government. For instance, in 1995 the company made a bid to work for long-time ally Mobutu 
Sese Seko in former Zaire, but, due to policy shifts, this was rejected by the State Department, 
illustrating that the private company’s inclinations are not always in line with all branches of 
the US government (Singer, 2008: 122). However, in some cases, MPRI’s close connections 
with former colleagues still employed in the public sector make the company able to lobby 
and sway the US government to approve licences for certain contracts.  
 
MPRI’s involvement in Equatorial Guinea exemplifies how its close connection with the US 
government has enabled the company to influence decision-making processes. McIntyre and 
Weiss argue that an intriguing illustration of the private force-state-corporate nexus exists in 
Equatorial Guinea (McIntyre and Weiss, 2007: 76). As a major African oil producer, 
Equatorial Guinea was already attracting exploration in the 1970s, but it was only in the 
1990s that the boom really began. The country has become an important destination for 
foreign, and particularly for US investment. However, Equatorial Guinea’s paranoid and 
fratricidal regime has invested negligibly in anything but its own security and a highly 
personalised interest in the oil industry. The country is ruled by a small elite, and oppression 
seems to prevent any political opposition. MPRI was hired in 1997 to train Equatorial Guineas 
coastguard which was necessary to protect offshore oil installations (McIntyre and Weiss, 
                                                 
14 Such off-budget bribes are typical in Angolan business. According to the US Department of Energy, Angolan 
officers received $900 million in bonuses/payoffs in 1999 (Richardson, 2000; Singer, 2008: 297). 
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2007: 76). The involvement of MPRI, although small in scale, is significant in that the 
company was initially denied a licence to take on the contract by two separate US State 
Department offices, holding up its signing for two years due to Equatorial Guineas appalling 
human rights record (Schreier and Caparini, 2005: 73). Nevertheless, the company lobbied 
successfully and managed to convince US authorities that the work would, in fact, be serving 
foreign policy interests, and the licence was eventually granted. Furthermore, MPRI 
convinced US policymakers that if they were not allowed to take on the contract, another 
foreign private military and security company would15 (Schreier and Caparini, 2005: 73). 
McIntyre and Weiss argue that “at best, this did not bode well for self-regulation in the 
industry; at worst, it indicated a willingness on the part of the US government to support a 
pariah state” (McIntyre and Weiss, 2007: 77). The growing importance of African oil reserves 
to the United States is among the possible justifications the US government could have 
accepted in reversing its original decision (McIntyre and Weiss, 2007: 77).  
 
3.3.2.3. ACRI, ACOTA and GPOI 
In 1996 the US government launched the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), a seven-
nation training programme established to help developing African countries’ capacity to 
create effective, rapidly deployable peacekeeping units (Singer, 2008: 131). ACRI’s official 
mandate was to provide training for both peacekeeping and humanitarian aid. One of the 
purposes of the initiative was to modernise local armed forces and bring them in line with US 
norms, particularly in response to the emerging terrorism in Africa. Its other purpose was to 
avoid a repeat of the Somalia disaster (Abramovici and Stoker, 2004: 687). Since the Somalia 
operation and the genocide in Rwanda, US policy has centred increasingly on developing the 
capacities of African countries to undertake peace operations under the pretext of ‘African 
solutions to African problems’. However, Kenneth Mpyisi argues that ACRI’s establishment 
acknowledges the fact that the US is unlikely to intervene in armed conflicts on the African 
continent (Mpyisi, 2007: 35). Aning et al. further claim that the establishment of ACRI is 
merely a convenient alibi to conceal US inaction (Aning et al., 2008, 615). Although ACRI is 
the creation of the US State Department, it is the US army’s European Command (EUCOM) 
that coordinates military resources, particularly the use of Special Forces. Private companies 
specialising in the sector, such as MRPI, provide logistical support, including equipment or 
specialist civilian personnel (Abramovici and Stoker, 2004: 687).  
                                                 
15 Schreier and Caparini argue (2005: 73) that another contender for the contract in Equatorial Guinea was a 
French private military and security company. 
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 The ACRI programme revolves around the principle of using minimal equipment for 
maximum training. It is based on six key objectives: standardisation, inter-operability, 
training the trainers, transparency, support and team-work. Bah and Aning (2008: 121) argue 
that, because ACRI had been crafted around Cold War peacekeeping doctrine designed for 
interstate conflicts, it quickly proved inappropriate for intrastate conflicts that often are 
characterised by disregard for international humanitarian law. However, while several 
countries embraced ACRI, the two regional powers, Nigeria and South Africa, remained 
opposed to what they viewed as a foreign initiative that did not address African concerns (Bah 
and Aning, 2008: 121). After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the US boosted military 
investment in Africa, particularly to avoid African countries from being used as bases for 
terrorism. Following this, ACRI was succeeded by the Africa Contingency Training 
Assistance (ACOTA) in 2004, an initiative of the administration of President George W. 
Bush. ACOTA, like its predecessor, was based on bilateral agreements between the United 
States and its recipient states, but it also allowed for the possibility of support to regional and 
sub-regional organisations. Furthermore, the ACOTA initiative placed more emphasis on 
peace enforcement versus peacekeeping skills (Mpyisi, 2007: 38). Abramovici and Stoker 
argue that, “while the forces deployed within the ACRI framework were never placed in a 
situation in which their security was threatened, those in the ACOTA framework will have to 
be prepared to face danger, since they will be responsible for restoring peace” (Abramovici 
and Stoker, 2004: 688). ACOTA is linked to the training centres of the Joint Combined Arms 
Training System (JCATS). The JCATS are run by MPRI and are described as essential, 
because they make it possible to maintain levels of qualification and military groundwork by 
using sophisticated simulation software that imitate battlefield situations (Abramovici and 
Stoker, 2004: 688).  
 
From late 2004, the ACOTA initiative was largely folded into the broader G8 Global Peace 
Operations Initiative (GPOI), which aimed to train 75,000 new peacekeepers worldwide, but 
with a focus on Africa, by 2010 (Bellamy and Williams, 2010: 124). Starting from fiscal year 
2006, US funds for peacekeeping training in Africa are now being channelled primarily 
through the GPOI, which incorporates the ACOTA and other US funds. Nina Serafino argues 
that under ACRI, private contractors, such as MPRI, were initially hired to conduct classroom 
training, while US soldiers were to provide field training. However, because of the increased 
demand for US soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, MPRI also began to conduct field training. 
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By the time GPOI was initiated, private contractors conducted most of the training, while 
active-duty military officers played a minimal role (Serafino, 2007: 5). McFate (2008b: 16) 
argues that until recently, the US State Department had outsourced the GPOI programme in 
its whole to private military and security companies. In 2006, the US Department of State 
awarded the GPOI contract to MPRI, as one of three contractors. It was a one-year contract 
with a possibility of being prolonged for up to four years, with a contract value ceiling of 
$500 million through 2011 (McFate, 2008b: 16). However, the contract was cancelled in 2008 
and the US State Department did not disburse any money to these companies (McFate, 2008b: 
16).  
 
3.4. DynCorp International 
There is a growing market for corporate logistics and hybrid peacekeeping services. 
American-based DynCorp International is one of the largest companies filling this niche 
(Burton-Rose and Madsen, 1999). DynCorp’s services range from equipment maintenance to 
paramilitary security forces to training police. DynCorp International has provided logistical 
support in Sierra Leone and Kuwait, intelligence and monitoring for the US in Croatia and 
Kosovo, training of police forces in Iraq, and personal security for government officials in 
Afghanistan (Schreier and Caparini, 2005: 31-33). The company provided logistics for the 
United Nations peacekeeping mission in Somalia from 1992 to 1995. Similar to the MPRI, 
DynCorp International has close ties with the US government. Since 2004, DynCorp has held 
an umbrella US State Department contract for peacekeeping, capacity enhancement and 
surveillance efforts in Africa. The contract was valued at between $20 million and $100 
million depending on the number of assignments (Tomlinson, 2007). In 2009, this contract 
was followed up by a new, indefinite delivery contract under the US State Department’s 
Africa Peacekeeping Program (AFRICAP) (DynCorp, 2009).  
 
According to James Davis, DynCorp is a company that can be placed within different 
categories of non-combat services (Davis, in Patterson, 2009: 62-63). In many ways it is a 
military train-and-equip company that provides military consulting, training and support 
excluding a commitment to engage in combat. Their operation in Liberia stands as an example 
of this type of activity. However, DynCorp also provides travel security for executives, 
supplies corporate intelligence and analysis and conduct corporate fraud and forensic 
investigations, and thus can also be categorised as a civilian security services company. In 
addition, DynCorp perform other activities that are not involved in combat functions, such as 
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logistic support. Logistic support companies have grown to the point where many militaries, 
and the US in particular, cannot sustain campaigns without them (Patterson, 2009: 62-63).  
 
3.4.2. Corporate connections 
DynCorp International has its origin with two companies formed in 1946, namely Land-Air 
Inc. and California Eastern Airways. Contract Field Teams (CFT) provide mission support 
and depot-level repair to US military aircraft and weapons systems worldwide. DynCorp and 
its predecessors have provided services under the CFT programme continuously since being 
awarded that first contract. In 1951, Land-Air Inc. was acquired by California Eastern 
Airways. After several name changes, the corporation eventually took the name DynCorp in 
1987. In March 2003, DynCorp and its subsidiaries were acquired by Computer Sciences 
Corporation (CSC). While DynCorp remained the parent of its existing subsidiaries, CSC 
became their ultimate ‘parent’. In 2004, CSC made a strategic decision to separate itself from 
its non-core businesses, including security and aviation services. As part of that decision, CSC 
transferred its aviation services business segment to a separate CSC subsidiary, DTS Aviation 
Services. The US Government approved the transfer of government prime contracts that were 
part of this business to DTS Aviation Services on September 30, 2004. On April 12, 2010, 
DynCorp International and private investment firm Cerberus Capital Management, announced 
a proposed merger, which was completed on July 7, 2010. As a result of the merger, DynCorp 
International became a private subsidiary of entities created by affiliates of Cerberus 
(DynCorp, 2010a; DynCorp, 2010b).  
 
3.4.3. Major operations 
3.4.3.1. Liberia 
The fourteen-year-long civil war in Liberia came to an end in 2003 when President Charles 
Taylor fled into exile. In an effort to bring an end to the war in Liberia, the parties signed the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Accra, Ghana on 18 August 2003. An important 
aspect of this peace agreement was the restructuring of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) 
(Aning et al., 2008: 624). Part of the CPA requested that the US play a role in the 
restructuring programme, and therefore this role has largely been discharged by the US 
government through the Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme. One of the central 
questions of SSR in a country like Liberia is how to transform the military from a symbol of 
conflict into an instrument of democracy (McFate, 2008c: 645-646). The AFL was accused of 
being complicit in human rights atrocities and the descent into civil war, and the objective of 
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the joint US-Liberia SSR programme was thus to demobilise and reconstitute Liberia’s armed 
forces. According to Sean McFate, the most controversial aspect of this programme was the 
US’s decision to completely outsource this critical task to private military and security 
companies. McFate argues that, throughout history, rarely has one sovereign nation hired a 
private entity to restructure a military for another sovereign nation (McFate, 2008c: 646). The 
decision to outsource the task of reconstituting the AFL to the private sector was mainly due 
to resource restraints, driven by US commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan (McFate, 2008c: 
646).  
 
Currently, several private military and security companies are involved in the peacebuilding 
process in Liberia. DynCorp and Pacific Architects Engineers (PAE) are involved in the SSR 
programme, under contract from the US State Department, to train a newly recruited armed 
force of 2,000 and to provide Liberia with training assistance administered by the UN Mission 
in Liberia (UNMIL) for civilian police forces (Aning et al., 2008: 624). DynCorp is in charge 
of the vetting, recruitment and basic military training, while PAE supplies specialised and 
advanced training services, equipment, and logistics (Krahmann, 2007: 95).  
 
The initial DynCorp proposal consisted of putting 2,000 men through training supplemented 
with a “significant rule-of-law and human rights component emphasising such things as 
respect for international humanitarian law and the law of war, separation of army and police 
responsibilities and the centrality of civilian control of the military”(International Crisis 
Group, 2009: 10). International Crisis Group (ICG) claims that the primary reason for 
awarding DynCorp the contract was because of the innovative human security paradigm at the 
centre of its proposal. However, before DynCorp could begin training the new army, it had to 
go through several preliminary tasks (International Crisis Group, 2009: 10). One of the most 
challenging aspects of this preliminary work was the demobilisation of the AFL and Liberian 
Ministry of Defence, and much of DynCorp’s work through 2006 consisted of this complex 
task. The basic training appears to have been successful, despite significant delays between 
recruitment and its commencement. The process picked up pace only in mid-2007, by 
postponing the human rights and rule-of-law training, thereby reverting DynCorp from their 
initial concept, with human security at its centre. The delay between recruitment and training 
was unavoidable given the need for vetting; however, the delay was much longer than would 
normally have been required. As a result, a major portion of the SSR budget was used for 
paying DynCorp staff who were unable to do their jobs. Although the delay was not 
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necessarily DynCorp’s fault, greater transparency around the contract might have encouraged 
further discussion to find a potentially better solution (International Crisis Group, 2009: 12-
13).  
 
Aning et al. (2008: 624) argue that the activities of DynCorp and PAE have been accused of 
expending over $172 million meant for the training of the army without input from the 
Government of Liberia. This situation, according to the Liberian Minister of Defence, has 
arisen because the allocation of funds for the project was not done in consultation with the 
Government of Liberia. This means that the Liberian government may have little influence 
over how the training of its own military is conducted, which poses a problem in relation to 
ensuring national ownership of such training programmes, no matter the company contracted 
to undertake it. As of 31 August 2008, DynCorp had completed the training of 2,000 soldiers 
(Aning et al., 2008: 624). By late 2009 or early 2010, the army was to undergo the Army 
Readiness Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) to test its ability to function as an 
integrated brigade. Once it passes this evaluation, the US-funded training by DynCorp and 
PAE will be finished (International Crisis Group, 2009: 13). 
 
3.4.3.2. Somalia 
Somalia has been without a stable government for nearly 20 years, and since the withdrawal 
of UN peacekeeping forces in the mid-1990s, it has suffered civil strife, war, and a prolonged 
humanitarian crisis. Uganda and Burundi provided contingents of soldiers for the African 
Union Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), but have faced serious equipment, 
deployment and sustainability challenges. In 2007, the US State Department hired DynCorp 
to equip, deploy, sustain, and train all AU peacekeepers from the Ugandan and Burundian 
contingents of AMISOM. The initial task was to equip and transport the vanguard force of 
1,650 Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) soldiers into Mogadishu (DynCorp, 2010). In 
addition, DynCorp was to provide logistical support to the AU peacekeepers in Mogadishu, 
thereby giving the US a significant role in the critical mission without assigning combat 
forces (Hansen, 2008: 593). DynCorp International will be paid $10 million to help the first 
peacekeeping mission in Somalia in more than 10 years (Tomlinson, 2007). The US State 
Department has committed $14 million for the African Union peacekeeping mission to 
Somalia, and has asked the Congress for an additional $40 million. DynCorp’s work force 
includes many former US troops who frequently work in hostile areas. This operation was not 
DynCorp’s first in Somalia. During the ill-fated UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia from 
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1992 to 1995, DynCorp provided logistical support. Hansen argues that, “in this setting, 
DynCorp emerges as key component of contemporary US Africa Policy in a way that other 
companies that sought contacts in Somalia have not” (Hansen, 2008: 594). 
 
DynCorp claims to have “provided a wide range of rapid-response ground and air 
deployment, sustainment and operational support services, including extensive maintenance 
of the equipment fleet, to AMISOM” (DynCorp, 2010). Furthermore, the company claims that 
while peacekeeping missions worldwide are experiencing severe deployment delays, they 
have ensured that “all AMISOM peacekeepers from troop-contributing countries have been 
deployed safely, well equipped,” (DynCorp, 2010). DynCorp was able to transport the first 
AMISOM peacekeepers into Somalia within a month of the UN Security Council’s 
authorisation.  
 
3.4.3.3. Sudan 
In 2004, the US pledged more than $200 million in the form of private contracts to support 
the African Union Mission in Darfur (AMIS). The contract was awarded to DynCorp and 
PAE and was worth $20.6 million (Chatterjee, 2004). Since November 2004, DynCorp has 
provided logistical support such as housing, office equipment, and transport and 
communication equipment to African forces in Sudan (Aning et al., 2008: 624; Gumedze, 
2007: 4). The US State Department awarded the contract to DynCorp, ignoring the accusation 
that the employees of DynCorp exhibited “aggressive behaviour” in Afghanistan (Chatterjee, 
2004). The Sudan operation was being carried out under a five-year task order issued by the 
US State Department on 27 May 2003. The open-ended contract allows the US State 
Department to use DynCorp and PAE anywhere in Africa. However, the specific details of the 
contract are not open to the public (Chatterjee, 2004). The director of Sudan programmes for 
the US State Department, Charles Snyder, argues that “private companies can do the job more 
quickly and efficiently in the short term than a government bureaucracy” (Snyder, in 
Chatterjee, 2004). Nevertheless, a cause for concern is the lack of transparency in the 
contracts between DynCorp and PAE on the one hand, and the US State Department on the 
other, due to “business confidentiality” (Chatterjee, 2004). This is a reoccurring problem in 
the private security industry, and makes it difficult to analyse their activities because of 
uncertainty about what they actually do.  
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In 2007, DynCorp was awarded a contract to begin training members of the former Sudanese 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in order to recruit soldiers to a new Sudanese Army 
following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the ruling National Congress 
Party (NCP) and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the south’s largest 
rebel movement16. The total worth of the contracts was reported to reach $40 million, which 
did include weapon deliveries. The project would be overseen by the government in southern 
Sudan. However, DynCorp lost its contract after numerous irregularities and misconduct by 
two of its advisors in the field was revealed. The contract was then turned over to United 
States Investigative Services (USIS), another private security company with close ties to the 
US administration (McGregor, 2008). 
 
3.4.3.4. Africa Peacekeeping (AFRICAP) 
AFRICAP is a US State Department programme that uses contractors to provide military 
training, perform advisory missions and provide logistical support and construction services 
consistent with the US Department of State’s peacekeeping policies for developing countries 
in Africa (Isenberg, 2010). On September 11, 2009, the US State Department announced that 
DynCorp was one of four companies chosen to perform various services under the AFRICAP 
Recompete programme. The $1.5 billion is divided at $375 million each between the 
companies (Bennett, 2009). The AFRICAP Recompete programme supports regional stability 
in Africa by building the capacity of African countries and regional organisations to prevent, 
manage and resolve conflicts on the African continent. This new indefinite delivery/indefinite 
quantity contract is a follow-on contract to DynCorp’s 2004 Africa Peacekeeping contract, 
under which it supported contingency and security sector reform programmes in Africa for the 
US State Department (DynCorp, 2009). The new AFRICAP contract establishes a mechanism 
for DynCorp and the three other companies to compete for task orders to provide training and 
advisory services, equipment procurement, logistical support services, and construction 
services to African countries. The period of performance is a base year plus four one-year 
options, beginning on September 11, 2009 (DynCorp, 2009). As part of the contract, DynCorp 
is on standby to provide services anywhere on the continent. These services include support of 
peace operations by training specific countries’ armed services to enhance their abilities, 
                                                 
16 The two signatories form the Government of National Unity (GoNU), which rules the country until the status 
of the South is determined by referendum in 2011. The SPLA is the armed wing of the SPLM, (collectively 
known as SPLA/M) a predominately southern Sudanese rebel movement turned political party (McGregor, 
2008).  
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provide logistics supports and work with regional organisations to prevent and resolve 
conflict (Tomlinson, 2007). 
 
3.5. Corporate versus humanitarian aspects of private military and security companies  
Unlike mercenaries, private military and security companies compete on the open global 
market and are in general considered legal entities that are contractually bound to their clients. 
In some cases, they are at least technically tied to their home states through laws requiring the 
registration and licensing of international contracts. While most mercenaries deny their 
existence, most companies within the private security industry publicly advertise their 
services through maintaining their own websites. Many companies also exhibit a desire for 
good public relations and a positive corporate image (Schreier and Caparini, 2005: 8). Unlike 
DynCorp and MPRI, Executive Outcomes had few ties with its home government in post-
apartheid South Africa, and its mercenary label caused discomfort for the administration, even 
if the criticism was directed to the company and not the government itself (Singer, 2008: 118). 
Arguably, this is perhaps one of the reasons why EO as a corporate entity ceased to exist, 
while MPRI and DynCorp seems to be thriving in the market for privatised security today.   
 
The vast majority of private military and security companies have not been hired to take part 
in direct combat and enforcement operations, with EO being one of the few that has done so. 
EO’s activities in Sierra Leone, and to some degree in Angola, generated heated debate about 
the most appropriate relationship between the UN and private companies in relation to peace 
enforcement (Bellamy and Williams, 2010: 332-333). According to Bellamy and Williams 
(2010: 333), EO’s ability to tilt local balances of power is particularly significant, given that 
the concept of peace support operations also attempts to alter local politics in favour of those 
actors that support the construction of liberal democracy as a long-term solution to conflict 
(Bellamy and Williams, 2010: 332-333). Shearer argues that, if there had been a structured 
relationship between EO and the UN in Sierra Leone, the military coup that ousted elected 
President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah four months after EO’s withdrawal could have been avoided 
(Shearer, 1998: 78-79). Shearer further argues that EO personnel “could have maintained a 
threat of enforcement against the RUF, giving the UN the breathing space it needed to 
implement its post-conflict programmes fully and to provide adequate reassurances for the 
RUF to demobilize” (Shearer, 1998: 78-79).  
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Another unique and perhaps less recognised legacy of EO’s operations is its apparent 
devotion to humanitarian support. EO, like many other private military and security 
companies, had several spin-off subsidiaries that it left behind when the contract expired. In 
an effort to expand its civilian role, subsidiaries in the SRC holding company offered medical 
services, civil engineering, water purification, and hospital construction. Furthermore, EO 
even set up water filtration networks and free medical dispensaries in Angola and Sierra 
Leone (Singer, 2008: 117). These services are not unlike those that are offered by many other 
companies with humanitarian agendas in today’s private security industry. Furthermore, EO’s 
intervention in Sierra Leone enabled thousands of displaced persons to resettle in the Kono 
region, although this may have been an incidental consequence of an extractive agenda. It 
seems that EO also assisted civilian resettlement while providing security, logistics and 
intelligence to humanitarian groups (Patterson, 2009: 68).  
 
EO also conducted an exploration of whether it would have had the capacity to intervene in 
the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Internal plans claim that the company could have had armed 
troops on the ground within fourteen days of its hire and been fully deployed with over 1,500 
of its own soldiers, along with air and fire support (roughly equivalent to the US Marine force 
that first deployed in Afghanistan), within six weeks (Bellamy and Williams, 2010: 334; 
Singer, 2003). One might speculate as to why EO apparently devoted some effort to 
humanitarian support, which was not strictly a military necessity. Zarate (1998: 97) suggests 
this was undertaken with an eye to future legitimacy, something necessary in order to engage 
new clients and address broader international politics. Although EO ceased to exist despite 
this newfound humanitarian approach, it appears that both MPRI and DynCorp have generally 
succeeded with this direction, increasingly gaining access to contracts within peacebuilding 
and peacekeeping.  
 
Like other corporations, private military and security companies today operate as any other, 
meaning that they focus on their relative advantages in the provision of military services. 
They target market niches by offering packaged services covering a wide variety of military 
skill sets to an increasingly wider variety of clients. Some companies cover everything from 
consulting, training, maintenance and logistics, operational and direct combat support, to post-
conflict reconstruction (Schreier and Caparini, 2005: 8). Many private security providers are 
subsidiaries of larger corporations listed on public stock exchanges (Schreier and Caparini, 
2005: 7-8; Singer, 2001/2002: 192). Particularly for some of the military-oriented 
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multinational corporations in the US, the UK and in Canada, the addition of military services 
to their list of offerings can help them to maintain profitability in times of shortages of public 
contracts. And for those multinationals engaged in the mining and energy extracting sectors, 
links with private military and security companies provide a welcome means for the 
management of their political risks in dangerous areas and volatile situations abroad (Schreier 
and Caparini, 2005: 8). Companies such as DynCorp and MPRI have become major growth 
forces for the private security industry. MPRI originally began these efforts by teaming up 
with several traditional defence manufacturers to assist international clients in the introduction 
and integration of new weapons. However, the military skill training and advisory contracts 
with other governments quickly attracted the most attention. The packages that MPRI offers 
make it possible to completely restructure a military from the bottom up and become 
compatible to NATO-level standards (Singer, 2008: 122).  
 
Nevertheless, the deregulated structure of activities is creating problems of transparency. 
Schreier and Caparini argue (2005: 9) that private military and security companies sometimes 
form part of large multinational corporations, making it difficult to establish where they begin 
or end. These corporations are often registered as businesses in other territories, which 
complicates issues such as governmental control over their activities. Moreover, contracts are 
often obtained on a subcontracting basis, thereby further complicating control and the issue of 
responsibility for their operations (Schreier and Caparini, 2005: 9). 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a case study of three private military and security companies, 
namely Executive Outcomes, MPRI and DynCorp. These specific companies were chosen in 
order to illustrate the different categories of companies within the industry, as well as the 
diverse activities performed by private military and security companies on the African 
continent. Each company has been presented by its background, its corporate connections and 
its major operations, with a specific focus on their involvement in Africa. EO generally 
provided combat and operational support, MPRI offers military advice and training, while 
DynCorp primarily deliver logistical support. Furthermore, this chapter has argued that the 
interventions of EO in Angola and Sierra Leone towards the end of the 1990s, often are 
viewed as the forerunners of a continued privatisation of international military operations. In 
the private security industry today, MPRI and DynCorp are among the leading American-
based contenders. MPRI has played a large role in US initiatives to train African militaries in 
 65
order for African countries to establish peacekeeping operations on their own. ACRI, ACOTA 
and GPOI are all examples of such initiatives. Furthermore, DynCorp has held umbrella 
contracts with the US State Department for peacekeeping and the capacity enhancement of 
African militaries, as well as for personnel supporting UN and AU peace operations. In 
addition, this chapter has discussed the corporate nature of these companies, as opposed to the 
humanitarian aspects of private military and security companies. The conclusion can be drawn 
that, the security and military-related functions these private companies perform remains their 
primary scope. However, an increasing number of private military and security companies 
have additionally demonstrated an apparent devotion to humanitarian support. The next 
chapter will make an assessment of the impact of the private security industry in 
peacebuilding efforts in Africa, and the following implications for the exercise of legitimate 
force.  
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Chapter 4. Assessing the impact of the private security industry in peacebuilding 
efforts and implications for the exercise of legitimate authority. 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Armed non-state actors may undermine a state’s ability to provide security to its citizens, but 
at the same time may exist in response to the inability of the state security sector to provide 
such security (Bryden, 2006: 6). The practice of outsourcing military functions is part of the 
effort to create more efficient armed forces. But this notion also has an inherent danger, since 
a central function of the state, namely the monopoly of force, could be damaged or 
endangered (Wulf, 2006: 93). Optimists have argued that the privatisation of security is likely 
to yield benefits for states, because the private security industry will deliver new security 
services cheaply and flexibly in ways that will enhance state security, and thus global 
governance. Pessimists have argued that privatisation will be costly to states, eroding 
accountability, and enhancing conflict and thus challenging global governance (Avant, 2004: 
154). 
 
This chapter will assess the impact of the private security industry in peacebuilding efforts in 
Africa and the subsequent implications for the exercise of legitimate authority and violence. 
First, a short theoretical overview of the industry’s impact on state responsibility and the 
dangers that follow, as put forward by Robert Mandel. That will be followed by an analysis of 
the UN and its views of, and relationship with, the private security industry. The next section 
will discuss the increased importance of private military and security companies in US policy 
towards Africa. Then there will be a section assessing the specific impact of the private 
security industry on African countries and the peace operations on the continent. Next, this 
chapter will discuss the political influence of the private security industry and its implications 
for the nation-state. The latter part of the chapter will focus on the changing nature of the 
private security industry, from the activities of Executive Outcomes to the more recent 
activities of MPRI and DynCorp. The concluding section of this chapter will focus on 
assessing the impact of all three companies on peace operations.   
 
4.2. The private security industry and its impact on state responsibility 
The most extensive potential impact of security privatisation is on the nature of the state itself. 
Mandel argues that, regardless of whether government functions end up being outsourced to 
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internal private providers, or to external private providers, the impact on the state government 
in question is frequently deemed to be negative (Mandel, 2002: 79). In this view, the growth 
of privatised security and the decline of national governments ability to maintain a monopoly 
on the provision of security appear to be inextricably interconnected. Mandel further argues 
that there are seven specific dangers to effective delivery of services that emerge from this 
privatisation (Mandel, 2002: 79). These are poor contractor performance; entrance of 
contractors into specific engagements that they have not anticipated or trained for, and thus 
not equipped to handle; significant unanticipated degradation of the overall environment in 
which they operate; engagement of contractor personnel in unauthorised or unlawful acts; 
protracted delays of competition-related problems in acquiring contracts, leading to 
inefficiencies; transformation of the contractors into targets for hostile intelligence services; 
and unwillingness of contractors to do the work specified by the government due to financial 
disagreements (Mandel, 2002: 79). Considered together, these consequences should highlight 
for the international community the jeopardy and vulnerability that may emerge from a 
transfer of protection to the private security sector. However, Mandel also points out that this 
“hollowing out of the state” may simply represent minor changes in government functions 
that not necessarily indicate the deterioration of state authority (Mandel, 2002: 80). 
Historically, nation-states have undergone a wide variety of adjustments in the services they 
perform for their societies. The emergence of private sub-national and transnational 
organisations seemingly taking on the role of the state may simply represent a transformation 
of both the “expectations and the reality of what the state performs for the society, altering in 
the process the social contract between ruling regimes and their citizenry” (Mandel, 2002: 
81).  
 
4.3. The United Nations and its relationship with the private security industry 
The increase in peacekeeping in recent times has placed a great additional strain on UN 
resources and personnel, as well as on member states’ ability to contribute funds, troops, or 
peacekeepers, support personnel and equipment (Charles and Cloete, 2009: 3). Furthermore, 
Lilly argues that the activities of private military and security companies have revealed many 
shortcomings of the UN and other multilateral organisations when responding to a growing 
number of global crises and that they could be used to take up the slack where these bodies 
are unable to or unwilling to intervene (Lilly, 2000b: 1). The enrolment of individuals seeking 
employment as mercenaries in the 1990s was perhaps of less concern to the United Nations 
than the proliferation of security companies with increasingly open links to their governments. 
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In a UN report on the use of mercenaries from 1995, it is stated that, member states should 
“prohibit their public authorities from resorting to mercenary activities, and counter any 
intelligence or security machinery which, through covert operations, uses mercenaries or does 
so through third organizations” (UN, 1995: §78). This, as later events relating to the US-based 
MPRI demonstrated, was exactly what governments did not wish to do. Deborah Avant 
argues that, during the 1990s, every multinational peace operation conducted by the UN was 
accomplished with the presence of private military or security companies (Avant, 2004: 153-
154). Changes in the nature of conflicts have played a role in this development, “leading some 
tasks less central to the core of modern militaries (such as policing and technical support) to 
be more and more at the front and center of maintaining security, and private security 
companies provide these services readily” (Avant, 2004: 154). Another key tool in conflicts 
today is international civilian police. Most states do not have an international civilian police 
force, and thus, in the 1990s used private military and security companies to recruit and 
deploy international civilian police. For instance, the international civilian police sent by the 
United States to Bosnia and Kosovo were all DynCorp employees (Avant, 2004: 154). 
 
According to Guy Arnold, the United Nations faces three major obstacles to achieving 
agreement regarding an international framework to regulate the private security industry. The 
first concerns the nature of the power at the disposal of the United Nations. As long as the 
principal member states, starting with the United States, are unwilling to provide the 
international body with the authority, finances and military capacity to conduct effective 
peacekeeping, alternatives will be sought. Further obstacles come from the major powers 
themselves: despite periodic condemnations of mercenary behaviour, they view private 
military and security companies as a useful weapon of policy and have no intention of 
depriving themselves of it. This readiness to use such companies became even more certain 
during the 1990s, with the rise of the corporate security industry with its concealed links to 
government military and foreign affairs establishments (Arnold, 1999: 167-168). A third 
obstacle to UN-inspired reform is the simple one of immediacy. If small countries 
overwhelmed by civil war are unable to obtain the assistance they require from the UN or 
some other regional or international body, they will turn elsewhere, and the private security 
industry is the obvious alternative (Arnold, 1999: 168).  
 
Since effective peacekeeping often comes at a high price, Charles and Cloete argue that, to 
truly become efficient, outsourcing non-core functions can allow the UN to reduce costs and 
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create funds for vital but non-funded activities (Charles and Cloete, 2009: 3). The degree to 
which private security services can be contracted in an open and accountable way increases 
with the amount of political capital invested. Holmqvist argues that such political capital is 
likely to be higher in a multilateral peace operation than when states unilaterally contract 
support from the private security industry (Holmqvist, 2005: 19). However, the use of private 
military and security companies in multilateral operations indicates a relinquishing of state 
control over the means of violence, and in this sense, represents a break with the principles of 
the UN Charter in this context: that member states take responsibility, under UN authority, for 
the maintenance of peace and security. The capacity of multilateral institutions to manage 
such a transferral of responsibility will have a crucial impact on the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of private sector support for multilateral peace operations. According to 
Holmqvist, the UN and regional organisations currently lack satisfactory structures to ensure 
high standards of conduct for the private security industry, and for the long-term sustainability 
of operations (Holmqvist, 2005: 19).  
 
4.3.1. The United Nations and the challenge of clear mandates in peace operations 
Although peacekeeping and peace enforcement may seem similar, the role of the private 
sector in each is different. Military action is not the primary objective in peacekeeping, since a 
ceasefire has already been reached. By contrast, in peace enforcement operations, armed force 
is required. Both parties generally look to go beyond a ceasefire or truce to a negotiated peace 
agreement. In peacekeeping operations, military force is required only for monitoring the 
ceasefire, and lethal action is only used in self-defence (Patterson, 2009: 85). Although 
devotion to the terms of mandate for engagement is as important in peacekeeping as in peace 
enforcement, flexibility often becomes a necessity. All too often, peacekeeping situations 
disintegrate into renewed conflict, requiring peace enforcement to maintain order. Here the 
private sector can step in to provide flexible yet accountable security (Patterson, 2009: 86).  
 
Patterson argues that, by privatising peace enforcement, many of the problems of private 
military and security companies can be addressed (Patterson, 2009: 88). In a private company 
the chain of command is clear. While the UN or another international organisation or 
government deals with how its mandates will be implemented, the ground troops will know 
precisely where it receives its commands. Problems that are global in nature demand an 
honest agent to seek resolution. Ideally, a United Nations force can rise above national 
sovereignty to play such a role. Or it can sponsor neutral parties to do so through the 
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sanctioned and regulated employment of private security companies (Patterson, 2009: 88-91). 
However, this argument assumes that the private company tasked with such this particular 
role is not from a state which is perceived as a threat to the country where the operation takes 
place. Thus, while this possible scenario might be true in theory, it can be problematic when 
transferred to a real-life situation.  
 
Today, the UN’s effort to patch together complex peacekeeping operations is continually 
determined by the fact that peace enforcement may be a necessary prerequisite to achieving 
sustainable ceasefires. For instance, nowhere is the tension and interplay between 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement more clearly revealed than in the UN’s effort to cope 
with the crisis in West Africa and the African Great Lakes region (Patterson, 2009: 88-91). 
However, Lilly argues that although companies within the private security industry might 
appear not to posses many of the political constraints of traditional peacekeeping forces, the 
UN Security Council (through exercising Chapter VII of the UN Charter) remains the only 
actor that can authorise mandates for peacekeeping operations (Lilly, 2000b: 10). Lilly claims 
that using private military and security companies does not prevent this requirement, nor does 
it overcome many of the political difficulties faced by the Security Council (Lilly, 2000b: 10). 
Many of the political constraints attached to mandates in UN peace operations are a result of 
the often lengthy negotiations and decision-making processes between the members of the 
UN Security Council. Even if it became feasible to use private military and security 
companies in a given instance, the process of issuing a mandate for the specific operation will 
most likely remain complex and lengthy, seeing as the interests of the UN member states 
often plays a major role in determining the outcome.  
  
4.3.2. The current United Nations view 
For the present, the UN remains in a conflicted position regarding private military and 
security services. While it publicly condemns them, member states employ them in various 
ways. The existence of the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing 
and Training of Mercenaries of the United Nations is inadequately drafted and lacks 
widespread support. Meanwhile, UN organs face escalating threats to their operations, which 
at times require them to hire armed contractors to secure the safety of employees. However, 
the organisation has yet to demonstrate any consistency towards the modern private security 
industry as possible collaborators. Over the past 17 years, the UN has invested resources in 
reports and a recent expert committee; however, the organisation is only now beginning to 
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engage with the industry in order to develop ethical models of operation and a suitable legal 
regime (Patterson, 2009: 60). Patterson argues that, at present, it remains too early to predict 
whether the private security industry will find eventual acceptance within the UN. Patterson 
argues further that it is equally possible that these companies will continue to be treated with 
fluctuating ambivalence, where acceptance is prevented by obstructive conduct that serves 
interests other than the purposeful service of the Charter objectives (Patterson, 2009: 60).  
 
4.3.3. The United Nations Working Group on the use of mercenaries 
The UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries was established in July 2005, comprising 
of five independent experts. It succeeded the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the use of 
mercenaries, which had been in existence since 1987 and which role was filled by Enrique 
Ballesteros from 1987 to 2004 and currently by Sharista Shameem (UNCHR, 2005; UN, 
2010b: 1.1). In March 2008, the UN Human Rights Council extended the mandate of the 
Working Group for a period of three years (UNCHR, 2008). The Working Group has been 
monitoring the impact on human rights of the activities of private military and security 
companies and their lack of accountability. The rationale for the working group is that the 
existing International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries does not cover the activities of the private military and security companies. 
Thus, the Working Group has focused on the ongoing work for the elaboration of a possible 
new international Convention on the regulation of the activities of the private security 
industry (UN, 2010b).  
 
The Working Group was expected to present a report of its findings and a proposed new 
Convention to the Human Rights Council in September 2010. However, already in early 
2010, the Working Group shared with all UN member states the elements for a new 
Convention, urging governments to support and set up an inter-governmental mechanism to 
draft and adopt a new convention (OHCHR, 2010a). According to the Chair of the Working 
Group, José-Luis Gómez del Prado, “the proposed Convention would reaffirm the principle 
that States should retain the monopoly on the legitimate use of force which is increasingly 
being eroded” (OHCHR, 2010b). In order to assure this, the proposed Convention would ban 
the outsourcing of inherent state functions, thus preventing companies taking part directly 
taking in hostilities or assuming police roles. Furthermore, the proposed Convention would 
require states to lift all immunity agreements that cover private military and security 
companies. This would mean that “supervisors, such as government officials or company 
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managers, may be liable for crimes under international law, committed by personnel under 
their authority and control” (OHCHR, 2010b). Nevertheless, a number of countries in which 
private military and security companies are headquartered have expressed resistance to a 
legally binding approach. While many governments have adopted regulations at the national 
level, and the industry has showed efforts to self-regulate, del Prado argues that it is not 
sufficient because “there remains a legal gap covering such activities at the international 
level” (OHCHR, 2010b). Del Prado points out an important point that every new scandal 
involving private military and security companies reinforces the notion that self-regulation by 
such a powerful industry is not sufficient, thus the need for a new Convention that includes 
these companies in addition to mercenaries. However, whether all UN member states will 
agree upon such a new Convention is questionable, given the close relations they maintain 
with their domestic military establishments. For instance, Ghebali argues that private military 
and security companies are used by major Western states as tools for a covert parallel or 
proxy foreign policy (Ghebali, 2006: 225).  
 
4.4. USA and the reliance on the private security industry 
The US government has a long history of looking to the market for military services. Up until 
the Second World War, most of these services were in the area of logistics support and 
weapons procurement. However, during the Cold War, the US began hiring private military 
and security companies to perform military training missions (Avant, 2008: 447). States have 
also tended to ‘rent out’ their forces to other states. For instance, Avant argues that, in the 
2003 war with Iraq, the USA paid forces from other countries to participate in the coalition 
(Avant, 2008: 447). Furthermore, it has become increasingly common for some UN member 
states to subcontract their commitment to provide peacekeepers to private military and 
security companies. In the United States, private military and security companies are 
employed primarily by the Defense and State departments, but the entire government 
(including the 16 agencies in the intelligence community), along with the departments of 
Homeland Security and Energy, relies on contractors (Isenberg, 2009: 7).  
 
The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) was established by the US Army in 
1985 and paved the way for the widespread use of civilian contractors in wartime and during 
other emergencies. In 1995 the Defense Science Board report suggested that the Pentagon 
could save up to $12 billion annually if it contracted out all support functions except actual 
war fighting. In addition, in 2000 then presidential candidate George W. Bush promised 
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during the elections to let private companies compete with government workers for 450,000 
jobs. In 2001, this resulted in the Pentagon’s contracted workforce exceeding civilian Defense 
Department employees for the first time (Isenberg, 2009: 19). However, since the Obama 
administration took over, it has sought to reverse the outsourcing of military and security 
functions. For instance, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report of 2010 states that, in order 
to reduce the government’s dependence on contractors the US Department of Defense (DoD) 
introduced its ‘in-sourcing’ initiative in the 2010 budget. This initiative seeks to reduce the 
number of private contractors to their pre-2001 level of 26 percent of the workforce (from the 
current level of 39 percent) over the next five years (Department of Defense, 2010: 55). The 
2010 budget does not specifically estimate the cost of this initiative, other then saying that it 
aims to better the value for the taxpayers and improve the transparency of the cost estimates 
of the activities of private contractors (Department of Defense, 2010: 78).    
 
While private military and security companies sometimes are contracted directly by a weak 
state to bolster its security capabilities, more often than not they are contracted by a donor 
government to carry out military training or increase other capacity within security sector 
institutions. One aspect of donor-sponsored Security Sector Reform (SSR) that has seen a 
high degree of private sector involvement is the provision of military training in weak states. 
US-based private security companies trained militaries in more than 42 countries during the 
1990s. In Africa, the US State Department and the US Department of Defense outsourced 
military training to MPRI and DynCorp, among others. Holmqvist argues that the outsourcing 
of military training may be most successful when companies support regular forces rather 
than assuming full responsibility for the mission (Holmqvist, 2005: 16).  
 
Among the programmes that were designed for this exact purpose is the GPOI, which was 
initially designed as a mechanism to contain conflicts throughout Africa and the world.  
The GPOI initiative is different in approach from previous programmes, such as ACRI and 
ACOTA, since it focuses on building the capacity of states rather than deploying its own 
forces in conflicts. Mpysisi states that “the provision of peacekeeping training by the US 
under different initiatives has positively impacted on the quality of peacekeeping operations 
delivered by African countries” (Mpyisi, 2007: 39). However, most peacekeeping missions 
have failed because of the lack of basic logistical resources. The GPOI, with assistance from 
the private security industry, has offered resources such as training and military hardware, 
which will have a greater impact in alleviating some of the logistical problems. However, 
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Kenneth Mpyisi argues that the rationale behind initiatives such as GPOI is often associated 
with reducing or avoiding the direct involvement of US troops in African peacekeeping 
operations. By providing peacekeeping training, the US hopes to preclude its need to 
intervene militarily in Africa. Mpyisi further claims that, despite its stated objective, the GPOI 
and its various programmes are designed to boost the US position in Africa for the purpose of 
securing energy (the US has become increasingly interested in Africa for its oil) (Mpyisi, 
2007: 39).  
 
Although there is scepticism about the real motive behind GPOI, the programme seems to be 
influential in raising the capabilities of African states to face complex humanitarian 
emergencies by themselves, in line with the continent’s objective of finding African solutions 
to African problems. The GPOI and other previous US initiatives have been criticised for 
concentrating on military training and the question of whether to focus on military 
developments only or the full range of tasks necessary for peacekeeping is at the centre of the 
criticism. Mpyisi claims that the “US’s willingness to deploy forces has been overshadowed 
by its inability to provide logistical support and basic field equipment such as field lodgings, 
mess facilities and medical facilities” (Mpyisi, 2007: 40). In order to consolidate the capacity 
of African states genuinely, the provision of peacekeeping equipment is a fundamental 
component. 
 
4.4.1. Has the private security industry become indispensable for the US military? 
The private security industry has seemingly become indispensible, and many of the reasons 
for such a development stem from the United Nations. During the 1990s, a belief that the 
military seemed to be particularly well-suited to the use of contractors because the need for its 
services fluctuated so radically and abruptly, gained acceptance within the US administration. 
In the light of such sharp spikes in demand it was thought that it would be more efficient for 
the military to call on a group of temporary, highly trained experts in times of war, rather than 
to rely on a permanent standing army that drained resources (with pension plans, health 
insurance, and so forth) in times of peace (Isenberg, 2009: 19). Aning et al. argue that the 
private security industry has become central to US military training initiatives. US military 
training of African personnel is largely outsourced to private contractors (Aning et al., 2008: 
625). As such, contemporary private security involvement in Africa is substantially different 
from that in the late 1990s, when Executive Outcomes were hired by weak African states to 
defeat their internal enemies in civil wars. According to Aning et al., this development raises 
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a series of questions “regarding the relationship between the stated US objective of training 
and democratising African militaries and the pursuit of US foreign policy objectives on the 
African continent” (Aning et al., 2008: 625). Undoubtedly, many African militaries are in 
need of professionalisation, and much is to be gained by strengthening their respect for human 
rights and democracy. However, whether private military and security companies are the most 
suitable teachers is questionable at best. Their human rights records are not good, and the lack 
of transparency can make it difficult for African states and civil society actors to gain 
information about their activities and contracts, and hence challenge their operations (Aning 
et al., 2008: 625-626).    
 
In February 2009, the Obama administration introduced a “set of reforms designed to reduce 
state spending on private-sector providers of military security, intelligence and other critical 
services and return certain outsourced work back to full-time government employees” 
(Isenberg, 2009: 15). Isenberg argues that the Obama administration is less committed to 
outsourcing in principle than the previous administration. For instance, the introduction to 
Obama’s 2010 budget noted that the administration would clarify what is essentially a 
governmental function and what is a commercial one, and furthermore, that critical 
government functions would not be performed by the private sector for purely ideological 
reasons (Isenberg, 2009: 16). According to Isenberg, the Obama reforms overall reflect the 
administration’s recognition that contractors are fully integrated into national security and 
other government functions (Isenberg, 2009: 16). This goes far in acknowledging that the 
United States cannot go to war without them. 
 
In August 2009, the Working Group voiced concern over the limited scrutiny of private 
security contractors by the United States Government, calling on greater transparency to 
prevent impunity for human rights violations. The Working Group said in a statement that 
“the responsibility of the State to protect human rights does not stop with contracting or 
subcontracting” (OHCHR, 2009). Furthermore, the Working Group noted that, in spite of 
mechanisms created by US authorities to better monitor private military and security 
companies, “there is very little information accessible to the public on the scope and type of 
contracts” (OHCHR, 2009). In addition, the Working Group voiced concern about the stated 
US policy intention to increase the number of private security contractors to match the surge 
in troops in Afghanistan. However, the Working Group seemingly “received assurances from 
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the US Government that it is not and does not intend to relinquish its State monopoly of the 
legitimate use of force” (OHCHR, 2009).  
 
4.4.2. Concerns regarding dependence on the private security industry 
The concern with military privatisation, even in seemingly inoffensive support areas, is that 
the entire military machine could quickly break down. Today, public military personnel may 
no longer have the basic skills or equipment to perform the tasks that have been privatised. 
However, this has largely been ignored amidst the rush to privatise. Under its own doctrine, 
the US military is supposed to privatise only those services that are not “emergency-essential 
support” functions, meaning those functions that would not weaken the military’s 
mobilisation and wartime operations (Singer, 2008: 162). At the start of the 1990s, the US 
Department of Defense Inspector-General warned that a number of emergency essential 
services were beginning to be performed by civilian companies, and that the US military 
could not ensure that their service would continue during crisis periods. Nevertheless, little 
evidence exists that concerns about lost control have been addressed since. Rather, more than 
a million personnel have left the US armed services and increasingly more of the public 
armed service functions have been privatised (Singer, 2008: 162).  
 
It is particularly within logistics and support areas that the private security industry is 
becoming increasingly indispensable. Companies specialising in these functions cover 
activities within military operations ranging from construction to heavy lift and aviation, mine 
action, medical services, communications, warehousing and armoured vehicle servicing to 
unexploded ordinance disposal. Wright and Brooke argue that, in an era of military 
downsizing and globalisation, most sovereign governments have come to recognise that 
outsourcing these non-combat service support functions gives them access to valuable 
experience, saves money, and allows their militaries to commit their limited budgets and 
resources to their core functions of fighting wars and enforcing peacekeeping mandates 
(Wright and Brooke, 2007: 106). Regardless of their expanding activities, Singer argues 
(2008: 162) that military personnel currently lack the training and skills to fill potential 
privatised voids. If the military keeps privatising key jobs, it may find in times of crisis that 
private military and security companies are unwilling to comply with its exact needs.  
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4.5. Implications of the private security industry for African peace operations 
The African Union shares the same stance as the UN regarding the use of private military and 
security companies. The heads of the United Nations and the African Union still refuse the 
idea of using the private security industry in peace operations, although some member states, 
aid organisations and even UN agencies do not agree with this standpoint. A number of 
important regional bodies also engage in peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities, including 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) (Johnston, 2004: 36).  
 
Despite the standpoint of the UN and the AU, private military and security companies already 
provide numerous services to the UN and other international organisations. To some extent 
these private companies use local resources and hire locals, stimulating local growth to the 
benefit of stability in the community. Part of the solution lies in the capabilities of the private 
sector and its ability to support peacekeeping forces. Taylor argues that these private security 
companies have a great deal of experience in Africa and in peace operations, and thus can be 
used to assist the AU, the UN and other international organisations (Taylor, 2009: 113). 
Already there are successful African peacekeeping support programmes that make use of 
private sector resources. These include (as mentioned in Chapter 3) the ACRI, which 
developed into the ACOTA, which is responsible for the training of thousands of 
peacekeepers, the US State Department’s Africa Peacekeeping Program, which offers 
training, logistics and construction programmes for building sustainable African capacity, and 
initiatives such as the GPOI, which has trained some 40,000 peacekeepers worldwide (Taylor, 
2009: 114). Leander argues that, because the private security industry is already extensively 
involved, any reasonable approach must be pragmatic (Leander, 2005: 610).  
 
The implications of privatising security and the influence of the private security industry on 
peace operations in Africa entail a diversion of human resources from the public armed forces 
(Leander, 2005: 616). The private sector offers better salaries, particularly for the more 
competent and professional employees. The salaries in many African armed forces are low 
and often not paid at all. Hence, it is not surprising to discover that African soldiers work as 
contractors for private companies, where the pay is higher. Moreover, the market for force 
drains human resources by eroding the status of public forces and accentuating the blurring 
boundaries between pubic and private forces. African governments play a central role in this 
by not paying salaries, and hence their armies look to the market in order to support 
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themselves (Leander, 2005: 616). Even more unconcealed, public officials further the 
commercialisation of the armed forces by turning them into money-making enterprises. The 
outsourcing of training by Western governments, particularly the US, further blurs 
distinctions, because it suggests the acceptability of moving between public and private forces 
(Leander, 2005: 616).  
 
Jeffrey Isima argues that the privatisation of security has created deep crises within the state’s 
security sector, including the destabilisation of civil-military relations and the weakening of 
state security institutions (Isima, 2007: 7). In Nigeria, for example, the outsourcing of military 
training to MPRI, gave rise to strained relations between force headquarters and the 
Presidency. The service chiefs protested against what they saw as unfettered access and 
privileges given by the government to MPRI personnel in the implementation of their 
contract. In response, the MPRI used its informal influence on the government and forced the 
immediate retirement of all three service chiefs. This incident makes it evident that MPRI and 
similar Western security firms can act as very powerful external forces, which the state lacks 
sufficient strength to bargain with over sensitive issues of national security (Isima, 2007: 7-8).  
 
A large number of African troops have received training from private military and security 
companies under the United States’ military training programmes. Evidently, these 
programmes have contributed to building the capacity of the troops and improving their 
readiness for peace support operations. Nevertheless, the limited nature of these programmes 
makes it difficult to see a clear cause and effect relationship between the training offered and 
the actual performance in the field. Aning et al. argue that Africa’s training needs surpasses 
the capabilities of these initiatives to fill the capacity gap in Africa for the delivery of 
peacekeeping needs (Aning et al., 2008: 625). Thus, the need to expand such initiatives to 
involve all African countries is necessary in order to have a rapid impact on African peace 
operations.  
 
According to Aning et al., there are reasons to be worried over the future of armies where 
African countries are not at least partially in control of the training of their militaries (Aning 
et al., 2008: 625). Firstly, it becomes difficult for African states to control and influence their 
armies. Secondly, the armies may even be trained in such a way that their interests and 
perceptions of threats are similar to that of the home government of the private military and 
security company, rather than of their own countries and peoples. Thus, the type of training 
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they receive may not enable them to deal with the real security threats facing their respective 
countries (Aning et al., 2008: 625). The concerns of African governments and regional 
organisations such as the African Union tend to centre on human security issues. An 
important consideration for the US is therefore how to bring together its own interests with 
those of African countries.  
 
4.6. The political influence of the private security industry  
Avant argues that “global forces, new ideas and political choices have combined to enhance 
opportunities for the private delivery of and private financing for security services. As a 
result, a growing market for force now exists alongside, and intertwined with, state military 
and police forces” (Avant, 2008: 449). This development holds significant implications, 
because the market thereby undermines the collective monopoly of the state over violence, 
which is a central feature of the sovereign system. Without that collective monopoly, states 
face increasing dilemmas about whether to hire from the private security industry and how 
best to regulate the export of the services they offer. The existence of an extensive market 
alternative for military and security services alters the options available to states for carrying 
out security policies. Avant further argues that this often entails the involvement of the private 
security industry in decision-making processes, thereby giving them, and other actors with 
business-related interest in policy, influence over its format and implementation (Avant, 2008: 
449). Because of these changes, the market option makes it easier to undertake adventurous 
foreign politics and more likely that such action will be taken (Avant, 2008: 449-450).  
 
Anna Leander argues that ‘ungovernance’ (as explained in Chapter 2) weighs heavily in the 
explanation of the key qualitative and quantitative changes in mercenary activity since the 
1990s (Leander, 2002: 3). It is difficult to find complete information on mercenaries and their 
activities. Nevertheless, according to the literature, there was a sharp increase in private 
security involvement in armed conflict during the 1990s. Leander argues that “this consensus 
is probably the most solid indicator of the growing importance of the phenomenon one can 
get” (Leander, 2002: 3). According to Leander, an indication of the private security industry’s 
involvement is that a compilation of available information on its activity in Africa from the 
1950s onwards showed 15 entries for the 40 years from 1950 to 1989, and further 65 entries 
for the period 1990 to 1998 (Leander, 2002: 3; Musah and Fayemi, 2000: Appendix 1). The 
industry is growing steadily and the structure of its activity is changing, as private military 
and security companies have developed and turned into corporate entities. These 
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developments are understandable by the changes that are intimately linked to the weakening 
of state structures and a retreat of the state from its monopoly on violence.  
 
4.6.1. Erosion of the nation-state 
Herbert Wulf argues that the concept of the state monopoly on force requires the elimination 
of armed non-state actors who want to take the law into their own hands (Wulf, 2006: 97). 
However, this notion is challenged in many parts of the world. While the internationally 
accepted norm of a state’s assurance for the public good of ‘security’ still exists, its 
implementation in reality is at present debatable at best.  
 
The state monopoly on force is also challenged by another development. Wulf argues that the 
idea of the undisputed national entity no longer exists as national boundaries have been 
increasingly lowered due to the general trend of globalisation (Wulf, 2006: 97). Many actors 
today operate outside the boundaries dictated by the logic of territoriality. Economics, politics 
and culture are spheres that are increasingly becoming separated from the nation-state. 
According to Wulf the state is being emptied of some of its functions, both conceptually and 
in reality (Wulf, 2006: 97). A logical consequence of the weakening of the nation-state is the 
need for multiple layers of authority over the monopoly on force. Such a new agenda breaks 
with traditional notions of the concept of the monopoly on force in which the nation-state is 
envisioned as the sole legitimate actor (Wulf, 2006: 97). At the global level, the dominant role 
of the nation-state is challenged both conceptually, through global governance, and 
institutionally, through the continually increasing number of multilateral regimes. Regionally, 
there are only weak signs of state sovereignty functions being delegated to regional bodies. 
Wulf argues that, however, that “in many regions of the world, local constituencies and 
traditional authorities within federalist structures are authorised to exercise public regulatory 
functions” below state level (Wulf, 2006: 98). According to Wulf, this portrays a trend 
towards a multiplicity of authority among public institutions, and further, functional areas that 
were previously part of state functions are taken over by private citizens and private 
organisations (Wulf, 2006: 98).  
 
In many unfavourable reviews of the use of private military and security companies in SSR it 
implicitly contrast with national governments. This is well founded to the extent that private 
companies are structurally not organised to take a long-term view of the institutions they are 
building. In fragile political settings, where many things can go wrong, private military and 
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security companies risk minimal damage to their reputations if the units they train later prove 
to be unsuccessful (International Crisis Group, 2009: 32). The arrival of international private 
security actors in weak states signals the availability of an alternative to the public provision 
of security. Financial constraints on state resources make the option of hiring private security 
services attractive to many states precisely because of its temporary quality. Rather than 
burdening government budgets with the fundamental restructuring of standing armies or 
police forces, governments may be tempted to resort to the seemingly quick solutions of 
private sector intervention (Holmqvist, 2005: 15).  
 
4.6.2. The private security industry is setting the agenda 
Leander argues that the very fact of being a private security contractor is increasingly a source 
of authority, as neo-liberal forms of governing seems to constitute contractors as a group of 
new security experts (Leander, 2007: 206). Privatisation shifts power over violence to outside 
the bounds of state machinery. Avant argues that “this is most obvious when non-state actors 
finance security, which accords influence over security decisions to actors both outside the 
territory of the state and outside of government” (Avant, 2008: 450). This diffusion of power 
should lead us to expect a greater variety of actors to have influence over the use of force, and 
predict a furthering of competing institutions with overlapping jurisdictions over force. 
According to Avant, the notion that the ‘ideal’ form of markets can only function effectively 
when the state is also playing its ideal role is often lost in contemporary commentary (Avant, 
2008: 450-451). Similarly, non-governmental organisations rely on a government in order to 
play their ideal role. In this sense, the privatisation of security does not so much transfer 
power from one institution (the state) to another (the market) so much as pose challenges to 
the way both states and markets have functioned in the modern system (Avant, 2008: 451). 
The market for force has not made states less significant, but has opened the way for changes 
in the roles states and other actors play in controlling force in the global arena. Avant argues 
that “the rush to normative judgement about whether the privatization of security was ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’ has impeded analysis of the range of privatization’s effects, the trade-offs associated 
with private security, and the choices available for its management” (Avant, 2008: 451).  
 
Abrahamsen and Williams argue that the rise of private security should not automatically be 
interpreted as an indication of declining state power. Rather than clearly defined spheres of 
private or public power, “the governance of various realms in the contemporary era emerges 
instead from the combination and cooperation of public and private actors” (Abrahamsen and 
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Williams, 2008: 142). However, this does not mean that traditional distinctions are irrelevant: 
the concepts of public and private and their different forms of authority remain important. 
According to Abrahamsen and Williams, particularly important is that fact that public security 
authorities maintain legislative authorisation and an extent of jurisdiction that no other actors 
possesses today (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2008: 143). Furthermore, private security usually 
operates within some form of regulatory framework. In this way, although states are not 
always the instigator of such hybrid forms of governance, they lend them further strength and 
legitimacy through official recognition and integration into domestic and international laws. 
 
As security professionals, it is not surprising that the private security industry is involved in 
politics. Sometimes, this concerns how best to deal with a given political priority, and private 
military and security companies are therefore arguably directly involved in establishing the 
priorities, as well as the security concerns. They do so through their intelligence gathering and 
analysis, as well as through their advisory functions. Furthermore, military doctrine and 
strategy are increasingly being developed by private companies (Leander, 2007: 52). Private 
military and security companies run military training, seminars, and educational programmes 
both the US and internationally. In addition, the lobby organisations of the private security 
industry are increasingly consulted on policy issues. The industry has, for instance, been 
invited to hearings in the US Congress on the development of peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding initiatives. As private experts on violence, they are increasingly filling 
functions similar to those filled by their public counterparts (Leander, 2007: 53). Moreover, 
modern contracts, such as indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contracts, grant private 
security actors more freedom in the implementation of governmental security policies in a bid 
for greater efficiency. In some cases, the private security industry seeks to influence politics at 
its own initiative. The reason for this is simply that its business depends on what happens to 
political priorities. How a problem is understood and what kind of solution is found for 
dealing with it, determines whether or not there will be a contract.  
 
Following the theoretical framework proposed in the previous section, it can be suggested that 
the growing role of private military and security companies has a number of effects. In 
geographical terms, the progressive use of the private security industry confirms the 
weakening of the link between the nation-state and the provision of international security. 
Krahmann argues that private military and security companies makes it possible for Third-
World governments, which do not have the necessary resources and capabilities provide for 
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their national security to hire services from foreign countries (Krahmann, 2002: 16). 
Furthermore, the private security industry offers governments in industrialised countries the 
potential to intervene internationally with greater flexibility and efficiency (Krahmann, 2002: 
16). Krahmann claims that the former can be of danger to newly emerging states, which might 
fail to establish stable national armies due to their reliance on private security services. The 
latter applies in particular to established democracies, which become able to disregard public 
opposition to foreign interventions. According to Krahmann, the growth of the private 
security industry contributes to the differentiation of interests in security governance 
(Krahmann, 2002: 17). While the primary interests of private firms are in expanding their 
markets and increasing their sales, these interests are not necessarily similar to the policies of 
the governments that employ them or the states in which they are based (Krahmann, 2002: 
17). Leander argues that the assessments of the gains from privatisation are narrowly drawn, 
being largely prospective rather than retrospective in the sense that evaluation is often based 
on what the private sector promised, not what it actually did (Leander, 2007: 207). 
 
4.7. Changes within the private security industry: from Executive Outcomes to MPRI 
and DynCorp 
Fredland distinguishes between companies willing to engage in combat and direct combat 
support, and companies that provide a variety of military and “quasi-military” services, but 
not combat and combat-support services (Fredland, 2004: 207). These combat-related private 
companies have been the most controversial and much of the academic literature has been 
dedicated to examining their activities. Fredland argues that there has been “relatively little 
publicly known contractual activity of this kind, and few firms are apparently willing to 
undertake such tasks” (Fredland, 2004: 207-208). Perhaps the best known company within 
this category is Executive Outcomes, which was relatively overt regarding its contracts, 
compared to many of today’s private military and security companies. Other companies that 
possibly can be placed in the same category are Sandline International, and perhaps Gurkha 
Security Guards (Fredland, 2004: 208). However, the companies providing non-combat 
services are numerous, and they perform a variety of roles. MPRI is often categorised as a 
military support company providing tactical training and advice on force. Furthermore, 
DynCorp is considered a nonlethal service provider which delivers specialised services with, 
but not exclusively, military applications (Fredland, 2004: 208).  
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This distinction is central in analysing the development of the private security industry. While 
Executive Outcomes was relatively open in terms of its activities, companies within the 
industry today remain secretive about the details of their contracts. There is no ‘evidence’ to 
claim that EO’s openness was the very reason for its closure, although, it certainly drew a 
great deal of attention to the new corporate mercenary organisations. As discussed in Chapter 
2, EO’s relationship with its home government in South Africa was problematic, and the 
subsequent regulatory framework essentially led to its closure in 1999. One might argue that 
the criticism that followed in the wake of their activities led the private security industry to 
devolve its focus towards new markets thereby illustrating the final advantage that these 
private companies possess (Singer, 2008: 118). Peace operations were a relatively new market 
for the private security industry, and the aftermath of the failure of the US intervention in 
Somalia in 1992, and the subsequent genocide in Rwanda in 1994, only exemplified how the 
international community had become less willing to take on interventions with a humanitarian 
approach, especially in Africa. However, in order to access the market of peace operations, 
the private security industry required to distance itself from the general view that private 
military and security companies were nothing more than corporate mercenary organisations.  
 
In an effort to improve their reputation, the International Peace Operations Association 
(IPOA), a US-based non-profit industry organisation for military service providers has argued 
since its inception in 2001 for the use of the private sector to ease the international 
community’s reluctance to intervene militarily and risk its own soldiers’ lives in conflicts. 
Part of their approach of refurbishment is, amongst other things, to ‘rename’ the private 
security industry to the ‘stability operations industry’ in order to distance itself from the 
negative connotations connected to the industry. IPOA argues that it seeks to promote 
operational and ethical standards for private military and security companies that are active in 
the peace and stability operations industry. The association has over 50 companies listed as 
members, including MPRI and DynCorp. IPOA claims that it “is committed to raising the 
standards of the peace and stability operations industry to ensure sound and ethical 
professionalism and transparency in the conduct of peacekeeping and post-conflict 
reconstruction activities” (IPOA, 2010). All member companies must subscribe to the IPOA 
Code of Conduct, which represents a “constructive effort towards better regulating private 
sector operations in conflict and post-conflict environments” (IPOA, 2010). The organisation 
argues that it is their belief that the need for high standards will both benefit the industry and 
serve the greater causes of peace, development and human security (IPOA, 2010). While the 
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effectiveness of the IPOA in increasing contract rates for its member companies is debatable, 
its use lies in its symbolic role as a unifying factor. It provides a united front for the industry, 
although, the group’s primary function is to provide political representation for the member 
companies. Thus, it does not exercise any real authority over them or their employees. 
However, after previous member Blackwater was implicated in a series of controversial 
shootings in Baghdad on the 16 September 2007, the IPOA put pressure on the company to 
withdraw its membership by preparing to launch an investigation of the company’s conduct 
(Falconer, 2007).  
 
It can be argued that the private security industry to some degree has managed to improve its 
reputation and distance itself from the ‘mercenary’ label. However, this is largely due to its 
increased political influence. John Lovering argues that “the leading defence company of the 
future will be primarily a manipulator of opinions” and that “their key asset is the ability to 
influence the ways in which prospective buyers (governments and armed services) imagine 
the wars of the future” (Lovering, 2000: 174). It is therefore not surprising to find that the 
IPOA was promoting a petition demanding a military intervention in Darfur. However, 
Leander argues that this promoted a general understanding of political priorities in Darfur, 
rather than a well-defined role of private military and security companies (Leander, 2007: 53). 
The need to shape broad political views explains the close links between political 
establishments and the private security industry. Individuals from the political and military 
establishment figure prominently on private military and security company boards. In 
addition, these companies also tend to figure prominently on the agenda of many 
policymakers. Moreover, classical concerns due to the increasing influence of the private 
security industry on politics and policymaking has furthered the question of how this 
influence can be limited (Leander, 2007: 54). Leander points out that one might have 
expected the rise of the private security industry to cause a revisiting of civil-military 
regulation, or more appropriately, of the regulation covering the role of ‘experts’ on violence 
in shaping political priorities, seeing as private military and security companies ultimately are 
agents in their own right over agents of a principal (Leander, 2007: 54).   
 
Singer argues that MPRI’s operations illustrate how the privatisation of military services has 
worked to the advantage of the government (Singer, 2008: 134). The company enables the US 
to maintain a presence in operations in which US military troops cannot officially become 
involved, thereby succeeding in furthering American foreign policy goals. Thus, direct 
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participation can be denied, resulting in the potential of a privatised policy mechanism, at less 
cost and lower political risk. Singer claims that since the L-3 acquisition of MPRI (as 
presented in Chapter 3), the company has become less responsible to the US government 
because its institutional investors are more “concerned with the bottom line than with US 
strategic interests” (Singer, 2008: 134). Singer further argues that, as MPRI tries to maintain 
its place as the favoured consultant to the US military, this could introduce more tension, 
similar to the conflicting motives at play between company and government in the Equatorial 
Guinea contract (Singer, 2008: 134). Furthermore, in relation to US operations on the African 
continent, it seems that DynCorp might challenge MPRI’s role as the preferred private 
security provider in Africa, through its indefinite-delivery AFRICAP contract.  
 
Today’s private military and security companies are able to present rapid deployment 
capacities and specialised capabilities to international peace and stability operations. Their 
comparative advantage comes from their ability to have capable responses and quickly 
assemble experts and specialised material from around the world. The business association of 
IPOA has created more oversight of the industry by representing the private military and 
security companies as a whole group, thus enabling them to interact and coordinate with 
governments and international organisations on a level not available to an individual 
company. The expectations are that industry associations create and enforce professional 
standards and guidelines in cooperation with international contributors (including partners in 
the developmental and humanitarian community of non-state actors, national governments 
and the UN). Furthermore, “potential clients are increasingly becoming aware of the value of 
trade associations, and recognise the necessity of ensuring that the companies they hire are 
willing and able to adhere to internally recognised industry codes of conduct” (Wright and 
Brooke, 2007: 109-110). Market allocation of security was never completely eliminated in the 
modern era; however, it was frowned upon. Avant argues that this prompted private security 
to become informally organised, secretive and directed to a specific customer base (Avant, 
2008: 447). Mercenaries operated in the shadows, similar to the covert private military and 
security services that were provided to individual governments. In the current system, 
however, private military and security companies have a corporate structure and operate 
openly, posting job listings on their websites and writing papers and articles considering the 
costs and benefits of the private actors in the security sphere. They have sought, and achieved, 
some degree of international acceptance (Avant, 2008: 447). 
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4.8. The impact of EO, MPRI and DynCorp on peace operations  
Private military and security companies do not necessarily help towards consolidating or 
constructing a centralised, legal-rational Weberian state (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2008: 
139). Abrahamsen and Williams argue that “weak states often lack the ability to deal with the 
consequences of privatization, and that the diffusion of control that results from hiring private 
forces may weaken rather than consolidate state authority” (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2008: 
139). The classic example is the activities of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone. The 
company was hired to fight the advancing RUF rebels, and the government managed to 
temporarily strengthen its power. However, when the contract with EO was terminated, the 
RUF advanced again and, in the long-term, the state’s ability to control the use of force seems 
to have been further eroded through the contract with the company. Ambrahamsen and 
Williams argue (2008: 139) that power and control were diffused towards EO, as they gained 
influence over key political decisions. Military outsourcing also strengthened local forces 
such as the Kamajor militias (as discussed in Chapter 3). Considering that the Kamajors’ 
primary loyalty was not necessarily to the government, but to their ethnic chiefs, it can be 
argued that “the contract with EO can be seen to have created future challenges for state 
reconstruction and consolidation” (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2008: 140). In addition, 
because EO’s contracts were secured by private military and security companies in return for 
future mining profits, their ultimate purpose should be questioned (Abrahamsen, 2008: 140). 
 
Schreier and Caparini argue that “from an operational perspective, outsourcing is supposed to 
improve flexibility and relieve pressures on support personnel” (Schreier and Caparini, 2005: 
47). It is essential for any operation to be able to adapt its logistics structures and procedures 
to changing situations and missions, and a certain level of flexibility is thus required. Schreier 
and Caparini argue that “one of the most obvious downsides of going into battle with civilians 
is the loss of flexibility” (Schreier and Caparini, 2005: 47). For that reason, the national armed 
forces involved in an operation must have adequate information and awareness of the 
contractors working in, and around, their areas of responsibility in order to resolve the 
challenges inherent in using private military and security companies. For instance, the 
coordination of the movements of the private military and security companies is crucial if the 
national armed forces are to manage the available assets and capabilities efficiently. However, 
this visibility is often difficult to establish since private military and security companies are 
not part of the official chain of command and, thus, are not “subject to the same orders that 
apply to soldiers regarding good order and discipline” (Schreier and Caparini, 2005: 47).  
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 McFate argues that security is a precondition for sustainable development, thus security sector 
reform (SSR) is essential in the transition from war to peace in conflict-affected areas. SSR 
refers to the complex task of transforming the security sector into “professional, effective, 
legitimate, apolitical, and accountable actors” (McFate, 2008b: 1). Beyond Afghanistan and 
Iraq, SSR efforts by the United States are fragmented within the bureaucracy, with large 
portions being outsourced to the private sector. DynCorp, for instance, provides employees to 
staff US police contingents in UN police forces. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the US military has 
used a variety of soldiers and civilian contract personnel to train and advise local police and 
judicial personnel. According to McFate, “putting the military in charge of the civilian 
components of SSR has been greatly disappointing” (McFate, 2008b: 14). While the US 
Department of Defense would like to return this responsibility to the US State Department, 
the lack of personnel and material resources makes it uncertain whether the State Department 
could manage these programmes. The lack of capabilities and capacity within the US 
government for SSR programmes has led to the outsourcing of most operational aspects of 
such programmes to the private security industry. For instance, companies such as DynCorp 
and MPRI have conducted SSR activities in Iraq, Afghanistan, Liberia, Nigeria and Sudan on 
behalf of the US government. Furthermore, the US State Department’s GPOI programme was, 
until recently, outsourced in its entirety to private military and security companies (as 
mentioned in Chapter 3). McFate argues that, there has yet to be a serious debate within the 
US government about appropriate areas of activity for the rapidly increasing private security 
industry; “its effective regulation and oversight; and its impact on foreign policy articulation, 
implementation, and outcomes” (McFate, 2008b: 16). Nevertheless, as discussed previously 
in this chapter, the Obama administration has implemented reforms in order to decrease 
government use of private actors in the security sector. Whether this implementation will be 
successful, or whether the private security industry has become an indispensable part of US 
military operations, remains to be seen.  
 
The essence of the private security industry is to provide capabilities to the client. When it 
comes to establishing peace within an unstable state, companies have two such capabilities 
that could be provided, namely security and services. How they are utilised in operations for 
creating peace differs from peace operations and supporting a military operation. For instance, 
whereas most of the companies currently operating in Iraq are there in support of the US 
military, in a peace operation the focus would be on supporting the people of the country. 
 89
This difference is significant, because it shifts the paradigm from being one of fighting the 
citizenry to one of cooperating with them. The ability to establish a self-sustaining 
infrastructure through both construction and the training local specialists is crucial to 
maintaining stability after the private military and security companies leave. However, Aning 
et al. voice concerns that US policy in Africa, especially, demonstrates a lack of sustained 
policy engagement with African countries that should be the primary beneficiaries of such 
programmes (Aning et al., 2008). Thus, the initiatives of the US and the private security 
industry can be viewed as serving the interests of the United States rather than the African 
countries in question.   
 
The increase in the use of private military and security companies has to be understood in the 
context of US reluctance to get involved in African conflicts. Some observers would also 
argue that the policy on the use of such companies in Africa is linked to the global war on 
terror and US strategy to secure access to African natural resources. Other important factors 
include the reduction in the strength of the armies of Western militaries (Aning et al., 2008: 
615). Due to these developments, Western militaries, and the US military in particular, have 
become over-tasked in their involvement in global military affairs, and thus it has become 
increasingly difficult for them to position sufficient troops in operations around the world. 
This is particularly evident in relation to conflicts in Africa, a continent traditionally viewed 
as being of little strategic relevance. In order to address this security deficit, hiring support 
within the private security industry to provide military training to foreign militaries has 
become a practical necessity.  
 
Following this argument is the question whether the private security industry can support 
long-term solutions to conflict; Krahmann argues that, since private military and security 
companies essentially are profit-oriented, they will only be available as long as a state can 
fund a particular project (Krahmann, 2007: 101). Since post-conflict states often have limited 
resources, private military and security assistance might have to be limited to a few selected 
programmes. Generally, the transformation to democratic security sector governance is often 
deemed less important than short-term safety and stability (Krahmann, 2007: 101). Therefore, 
the increased dependence on the private security industry, especially by the USA, can prove 
critical should a situation arise where, for some reason, private services are not available. 
Singer argues that private military and security companies are only capable of providing 
temporary means of sustaining the existing order or providing the training and support 
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functions needed to conduct peace operations. However, the private security industry does not 
address the underlying causes of conflict (Singer, 2008: 186-187). This responsibility still 
remains within the realm of the state. 
 
4.9. Conclusion 
This chapter has assessed the impact of the private security industry in peacebuilding efforts 
in African conflicts, and the subsequent implications for the exercise of legitimate authority 
and violence. The conclusion can be drawn that the relationship between the United Nations 
and the private security industry has been relatively ambivalent. However, the elaboration of a 
possible new Convention, on the regulation of the private security industry, has reaffirmed the 
UN principle that states should retain the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. 
Furthermore, this chapter has examined the increased reliance on the private security industry 
in United States policy towards Africa. While this issue has largely been ignored in the past, 
recent reforms by the Obama administration aims to reduce the outsourcing of critical 
government functions. In addition, this chapter has assessed the political influence of the 
private security industry and the changing nature of the private security industry. It has been 
argued that neo-liberal forms of government, and the consequent enabling of non-state forms 
of authority, has led to increased political involvement by the private security industry in 
establishing priorities, as well as security concerns. Additionally, through the establishment of 
IPOA, the private security industry has, to some degree, managed to improve its reputation 
and distance itself from the ‘mercenary’ label. Finally, this chapter has discussed the impact 
of Executive Outcomes, MPRI and DynCorp on peace operations. The lack of capacity and 
resources amongst Western militaries has impeded their ability to position sufficient troops in 
operations around the world. This has made hiring support within the private security industry 
practically necessary, and this is perhaps, particularly evident in relation to the military 
training of armed forces in African countries. The next chapter concludes the findings of this 
thesis, and presents the answers to the research questions put forward in this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 91
Chapter 5. Conclusion 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This thesis has focused on assessing the impact of the private security industry on peace 
operations and peacebuilding efforts in Africa. Furthermore, this thesis has discussed the 
implications that the influence of the private security industry has on the traditional notion of 
the state as the sole legitimate actor in the use of force. This has been done by exploring the 
changing activities of three private military and security companies, from Executive 
Outcomes to Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) and DynCorp. The final 
chapter will begin by summarising the findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. The next 
section will revisit the problem statement and discuss in what way the findings from Chapter 
4 have shed light on the research questions put forward. The latter part of the chapter will 
discuss the implications of the findings and potential issues for future research of the private 
security industry.  
 
5.2. Findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 
This thesis has focused on the implications of the private security industry for state authority 
and peacebuilding efforts in Africa. The changing nature of the private security industry, from 
the activities of Executive Outcomes to those of MPRI and DynCorp, has in many ways 
altered the way the industry needs to be analysed. Especially, the relatively recent increased 
influence of private military and security companies in United States-Africa relations has 
raised concern about the growing dependence on the private security industry.  
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis presented the growth of the private security industry. The history of 
mercenaries reveals that hiring outsiders to fight your battles is a common practice throughout 
the times. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 largely solidified the emergence of the state by 
preserving the importance of sovereignty over affairs within borders, including the legitimate 
exercise of force. The activities of the mercenaries in post-colonial Africa in the 1960s 
prompted the United Nations and other international bodies to seek out the regulation of 
mercenary organisations. In 1977 mercenaries were given legal status within international 
humanitarian law with the adoption of Article 47 to Additional Protocol I of the Geneva 
Convention. However, while the Convention give mercenaries legal status within 
international humanitarian law, they have proved inefficient regarding the private security 
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industry that exists today. The Convention was worded in its specific manner in order to allow 
states to retain the right to hire foreign soldiers as part of their national forces. Chapter 2 
further discussed the process of globalisation and the emergence of neo-liberalism as drivers 
for the development of non-state actors increasingly taking on functions previously associated 
with the state, thereby creating an alternative to global governance. The privatisation of 
security is particularly controversial; however, the private security industry has gained 
legitimacy over time. The rapid growth of the industry came as a result of the general 
reduction in military spending after the Cold War and the subsequent changes in security 
threats, as well as technological and financial developments that made small organisations 
able to wage war. Furthermore, the increasing reluctance of the United Nations and its 
member states to intervene in conflicts on the African continent since the 1990s has created 
further markets for private military and security companies. Chapter 2 also outlined the 
history of the concepts of United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Due to the 
decreased willingness by Western states to intervene in African conflicts, the private security 
industry has sought to fill the subsequent security vacuum. While the United Nations has 
publicly remained reluctant to outsource peacekeeping, private military and security 
companies are playing an increasingly important role in terms of support functions in the 
peace operations of the United Nations and of regional organisations such as the African 
Union. Recently there has been a greater focus on Security Sector Reform (SSR) within 
peacebuilding initiatives, and a great deal of that aspect is outsourced to the private security 
industry.  
 
Chapter 3 of this thesis presented the case studies of three private military and security 
companies, namely the now defunct South African-based Executive Outcomes, and the 
American-based MPRI and DynCorp. These specific companies were chosen in order to 
illustrate the different categories of companies within the industry, as well as the diverse 
activities performed by these companies. EO is generally considered a private military 
company, meaning that it was a commercial entity conducting combat or combat support 
operations. EO had strong corporate connections to mining companies, which often enabled 
their operations. Although EO received much criticism for their ‘interference’ in conflict 
situations, the company was relatively open about its operations, which perhaps came as a 
surprise to many observers. Nevertheless, EO became renowned for their effectiveness and 
expertise in low-intensity conflicts. MPRI has specialised itself in military training, and has 
played a large part in US initiatives to train African militaries in order for African countries to 
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establish peacekeeping operations on their own. ACRI, ACOTA and GPOI are examples of 
such initiatives. Although playing minor roles initially, by the time GPOI was initiated, 
private contractors were conducting the majority of the training, while military officials 
played only a minor role. Furthermore, like MPRI, DynCorp has managed to establish itself as 
one of the major private military and security companies that operates in Africa. Since 2004, 
DynCorp has held (together with three other companies) umbrella contracts with the US State 
Department for peacekeeping and the capacity enhancement of African militaries, as well as 
for personnel supporting UN and AU peace operations. Their recent activities in Somalia in 
particular have drawn attention as a result of their extensive involvement, from the initial 
planning to the implementation of the operation. MPRI and DynCorp are different from EO in 
that they enjoy the benefits of a close relationship with their home government. This could be 
one of the reasons why EO closed down in 1999, while MPRI and DynCorp continue to 
thrive. It can be argued that MPRI and DynCorp function as extensions of the US military and 
as instruments of US foreign policy by taking on tasks the US military cannot undertake, 
either due to the sensitive nature of the mission or the lack of available personnel due to other 
commitments.  
 
5.3. Answering the research questions 
This section will address the findings of the research questions as outlined in Chapter 1. This 
research has been a qualitative study, with a descriptive purpose. Furthermore, this study has 
included elements of exploratory research, in order to investigate and assess the phenomenon 
of privatised security and the following implications for state authority and the legitimate use 
of force. Therefore, the findings from Chapter 4 are discussed in this section rather than in the 
previous, as they form part of the answers to the research objectives. In Chapter 4, this thesis 
made an assessment of the impact of the private security industry on peacebuilding initiatives 
in Africa. Furthermore, Chapter 4 discussed the implications of the private security industry 
for the traditional notion of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force.  
 
5.3.1. The role of the United Nations   
Through case studies, this thesis has illustrated the lack of willingness amongst UN member 
states to contribute funds and troops to multinational peace operations. This has resulted in the 
presence of private military and security companies in more or less all UN peace operations 
since the 1990s, whether it be in support functions or for equipment delivery. While the UN 
might acknowledge the potential of the private security industry, the organisation remains 
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ambivalent about recognising its growing authority. Not until recently did the organisation 
start elaborating the possibility of adopting a new Convention that is better suited to today’s 
private security industry in the hope of better regulation and oversight. This work was done 
through the UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries. The purpose of the proposed 
Convention would be to reaffirm the principle that states should retain the monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force. In order to achieve this, the Convention would ban the outsourcing of 
inherent state functions and lift all immunity agreements that cover private military and 
security companies.  
 
5.3.2. US dependency on the private security industry 
While much research has been done on the activities of EO, similar attention has not been 
paid to the increased involvement of American-based private military and security companies 
in Africa. The US has become a leading contender when it comes to hiring private companies 
to conduct military training and military-related activities on the African continent, 
particularly post-9/11. MPRI and DynCorp are two of the major American-based companies 
that operate throughout Africa, primarily employed by the US State Department and the US 
Department of Defense. The Bush administration in particular contributed to an increase in 
the outsourcing of security, a trend that the Obama administration seeks to reverse, as stated 
in its 2010 budget. In addition, the outsourcing of large parts of initiatives like the GPOI is 
being criticised for reducing or avoiding the direct involvement of US military troops in 
African peacebuilding and peacekeeping efforts. Despite this criticism, the programme seems 
to be somewhat influential in raising the capabilities of African countries to deal with 
complex emergencies on their own. Although the US has stated its intention to reduce the 
outsourcing of security functions, it is likely that private military and security companies will 
remain important in its peace initiatives in Africa for some time. Furthermore, Chapter 4 
discussed whether the US had become excessively dependent on the private security industry. 
The findings of this thesis illustrates that outsourcing has become well-established in the 
American state system, and that private military and security companies are employed by the 
entire US government and the major Departments. Furthermore, in 2009, the US was 
criticised by the UN Working Group on the use mercenaries for a lack of oversight and 
transparency, despite the introduction of mechanisms to better monitor the activities of the 
private security industry.  
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The concerns are that, by becoming too dependent on the private services, national armies 
will no longer have the skills or equipment to perform the tasks that have been privatised. The 
important question is thus, in times of complex emergencies or crisis, can one trust that the 
service of the private security industry will continue? The risk is that, in such situations, the 
private military and security companies might be unwilling to comply with the needs of the 
state, for whatever reason. The fact that these companies are not obligated in the same sense 
as national armies to take on any operation can create potentially dangerous situations in the 
absence of security and protection.   
 
5.3.3. Impact on state authority and the legitimate use of force 
The influence and authority of the private security industry is also becoming an important 
actor in setting the political agenda by becoming involved in decision-making and policy 
management, thereby being viewed as security experts to a certain extent. For instance, the 
private security industry has been invited on several occasions by the US Congress to 
hearings on the development of peacekeeping. The industry itself actively seeks to influence 
politics for the reason that its business depends on what happens to political priorities. While 
the emergence of private military and security companies certainly has altered the relationship 
between the public and the private sphere, it does not mean that the state is becoming less 
significant. For instance, the private security industry is also dependent on the state through 
legal frameworks. Chapter 4 suggests that perhaps what is being altered is the way the state 
and the markets are perceived in the modern system. However, the private security industry 
can also be of danger to newly emerging states in the sense that they might fail to establish 
stable national armies because of reliance on private military and security companies. There is 
a concern that the outsourcing of the training of African militaries can make it difficult for 
African states to control and influence their own armies, because they are not in control of the 
training themselves. Furthermore, the armies may be trained in such a way that their 
perceptions of threats are not in accordance with their home government or even with the real 
security threats their particular country is facing. This could certainly damage civil-military 
relations and lead to the weakening of state security institutions in the future.  
 
5.3.4. The changing nature of private military and security companies 
This thesis has illustrated the changes in the nature of private military and security companies, 
from the former EO to MPRI and DynCorp. It has been argued that many commentators were 
surprised about the openness of EO regarding its activities, besides for the issue of payment 
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and payment methods (in mining concessions etc.). Today there seems to be increased secrecy 
surrounding the details of the contracts entered into by these companies. While MPRI and 
DynCorp tend to be relatively open about their payments and existence, not much has been 
written about the details of their operations.  
 
The failure of the international community in Rwanda in 1994, and the failed intervention in 
Somalia in 1992, in many ways opened up a new market for private contractors. Due to the 
scepticism of private military and security companies in the 1990s, the industry recognised 
the need to improve its reputation in order to access the market of peace operations. 
Companies such as MPRI and DynCorp have managed to keep close contact with their home 
governments, which arguably has been a crucial factor in their growing business. 
Furthermore, the companies today have sought to distance themselves from the activities of 
companies such as EO in the 1990s, by avoiding operations involving elements of direct 
combat. Their focus on military training and support functions has been successful in a post-
9/11 environment, which has seen the emergence of new security threats and an increased 
demand for a military presence. The establishment of IPOA in 2001 was part of this new 
approach. IPOA argues that it seeks to promote operational and ethical standards for private 
military and security companies that are active in the peace and stability operations industry, 
and that its effectiveness lies in its symbolic role as a unifying factor. The association’s 
primary function is to provide political representation for the member companies, and it does 
not exercise any real authority over them. However, it has been known to put pressure on its 
members to follow a certain Code of Conduct.  
 
5.4. Implications of the findings and the way forward 
Although the proposed new Convention put forward by the UN Working Group is a positive 
development in that the UN reaffirms its stance when it comes to the private security industry, 
it is questionable whether it will be adopted. Previous Conventions have also been 
unsuccessful in terms of regulating the growing industry, mainly due to wording and 
definitional issues. Article 47 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention is not 
particularly useful today, because its definition of a mercenary is reserved for individuals, not 
corporate enterprises. Furthermore, the definition was worded in this specific manner to allow 
states to retain the right to hire foreign soldiers as part of their national forces.  
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The findings of this thesis indicate that many countries do not want stricter regulation or 
elimination of the private security industry, for the reason that these companies are viewed as 
valuable assets in fulfilling foreign policy objectives that for various reasons cannot be 
fulfilled by national armies. While the additional regulation should be welcomed, the 
Working Group itself realises that it will not be sufficient to keep control over the private 
security industry. The Chair of the Working Group, José-Luis Gómez del Prado, recognises 
that “there remains a legal gap covering such activities at the international level” (OHCHR, 
2010b). It can be argued that the proposed new Convention will face the same challenges as 
Article 47, namely, that throughout the adoption process, many states will work to ensure that 
the phrasing is diffused thereby making the Convention not enforceable in reality or having 
considerable loopholes. In addition, it is likely that many states will refuse to adopt the new 
Convention at all, perhaps especially the US, which is highly dependent on the private 
security industry and would want to avoid any legally binding commitments. This is a 
challenge faced by the UN in decision-making processes other issues as well. Considering 
that the UN functions as an arena for cooperation between states with states, with the states 
being the main actors, it will be difficult to reach similar grounds on a binding Convention 
prohibiting the outsourcing of particular functions of the state as long as many states regard 
the outsourcing security to be a useful tool.   
 
The findings of this thesis indicate that the problems related to the private security industry 
tend to arise because there is little openness and oversight between the private and the public 
spheres. The lack of availability of details surrounding the specifics of the private military and 
security companies’ contracts and activities makes it difficult to analyse and undertake an 
assessment of the implications of their operations. Furthermore, the criticism received by the 
US from the UN Working Group for the lack of transparency between the state and the 
private security industry shows that not even states have full control over the activities of the 
private military and security companies working for them. The secrecy surrounding the 
private security industry therefore adds to the problem of the role of the state and control over 
the legitimate use of force. However, this thesis has indicated that it is still within the interests 
of states to remain, if no longer the sole, then the main actor, in wielding legitimate force. In 
order to maintain this position, some form of regulation is necessary. There seems to be great 
consensus among academics that some form of regulation of the private security industry is 
needed. Up to this point, the private security industry has recognised the need for self-
regulation in order to better its reputation and this is perhaps the only form of functioning 
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regulation of the industry at the international level today. Perhaps the problems with adopting 
an appropriate international legal framework have contributed to the recent discussions among 
academics and in the industry itself of in what areas private military and security companies 
can best be utilised.  
 
While the private security industry has managed to improve its reputation over the last 
decade, the concerns about its activities and general existence remain the same. The ongoing 
process of the UN regarding the adoption of a new Convention on the use of mercenaries, 
aimed at restricting outsourcing of state functions, has been an anticipated and sought-after 
development that reaffirms the UN’s attitude towards the growing private security industry. 
While it might not be enough to halt the increasing influence of the industry in the near future, 
it certainly demonstrates that a significant message is being sent that the need for regulation is 
essential.  
 
5.5. Potential issues for future research of the private security industry 
In order to fully determine how the private security industry affects the nature and authority of 
the state, it is necessary with broader and more detailed studies of its activities and the results 
emerging from its growing influence in peace and stability operations. To be able conduct 
such studies, regulation to improve the transparency of the private security industry must be in 
place. As the situation remains today, the lack of insight into the details of the private military 
and security companies’ contracts makes it difficult to construct a comprehensive 
understanding about their impact. Seeing that there seems to be a constant need to improve its 
image, it is possible that the need for greater openness will be recognised by the industry itself 
after the debate that is certain to come as the negotiations on the new Convention take place in 
the near future.  
 
In future research it would be necessary to re-examine the outdated assumptions about the 
exclusive role of the state in the sphere of defence and security. Schreier and Caparini argue 
that “a broadening of civil-military relations theory to allow for the influence of third parties 
is an example of how this can be done without threatening the core of the theory” (Schreier 
and Caparini, 2005: 13). Furthermore, the increased influence of the private security industry 
raises possibilities and dilemmas that are equally undeniable in an academic sense as by real-
world relevance. Thus, it would seem to be essential that the understanding of these new 
players in international security is further expanded and developed.  
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